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PREFACE
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Public Law 91-596) states 
that the purpose of Congress expressed in the Act is "to assure so far as 
possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful
working conditions and to preserve our human resources... b y a m o n g  other
things, "providing for research in the field of occupational safety and
health...and by developing innovative methods, techniques, and approaches 
for dealing with occupational safety and health problems." Later in the 
Act, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) is 
charged with carrying out this policy. One method by which NIOSH responds 
to this charge is to publish Technical Guidelines.
Technical Guidelines present the results of comprehensive systematic 
analyses of occupational hazards, and suggestions for preventing injury and 
disease among workers. They are intended to supplement existing Federal
safety and health standards and may provide background useful in formulating 
new standards for development. In the interest of wide dissemination of 
this information, NIOSH distributes Technical Guidelines to other 
appropriate agencies, organized labor, industry, and public interest 
groups. We welcome suggestions concerning the content, style, and 
distribution of these documents.
This particular document addresses workers engaged in land-based oil and gas 
well drilling operations. It was prepared by the staff of the Division of 
Safety Research in conjunction with the Division of Standards Development 
and Technology Transfer, NIOSH. I am pleased to acknowledge the 
contributions made by consultants and reviewers, in particular the 
International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC), the American 
Petroleum Institute (API), representatives of other Federal agencies, other 
reviewers, and the staff of the Institute. However, responsibility for the 
conclusions and recommendations belongs solely to the Institute. All 
comments by reviewers, whether or not incorporated into the final version, 
are being sent with this document to the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) for consi - ■ •
Director, National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health 
Centers for Disease Control
iii
ABSTRACT
This report serves as an informative analysis of the safety hazards to which 
workers are exposed during the drilling of land-based oil and gas wells. 
Comprehensive safety recommendations are presented for the control of worker 
exposure to the hazards associated with the performance and/or use of the 
tasks, tools, equipment, and work practices in the drilling of land-based 
oil and gas wells.
The magnitude of the occupational safety problem in land-based oil and gas 
well drilling is defined through the development of data estimating the 
injury and illness incidence rates for the industry (SIC 1381). A detailed 
analysis of 738 accident case histories from Federal and State OSHA 
investigations, as well as workers' compensation injury reports, identifies 
which tasks, tools, and equipment are the most hazardous to the worker and 
how the worker is injured during well drilling operations. Recommendations 
are presented for engineering controls and/or operational safe work 
practices to reduce the occupational hazards of drilling operations.
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Based on U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
reports, it is estimated that employees in the oil and gas field service 
industries (Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 138) were injured at 
about twice the rate of general industry employees from 1972 through 1980. 
During this study, examination of three separate sources of injury data 
(Chapter III) indicated that in the oil and gas well drilling! industry 
(SIC 1381) workers (excluding clerical and administrative support personnel) 
may have been injured at an even higher rate. Calculations based on these 
sources of injury data have produced yearly injury incidence rates that 
range from 11.2 (lost-time injuries only, as computed by the International 
Association of Drilling Contractors) to 49.4 (compensable injuries recorded 
by the Texas Workers' Compensation State Board of Insurance) incidents per 
100 person-years. The workers involved in drilling activities, the 
population at risk in this study, increased in number from approximately 
25,000 in 1971 to nearly 80,000 in 1980.
Employees who work on drilling rigs may be injured while performing tasks 
and using equipment unique to well drilling operations; furthermore, these 
tasks and operations are not specifically addressed by existing Federal 
occupational safety and health standards. The Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) General Industry Standards (29 CFR 1910) are 
applicable to many of the general tasks, equipment, and conditions that are 
present at well drilling operations; e.g., welding and cutting, scaffolding, 
handtools, ladders, hydrogen sulfide exposure levels and electrical
equipment. However, many of the tasks, equipment, and conditions present at
well drilling sites are not specifically regulated by existing Federal 
safety standards. Some of these include:
o Tongs
o Rotary tables and bushings
o Catheads and catlines
o Elevators and slips
o Drill pipe and casing
o Derrick operations
o Making and breaking drill pipe connections
o Well blowout
o Hydrogen sulfide monitoring.
The scope of this report is to identify the hazards resulting in accidents 
and injuries during the performance of oil and gas well drilling operations
1 The term "oil and gas well drilling" as used in this report refers to 
"land-based oil and gas well drilling."
(SIC 1381), and to recommend safe work practices and technologic 
improvements that will reduce worker exposure to the identified hazards.
The multiplicity of well servicing and completion operations, as performed 
by SIC 1389 companies, has not been included in the statistical development 
of this document; however, this is not intended to exclude servicing and 
completion contractors from utilizing all applicable safety recommendations 
presented in Chapter IV.
Chapter II discusses the processes and technologies used to drill oil and 
gas wells and defines the population at risk in the industry. Chapter III 
defines the problems: injury incidence rates for the population at risk are 
presented, and hazardous tasks are identified. Chapter IV presents 
comprehensive safety recommendations for the oil and gas well drilling 
industry. Appendix A presents representative case histories of oil and gas 
well drilling accidents that further demonstrate the uniqueness of drilling 
operations. An evaluation of the applicability of existing standards 
(State, Federal, international, and consensus) to oil and gas well drilling 
operations, and specifically to situations involving unique drilling 
equipment and tasks, is presented in Appendix B. A glossary of general 
industry terms is also included at the end of this report.
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CHAPTER II
DESCRIPTION OF THE OIL AND GAS WELL DRILLING INDUSTRY
The first section of this chapter briefly describes the oil and gas field 
industries that interact in developing an oil or gas well; the next section 
describes the technology and processes used by oil and gas well drilling 
companies; and the final section assesses the population at risk in the oil 
and gas well drilling industry.
This document is specifically directed toward tasks associated with oil and 
gas well drilling and, concomitantly, those industries performing the 
drilling (SIC 1381). To facilitate an understanding of the development of 
an oil well, an overview of all tasks necessary to complete a well is 
presented in the following section.
A. General Structure of the Oil and Gas Field Industry
Oil and gas field companies (SIC 138) perform tasks associated with the 
construction of oil or gas wells and the subsequent maintenance of a 
producing field. The industry is composed of companies that erect the rig 
and drill the hole (SIC 1381); companies that provide ancillary services 
such as well completion, casing, and perforating (SIC 1389); and companies 
that offer exploratory services (SIC 1382).
The size of the drilling rig, the number of employees, and the duration of 
the drilling operation depends on the depth of the well to be drilled, which 
may range from a few hundred feet to over 30,000 feet. Drilling times tend 
to increase exponentially with well depth and may vary from a week to more 
than 2 years.
As many as 20 different companies may perform their specialized operations 
at each well site. The scope of this document is limited to the tasks and 
operations performed in drilling a well. Figure II-l is a flow chart 
showing the individual operations (underscored in the section below) 
required in the construction and maintenance of a producing well, starting 
from the geological survey.
Once a well site has been selected by a geological survey team, the site 
preparation will usually be subcontracted to a company specializing in 
earthmoving operations. This contractor will level the site, dig and dike 
any required reservoirs, and excavate the cellar. The "spudding-in" of the 
starter hole and running of conductor casing may be subcontracted to a 
service company, or the drilling contractor may choose to perform this task 
itself after it has erected the derrick. The surface casing will then be 
cemented in place to ensure well integrity and blowout prevention. 
Meanwhile, a trucking company will be transporting the drilling rig and
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FIGURE II-l. TASKS NECESSARY TO DRILL AND MAINTAIN A PRODUCING OIL OR GAS WELL
acc es so r ie s  to  the well  s i t e  for  assembly and e r e c t i o n  by the d r i l l i n g  
c o n t r a c to r .  As the well  d r i l l i n g  proceeds,  i t  i s  probable t h a t  in te rm edia te  
p ro te c t iv e  cas ings w i l l  have to  be run and cemented in  p lace .  I f  the d r i l l  
s t r i n g  breaks and a se c t io n  i s  l o s t  in  the well  bore,  then a f i sh in g  company 
may be con trac ted  to  remove the p o r t io n  of  broken d r i l l  s t r i n g  remaining in  
the well  bore .
When the well  depth has reached the hydrocarbon-bear ing formation, a logging 
company may be h i red  to  t e s t  the formation fo r  o i l  and gas product ion 
p o t e n t i a l .  I f  the well  i s  to  be completed—t h a t  i s ,  i f  the well  bore has 
pene t ra ted  a formation t h a t  con ta in s  commercial q u a n t i t i e s  of o i l  and/or  
gas—then product ion cas ing w i l l  be run, sometimes by a c o n t r a c to r  who 
s p e c ia l i z e s  in  t h i s  s e rv ic e .  Usually the d r i l l i n g  c o n t r a c t o r ' s  r i g  remains 
o n s i t e  during the running and cementing of product ion  cas ing .  Once the 
cas ing has been cemented, f requen t ly  a company s p e c ia l i z in g  in  well  
p e r fo r a t in g  i s  engaged.
Many hydrocarbon-bear ing formations can be s t im ula ted  to  produce a t  f a s t e r  
r a t e s  than i n i t i a l l y  evidenced. Pressure  f r a c tu r in g  or ac id iz in g  companies 
may be used to improve formation c han ne l iza t ion .  Bai l ing  may be necessary 
to remove sand from the pe r fo ra ted  a rea ,  or the well  may have to be 
swabbed. F in a l ly ,  once well  product ion has been maximized, a "Christmas
t r e e "  may be added i f  the well  i s  a flowing g;as w e l l ,  or a pump may be
i n s t a l l e d  i f  i t  i s  an o i l  producer .  Most new o i l  w e l l s ,  l i k e  gas w e l l s ,
w i l l  flow on th e i r  own.
Addi tional s t im u la t io n  and well  se rv ice  may be requ ired  throughout the 
producing l i f e  of a we l l .  Hot o i l  or scraping may be used to remove
p a r a f f i n  buildup in the cas ing .
The a dd i t ion  of d e t e r g e n t s , d e f l o c c u l a n t s , or o ther  chemicals may be 
requ ired  to mainta in  the flow r a t e .  Acid izing or p ressure  f r a c tu r in g  may 
again  be necessary.
B. Well D r i l l i n g  Technology and Process Descr ip t ions
The following process d e s c r ip t io n s  concen tra te  on the a c t i v i t i e s  a ssoc ia ted  
with o i l  and gas well  d r i l l i n g  (SIC 1381). Hazardous exposures a s soc ia ted  
with these  ta sks  are mentioned ( b r i e f l y )  and d e t a i l e d  in  Chapter I I I .
1. Rigging-Up
Before descr ib ing  the func t iona l  components of  a d r i l l i n g  ope ra t ion  and 
t h e i r  a t tendan t  haza rds ,  i t  i s  necessary  to  mention r igg ing-up ;  i . e . ,  
assembling and e re c t in g  the d e r r i c k  and a s so c ia te d  gear .  This phase,  
however, i s  s im i l a r  to  many o ther  r igg ing  opera t ions  with common 
procedures and hazards  and does not req u i re  sp e c ia l  t reatment in t h i s  
study.  Equipment i s  designed fo r  rap id  assembly and economy of  labor .  
In most cases ,  i t  i s  off loaded from trucks  by winch and skid 
techniques .  The su b s t ru c tu re  supporting the d r i l l  deck and d e r r i c k  is  
e i t h e r  placed i n t a c t  or assembled over a p rev ious ly  completed c e l l a r .
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In many in s ta nc es ,  the  spudding- in,  or  augering of the la rge-d iam eter  
s t a r t e r  ho le ,  w i l l  have been completed e a r l i e r  by a c o n t r a c to r  us ing a 
workover r i g .  In t h i s  case the spud hole  w i l l  be l ined  with conductor 
cas ing ,  which i s  l i k e ly  to  be cemented in  p lace .  Then the d r i l l i n g  r ig  
w i l l  be assembled ( r igged-up)  and used to d r i l l  the hole  below the 
conductor cas ing .  Surface cas ing i s  then run and cemented.
Techn ical ly ,  the d e r r i c k s  in use today a re ,  for  the most p a r t ,  masts in 
th a t  they are  not e rec ted  p iece  by p iece .  In s tead ,  they a re  r a i s e d  
e i t h e r  by jackkni f ing  or  by hydrau l ic  t e le sc op ing .  On truck-mounted
r i g s  and small workover r i g s ,  guy l i n e s  are  s t rung  from the mast to  the
ground. On la rge  jackkn i fe  masts,  guy l in e s  are not used as they are
s e l f - su p p o r t in g .  An emergency d e r r i c k  l i n e  with escape t r o l l e y  i s
s t rung from the d e r r i c k  board, a l so  c a l l e d  a "monkey board ."  The
hazards of these  ope ra t ions  a re  those commonly a s soc ia ted  with 
cons t ru c t ion  s i t e s  and are not addressed in  t h i s  document.
2. Rotary D r i l l i n g
The func t iona l  components of a ro ta ry  d r i l l i n g  r i g  have been grouped
under these a c t i v i t i e s / s y s t e m s :
o Power genera t ion  and t ransmiss ion  
o Hoisting  the d r i l l  s t r i n g  
o Rotating the d r i l l  s t r i n g  
o C ircu la t ing  f lu id  systems
o M ater ia ls  handling during d r i l l i n g  ope ra t ion s .
These components, described  in  more d e t a i l  below, a re  shown in  a
func t iona l  diagram (Figure I I - 2 )  and are  depic ted  in Figure I I - 3 .
a. Power Generation and Transmission
The primary power source i s  normally one or  more in t e r n a l  
combustion engines .  On l a r g e r ,  modern r i g s ,  the engines a re
f requent ly  loca ted  a t  ground l e v e l ,  100 or more f e e t  from the 
d e r r i c k .  This i s  to  minimize the p o t e n t i a l  of f i r e s  caused by 
engines ig n i t i n g  gases th a t  could escape from the well  bore.  On 
smal ler  r i g s ,  the engines f requent ly  a re  mounted immediately next 
to  the d e r r i c k .  The most common fue l  used i s  d i e s e l ;  but ga so l ine ,  
n a tu r a l  gas,  l i q u e f i e d  petroleum gas ,  and purchased e l e c t r i c i t y  a re  
a l so  used. Typ ica l ly ,  seve ra l  hundred horsepower (HP) w i l l  be 
generated and used on a d r i l l i n g  r i g ,  although a l a r g e r  r i g  may
produce more than 3,000 HP.
The t ransm iss ion  i s  mechanical or e l e c t r i c .  A mechanical 
t ransm iss ion ,  which i s  more common in  o lder  r i g s ,  u t i l i z e s  a 
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FIGURE II-2. FUNCTIONAL AND COMPONENT DIAGRAM OF A ROTARY DRILLING RIG
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and a number of d r iv ing  and dr iven s h a f t s .  An e l e c t r i c  
transmiss ion  i s  more common in  newer equipment.
Most exposures to  hazards  a ssoc ia ted  with the power genera t ion  and 
t ransmiss ion  system occur during maintenance, fu e l in g ,  and 
l u b r i c a t i o n .  Inadequate or nonex is ten t  equipment guards and 
i n e f f e c tu a l  (or  the lack of)  lockout procedures fo r  maintenance 
operat ions  during continuous d r i l l i n g  increase  the r i s k  of physica l  
in ju ry .  Other hazards include high v o l ta g e s ,  chemical in ju ry  to  
the eyes during fu e l in g ,  f i r e ,  and explos ion . The noise  l e v e l s  in  
power genera t ion  a reas  may be h igh,  wi th  the r i s k  of hear ing  lo s s .
b. Hoisting the Drill String
The primary funct ions  of  the h o i s t i n g  appara tus  a re  to  r a i s e  and 
lower the d r i l l  s t r i n g  components during t r ip p in g  and d r i l l  stem 
lengthening opera t ions  and to  support  the d r i l l  s t r i n g  a t  the 
des i red  b i t  weight during d r i l l i n g .  The drawworks i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  a 
r o t a t i n g  spool,  u su a l ly  loca ted  on the d r i l l  deck, c o n t r o l l e d  by a 
c lu tch  and brake system operated  by the d r i l l e r .  The wire rope 
d r i l l  l i n e  runs from the drawworks to  the crown block a t  the top of 
the d e r r i c k ,  and then to  the t r a v e l in g  block and hook, which i s  
a t tached  to  the d r i l l  s t r i n g  during d r i l l i n g  o p e ra t io n s .  The 
d r i l l i n g  l i n e  diameter  and reeving sequence of  the blocks a re  
determined by maximum d r i l l  s t r i n g  weight .  The deadl ine  anchor,  
usua l ly  located on the d e r r i c k  su b s t ru c tu re ,  serves as an 
ad ju s tab le  terminal anchor po in t  fo r  the wire rope (Figure I I - 4 ) . 
Typ ica l ly ,  the dead l i n e  anchor w i l l  be a d ju s ta b le  to allow fo r  the 
con t inua l  a dd i t ion  of new wire rope to  the h o i s t i n g  system.
Employee exposure to hazards associated with hoisting should be 
slight unless structural defects exist or system overloading 
occurs. Routine inspection of elevated hoist mechanisms involves 
the risk of falls. Pinched fingers and injuries from wire rope 
splinters are other hazards.
c. Rotating the Drill String
In addition to rotating the drill string and bit, the rotary table 
provides for free vertical motion of the drill as the bit 
penetrates into the earth. Torque is transmitted from the rotary 
table to the drill by the kelly, which also conveys the drilling 
mud that is pumped into it through a swivel connector.
The k e l ly  i s  a t h r e e - ,  fo u r - ,  s i x - ,  or  e ig h t - s id e d  40- foo t - long  
conduit  ( i . e . ,  longer  than the 30-foot d r i l l  pipe s e c t io n s )  th a t  
threads in to  the d r i l l  pipe and i s  connected to  the h o i s t  t r a v e l in g  
block by the swivel.  The swivel supports the buoyed weight of  the 
d r i l l  s t r i n g  while a llowing the k e l ly  to r o t a t e  and the p re ssu r ized  
d r i l l i n g  f lu id  to  e n te r  the d r i l l  stem. The k e l l y  i s  r o t a t e d  by a 
su i t a b ly  s t ru c tu re d  k e l ly  bushing th a t  t r a n s f e r s  r o t a t i o n a l  force
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FIGURE I 1-4. ROTARY DRILLING RIG HOISTING SYSTEM [1]
Copyright by the Univers i ty  of  Texas a t  Aust in (PETEX).
Reprinted by the Department of  Health and Human Services 
with permission.  Fur ther  reproduct ion  without permission 
of copyright ho lder  p roh ib i t ed .
without impeding the continuous downward movement of the k e l l y .  
During operat ions  such as t r ip p in g ,  the ke l ly  bushing must be 
e a s i ly  removable to  permit the d r i l l  pipe to  be withdrawn from the 
we l l .  When the k e l l y  i s  ho i s ted  and s tored  in  the r a th o le  during a 
t r i p ,  the ke l ly  bushing i s  removed as an i n t e g r a l  p a r t  of the k e l ly  
assembly. To f a c i l i t a t e  th i s  maneuver, the ke l ly  bushing s i t s  
ins ide  a t h r e e - ,  fo u r - ,  s i x - ,  or  e ig h t - s id e d  master bushing th a t  i s  
a f ixed por t ion  of the ro ta ry  t a b l e .  The ro ta ry  ta b le  (and o ther  
r o t a t i n g  p a r t s )  may tu rn  a t  r a t e s  of up to  400 rpm; however, much 
slower speeds are usua l ,  perhaps in  the range of 25-100 rpm. The 
d r i l l e r  operates  the ro ta ry  ta b le  c lu tch  c o n t ro l s  and h o i s t  
c on t ro l s  from the same s t a t i o n .  The power source i s  e i t h e r  an 
e l e c t r i c  motor or mechanical power th a t  i s  connected to  the ro ta ry  
tab le  by a compounded chain d r ive .
10
A ty p ic a l  d r i l l  s t r i n g  c o n s i s t s  of 30-foot s ec t ion s  of d r i l l  p ipe ,  
male and female threaded , t h a t  weigh between 14 and 18 pounds/ foot  
(500 p o u n d s / jo in t ) . Several heavy, th ick -w a l led  j o i n t s  of p ipe ,  
c a l l e d  d r i l l  c o l l a r s ,  are  made up in  the d r i l l  stem, j u s t  above the 
b i t ,  so the b i t  w i l l  pe n e t r a t e  in to  the formation being d r i l l e d .  A 
s ing le  d r i l l  c o l l a r  can weigh between 2,500 and 4,000 pounds (or 
more) depending on i t s  diameter .
The hazards associated with this equipment are discussed in section 
e. , Materials Handling During Drilling Operations, However, it 
should be noted that employee exposure to rotating parts during 
drilling makes this operation one with a high potential for severe 
injuries, although the frequency of occurrence is low. The rotary 
table and kelly bushing are in nearly continuous motion and are not 
usually provided with any guarding mechanism. Contact with either 
is likely to cause slips, falls, and bruising accidents; also, 
there is a risk of being caught between stationary and rotating 
parts.
d. Circulating Fluid Systems
Drilling fluid, or "mud," is typically a mixture of water and 
bentonite (an absorbent, gel-forming clay) and sometimes oil or 
other components. It has four primary functions: cooling,
lubricating, and cleaning the bit; removing the cuttings; providing 
hydrostatic pressure to prevent entry of formation fluids into the 
well bore; and reducing the risk of hazardous blowouts.
Mud pumps force  the mud up a s tandpipe  and through the f l e x i b l e  
k e l ly  hose to the swivel,  where i t  e n te r s  the d r i l l  s t r i n g  v i a  the 
k e l ly  and even tua l ly  emerges a t  the b i t  in  the well  bore.
Continuous p ressure  (up to  3,000 p s i )  fo rces  the mud up the well  
annulus and out the mud r e t u r n  p ipe ,  where i t  i s  f i r s t  screened of 
l a r g e r  c u t t in g s  a t  a shale  shaker and then processed through a 
s e r i e s  of desanders and d e s i l t e r s  p r io r  to  recyc l ing  (Figure 
I I - 5 ) . Cutt ings  c a r r i e d  by the d r i l l i n g  f l u i d  are  taken for
a n a ly s i s  to  determine the composition of  the s t ra tum being d r i l l e d .
Hazards associated with working on or around components of
circulating fluid systems are various. Mixing of the mud exposes 
workers to airborne respirable dust and chemical splashes. Tanks 
in which mud is mechanically stirred are hazardous when unguarded, 
or when effective lockout procedures are not followed during
maintenance operations. Walking surfaces nearby may be slippery, 
especially in wet or icy weather. Pressure surges causing line 
rupture are an occasional hazard.
e. Materials Handling During Drilling Operations
On a drill rig, most of the materials handling equipment is unique 
to the oil field. This equipment is used in the working routines
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FIGURE I I - 5 .  CIRCULATING FLUID SYSTEM [1]
Copyright by the University of Texas at Austin (PETEX).
Reprinted by the Department of Health and Human Services 
with permission.  Fur ther  reproduc t ion  without  permission 
of copyright  ho lder  p roh ib i t ed .
of r a i s i n g  and lowering the d r i l l  s t r i n g ,  adding new sec t ion s  of  
d r i l l  p ipe ,  and t r i p p in g .  This equipment and i t s  ope ra t ion  are 
described in  o p e ra t ion a l  sequence in  t h i s  se c t io n .
To extend tne length of the d r i l l  s t r i n g ,  a j o i n t  (30-foot sec t ion )  
i s  ho is ted  from h o r iz o n ta l  pipe s to rage  racks ( loca ted  a t  ground 
leve l )  to the d r i l l  deck. The j o i n t  i s  lowered in to  a hole in  the 
d r i l l  deck (known as a mousehole), where i t  i s  s to red  u n t i l  i t  i s  
added to the s t r i n g .  This h o i s t i n g  opera t ion  can be performed with 
a f ib e r  rope, hands-on f r i c t i o n  pu l ley  (known as a cathead)  th a t  
protrudes  from each s ide  of the drawworks. Most modern d r i l l i n g  
r ig s  have s t e e l  cable  a i r  h o i s t s  to perform the h o i s t i n g  of the 
d r i l l  p ipe .  When the ke l ly  i s  a t  the le v e l  of the ke l ly  bushing, 
the ro ta ry  ta b le  and mud c i r c u l a t i n g  pumps are  stopped. The 
d r i l l e r  r a i s e s  the d r i l l  stem u n t i l  the bottom of the k e l ly  pipe 
j o i n t  connection i s  about 2 f e e t  above the le v e l  of the ro ta ry  
t a b l e .  A se t  of  " s l i p s "  i s  wedged in to  the space between the
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master bushing and the d r i l l  stem to main ta in  the d r i l l  p i p e ' s
p o s i t i o n .  A la rge  p a i r  of counterweight-suspended wrenches, c a l l e d  
tongs,  are  used to  "break out"  the torqued k e l l y  pipe j o i n t
connection. Once the tongs are  clamped above and below the
connection, mechanical force i s  appl ied  to  the handle of  the 
breakout tong by a tong p u l l  l i n e  o r i g i n a t i n g  from a mechanical
cathead loca ted  on the drawworks. When the connection has been 
loosened, the j o i n t s  are  "spun o u t . "  Some r i g s  use an a i r -o p e r a t e d
k e l l y  spinner  to  sp in  out the k e l l y  from the d r i l l  p ipe ,  whereas
o thers  sp in  out the d r i l l  pipe with the ro t a r y  ta b le  a f t e r  the to o l  
j o i n t  has been "broken" with the pipe tongs.  When making up a 
connection, some r i g s  use a pipe spinner  to sp in  the j o i n t  up; then 
i t  i s  t igh tened  with the pipe tongs.  Many r i g s  use the t r a d i t i o n a l
spinning chain  to  make up a j o i n t  of pipe; then i t  i s  t igh tened
with the pipe tongs.
Once disengaged, the lower end of the kelly, suspended by the 
hoist, is pushed/pulled by the floorhands until it is centered over 
the pipe joint that was temporarily stored in the mousehole. The 
kelly is "stabbed" into the pipe joint, spun up, and tong 
tightened. The driller next engages the drawworks and raises the 
kelly and pipe joint assembly, which in turn is stabbed into the 
drill stem that is held by the slips. This connection is then spun 
up and tong tightened. The slips are removed, the mud pumps and 
rotary table are reactivated, and the drilling operation proceeds.
Tripping i s  a procedure used when well  bore in spec t ions  and b i t  
changes a re  necessary .  The e n t i r e  d r i l l  s t r i n g  must be removed 
from the hole  and l a t e r  re tu rned  i f  the d r i l l i n g  i s  to  proceed. 
During a "round t r i p "  (cycle  of removal and rep lacement) ,  the k e l ly  
i s  disconnected and s to red  in  the r a t h o l e ,  a hole  in  the r i g  f lo o r  
in to  which the k e l ly  and swivel are placed during h o i s t i n g  
o pe ra t ion s .  E leva to r s ,  a s e t  of clamps a f f ix e d  to  the b a i l s  on the 
swivel below the t r a v e l in g  block, are  a t tached  to  the b e l l  p o r t io n  
( to o l  j o i n t )  of the d r i l l  pipe and used to  r a i s e  the d r i l l  s t r i n g  
from the ho le .  Pipe tongs and f requen t ly  the ro ta ry  ta b le  are  used 
to  disconnect the stands (usua l ly  90 f e e t  of d r i l l  p ipe)  as one 
u n i t .  The i n i t i a l  breaking of  the pipe j o i n t  i s  p roper ly  performed 
by the automatic  cathead tens ion ing  the breakout  tong. To ensure  
well  c o n t ro l ,  d r i l l i n g  mud i s  u sua l ly  added to  the well  bore to  
rep lace  the f l u i d  volume d isp laced  by the d r i l l  stem and to 
mainta in  h y d ro s t a t i c  p ressure  when the d r i l l  stem i s  removed. The derrickman, u su a l ly  using a f a l l - a r r e s t i n g  d e r r i c k  c limber,  climbs 
the d e r r i c k  and works from the monkey board, which i s  u sua l ly  
located 90 f e e t  above the r i g  f l o o r .  His ta sk  i s  to  coord ina te  the 
placement of the t r i p l e  j o i n t s  between the f inge r s  of the " f in g e r  board" for  temporary s to rage  during the t r i p  and to disconnect  the 
d r i l l  pipe from the e le v a to r s .
Once the bit has been removed from the hole, it is inspected for 
wear and replaced as necessary. "Logging" devices may be lowered
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in to  the hole on a s tranded wire e l e c t r i c  cable  by a cathead power 
takeof f  system or an independent e l e c t r i c  winch. I f  the well
d r i l l i n g  opera t ion  i s  to  continue, the above sequence i s  reversed ,
completing the round t r i p .
Workers d i r e c t l y  involved in  these  opera t ions  are c lose  to moving 
equipment components, while performing tasks  th a t  requ ire  
s u b s t a n t i a l  e x e r t io n  and good coord ina t ion  between in d iv id u a l s .  
T ransfe r r ing  d r i l l  pipe from the rack to  the d r i l l i n g  p lat form may
r e s u l t  in  the s to ck p i le  r o l l i n g  or in  the mishandling of suspended
loads,  with the r i s k  of crushing in ju r y .  Handling of the tongs
req u i res  wel l -coord ina ted  e f f o r t s  and proper body limb placement. 
Mistakes in  the hands-on spinning chain opera t ions  can lead to
entanglement th a t  may r e s u l t  in  c rushing, amputation, and death .
Machinery i s  a c t iv a t e d  by an opera to r  who depends on v i s u a l  and/or
audib le  cues; a mistake can lead to premature a c t i v a t i o n  while 
workers are  s t i l l  in  con tac t  with moving p a r t s .  Mechanical f a i l u r e  
from overloading systems can occur.  L i f t i n g  and moving heavy items 
on wet su rfaces  may lead to s l i p s ,  f a l l s ,  and overexer t ion .  Eyes 
are a t  r i s k  from m a te r ia l  f a l l i n g  o f f  the d r i l l  p ipe.  P o te n t i a l  
hazards in  these opera t ions  can be increased i f  the d r i l l i n g  crew 
has not worked toge the r  very long; teamwork i s  necessary to  carry  
out the operat ions  quickly and s a fe ly .
3. Other D r i l l i n g  Techniques
a.  Compressed Air
Compressed a i r  may be used ins tead  of d r i l l i n g  mud when there  i s  no 
r i s k  of encountering h igh -p res su re ,  permeable formations or 
formations conta in ing water.  I t  has the advantages of f a s t e r  
d r i l l i n g  and of not having to r ec ond i t ion  the c i r c u l a t i n g  mud. The 
d r i l l i n g  dust i s  discharged from the "blooey l in e "  and may be blown 
across  the working a rea  to  cause a r e s p i r a to r y  hazard;  dust 
p a r t i c l e s  may cause eye i n j u r i e s .
b. Directional Drilling
D irec t iona l  d r i l l i n g  occurs when a c o n t r a c to r  i n t e n t i o n a l l y  d r i l l s  
a well  t h a t  i s  out of plumb. Surface cond i t ions  may d i c t a t e  th a t  a 
d r i l l i n g  r i g  cannot be e rec ted  over the formation to be explored 
o r ,  as in  o f fshore  o pe ra t ion s ,  the r i g  may be c o s t ly  enough th a t  
m ul t ip le  formations should be explored from a c e n t r a l  d r i l l i n g  
p o s i t i o n .  D i rec t iona l  d r i l l i n g  i s  achieved by a number of 
d i f f e r e n t  methods. D irec t iona l  to o l s  include downhole hydrau l ic  
tu rb ine  motors,  j e t  d e f l e c to r  b i t s ,  bent subs,  f l e x ib l e  j o i n t s ,  or ,  
most common in pas t  years ,  whipstocks.
c. Redrilling
The r e d r i l l i n g  of a well  takes place when well  depth must be
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extended. (The e x i s t i n g  formation may not be product ive  and the 
well  may be extended to  tap a lower fo rm at ion .)  In some in s tances  
the  p r io r  d r i l l i n g  opera t ion  may have stopped for  reasons 
a ssoc ia ted  with a'nnulus c o l l a p s e ,  damaged cas ing ,  l o s t  d r i l l i n g  
s t r i n g ,  or  blowout.
O pera t iona l ly ,  the d r i l l i n g  procedure and hazard exposure are  the 
same as descr ibed  e a r l i e r ;  however, techniques may have to be 
a l t e r e d  to  overcome any formation or well  bore i r r e g u l a r i t i e s .
4. Casing Operat ions
Lining or cas ing a well  i s  a ta sk  performed to ensure the i n t e g r i t y  of 
the well  bore throughout the d r i l l i n g  and product ion phases .  
Large-diaraeter su r face  cas ing c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y  i s  used in  the 
uppermost p o r t io n  to  ensure well  wall  i n t e g r i t y  and fo r  well  c o n t r o l .  
The use of  in te rm ed ia te  cas ings is  determined by the depth t h a t  the 
su rface  cas ing i s  s e t  and the r e l a t i v e  p r e s s u r e s . o f  shallow formations 
as compared to  deeper formations .  Production cas ing ,  which may be se t  
by the d r i l l i n g  c o n t r a c to r ,  i s  normally r equ ired  i f  the well  i s  to  be 
brought to  product ion.
In most in s tances ,  a subcon trac to r  i s  h i red  to  i n s t a l l  the cas ing .  The 
cas ing c o n t r a c to r  supp l ies  the l a r g e r  e le v a to r s  and pipe tongs necessary 
to  handle the la rge r -d ia m e te r  cas ing m a t e r i a l s .  Most f re q u e n t ly ,  the 
manpower comprises a few d i r e c t  employees of the cas ing c o n t r a c to r  and 
the employees of  the d r i l l i n g  c o n t r a c to r  supervised by the 
subcon trac to r .  However, the re  i s  no standard  procedure governing 
manpower supply during cas ing ope ra t ions .  The cas ing opera t ion  proceeds 
in  a manner fundamentally the same as m u l t ip le  r e p e t i t i o n s  of  adding new 
sec t ion s  of pipe to  the  d r i l l  s t r i n g .  Surface and in te rm ed ia te  cas ing 
i s  l a r g e r  in  d iameter ,  and i s  l i k e ly  to  r e s u l t  in  a g re a te r  s e v e r i ty  of 
m a te r ia l s  handling or  r o l l i n g  stock in c id e n t s .  Production cas ing i s  
normally run by a cas ing c o n t r a c to r  us ing the same r i g  used to  d r i l l  the 
h o le ,  although in  some cases i t  may be run by a completion c o n t r a c to r  
using h i s  own mobile r i g .
Casing opera t ions  are  conducted by companies th a t  are  c l a s s i f i e d  by the 
SIC system in to  the o i l  and gas f i e l d  se rv ices  (1389) ca tegory .  The 
o p e ra t ion a l  procedures and equipment used are s u f f i c i e n t l y  s im i l a r  to 
those in  the a c tu a l  d r i l l i n g  opera t ions  to y i e ld  s im i la r  a c c id e n t / in j u r y  
p o t e n t i a l s .  However, da ta  on in jury  incidence  r a t e s  for  t h i s  s p e c i f i c  
po r t ion  of SIC 1389 are  not a v a i l a b le .
5. Special  Hazards
In c e r t a in  a reas  and depths ,  i f  proper  p recaut ions  and c o n t ro l  methods 
a re  not employed, two condi t ions  may be encountered th a t  have the 
p o t e n t i a l  to  cause major d i s a s t e r s :  blowouts and the escape of hydrogen
s u l f i d e .
15
a. Blowouts
A blowout i s  an uncon tro l led  escape of gas,  o i l ,  or formation 
f lu id s  th a t  may lead to f i r e ,  explosion, d r i l l i n g  r ig  d e s t r u c t i o n ,  
i n ju ry ,  o r  death.
Blowouts may occur when the formation f l u i d  p ressure  exceeds the 
h y d ro s ta t i c  p ressure  of the c i r c u l a t i n g  f l u i d  in the well  annulus 
such as the t o t a l l y  unexpected encountering of unpred ic tab le  
p ressures  and/or  when mechanical c o n t r o l l i n g  methods; e . g . ,  blowout 
p reven te rs  (BOP's) or o ther  p re ssu re -c o n t ro l  techniques ,  f a i l  
through misuse, m isa p p l ic a t io n ,  or malfunct ion. During a d r i l l i n g  
opera t ion ,  the mud serves as the f i r s t  c o n t ro l  method. I f  th e re  i s  
a p i t  l e v e l  increase  (or any of seve ra l  o ther  i n d i c a t i o n s ) , then 
the formation p ressure  exceeds the h y d ro s t a t i c  p ressure  of the 
mud. This i s  c a l l e d  a k ick .  I f  a k ick  occurs ,  the d r i l l e r  should 
take s teps  to  c lose  in the well  with the BOP's. A f te r  the BOP's 
are  c losed ,  the mud weight i s  increased so th a t  i t  can exer t  a 
pressure  equal to ,  or s l i g h t l y  h igher  than, the p ressure  of the 
formation.
Most wells  are  d r i l l e d  in o i l  f i e l d s  with p re d ic ta b le  formation 
p re ssu re s .  BOP's se le c t ed  to be compatible with these  p ressures  
are i n s t a l l e d  as soon as the su rface  cas ing i s  in  p lace .  BOP's 
funct ion  by se a l in g  o f f  the well  bore.  A s e r i e s  of hydrau l ic  (and 
some manual) rams a c t iv a te d  from ground leve l  (not on the d e r r i c k )  
sea l  and con ta in  the formation p re ssu res .
I f  the kick  i s  not no t iced  in  time or the techniques used to 
con t ro l  the formation p ressu res  are  not adequate,  then a blowout 
occurs .  Since blowouts and subsequent f i r e s  involve the lo ss  of 
equipment and time (as well  as employee exposure to  extremely 
hazardous c o n d i t io n s ) ,  the indust ry  usua l ly  takes g rea t  care  to 
prevent t h e i r  occurrences .
b. Hydrogen Sulf ide
Hydrogen s u l f id e  i s  a h ighly  to x ic ,  c o lo r l e s s  gas.  I t  i s  a very 
in s id ious  i n d u s t r i a l  hazard fo r  two reasons:  u n r e l i a b i l i t y  of  odor
as a warning, and sudden onset of i n c a p a c i t a t io n .  Hydrogen s u l f i d e  
has been i d e n t i f i e d  by NIOSH as a leading cause of sudden workplace 
death [2] .  At concen tra t ions  up to  30 p a r t s  per m i l l io n  (ppm), i t  
has an odor of r o t t e n  eggs [2] .  However, a t  more deadly 
concen tra t ions  (100 ppm), hydrogen su l f id e  rap id ly  f a t ig u e s  the 
o l fa c to ry  nerves [3-5] .  A person may momentarily smell the gas but 
th ink  l i t t l e  of i t  when the odor i s  no longer d e te c t a b le .  I f  
exposure i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  in te n se ,  unconsciousness and r e s p i r a to r y  
f a i l u r e  may occur without  warning symptoms. The gas i s  1.2 times 
denser  than a i r ,  and a t  high concen tra t ions  w i l l  tend to  accumulate 
in  low spo ts .  Mixed with a i r  in  concen tra t ions  of 4.3-45.5%,
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hydrogen su l f id e  i s  explosive [2] .  I t  may a l so  burn with the 
product ion of tox ic  s u l f u r  d ioxide .
During o i l  and gas well  d r i l l i n g  opera t ions ,  H2S i s  f i r s t  
re leased  to the atmosphere a t  the shale  shaker a rea  and l a t e r  a t  
the c i r c u l a t i o n  f l u i d  t reatment a rea s .  I t  may a lso  be re leased  
during t r ip p in g  procedures in the immediate a rea  around the 
d r i l l i n g  opera t ion .  Typica l ly ,  however, only nominal amounts of 
H2S are re lea sed  during normal d r i l l i n g  opera t ions .
The e f f e c t  of hydrogen s u l f id e  on meta ls ,  known va r ious ly  as metal 
f a t ig u e ,  hydrogen embri t t lement ,  and s u l f id e  s t r e s s  c racking , can 
cause f a i l u r e  of the d r i l l  s t r i n g  during a well  con t ro l  s i t u a t i o n  
[3 ,6 ,7 ] .  Such f a i l u r e  can r e s u l t  in  the r e l e a s e  of  hazardous concen tra t ions  of H2S in  the d r i l l i n g  a rea .  Careful s e l e c t i o n  of 
r e s i s t a n t  metals and chemical t reatment of d r i l l i n g  f l u i d s  can 
e f f e c t i v e ly  guard aga in s t  such f a i l u r e .
With the except ion of explora to ry  or "wildca t"  w e l l s ,  d r i l l i n g  
operat ions  take  place  in  o i l  f i e l d s  where the hydrogen s u l f id e
loca t ions  and formation p ressures  l i k e ly  to  be encountered are 
known. With the demand fo r  hydrocarbons in c rea s in g ,  formations 
h i s t o r i c a l l y  deemed too dangerous to produce are now being 
developed. In some in s ta n c es ,  there  i s  frequent to  near ly
continuous employee exposure to  hydrogen s u l f i d e  a t  concen tra t ions  
from 10 ppm (OSHA 8-hour perm iss ib le  exposure l im i t  (PEL)) to 
l i f e - t h r e a t e n i n g  l e v e l s  req u i r ing  the wearing of se l f -co n ta in e d  
brea th ing  appara tus .  Innovat ive technolog ies ,  alarm systems, and 
r e s p i r a to r y  p r o te c t iv e  equipment and programs are being employed 
without uniform Federal r eg u la t io n .
C. Companies, Employment F igures ,  and Popula t ion  a t  Risk
The companies th a t  perform the ta sks  necessary to  cons t ru c t  and main ta in  o i l  
wel ls  a re  grouped by the SIC system in to  the o i l  and gas f i e l d  se rv ice  
companies (SIC 138). They are composed of companies th a t  o f f e r  explora tory
se rv ices  (SIC 1382); companies th a t  perform d r i l l i n g  opera t ions  (SIC 1381)
such as spudding-in,  a i r  d r i l l i n g ,  r e d r i l l i n g ,  o f fshore  d r i l l i n g ,  and 
d i r e c t i o n a l  d r i l l i n g ;  and companies th a t  perform tasks  assoc ia ted  with  well  
completion and s t im u la t io n  (SIC 1389).
As shown in  Table I I - l ,  764 companies were engaged in  o i l  and gas d r i l l i n g  
opera t ions  in  1980 [8] .  The s i z e s  of the companies, as def ined by the
number of d r i l l i n g  r ig s  owned, ranged from one - r ig  opera t ions  to  companies 
th a t  owned more than 20 d r i l l i n g  r i g s .  The Dun and B rads t ree t  I n d u s t r i a l  
P r o f i l e  Data for  1980 in d ic a t e s  t h a t  the number of  employees a t  each 
f a c i l i t y  ranged from 1 to  7 to  more than 500 employees (Table I I - 2 ) .  The 
number of workers es timated by NIOSH to be employed by d r i l l i n g  c o n t r a c to r s  
during 1980 was 88,116 [9] .  However, included in  the NIOSH es t im a te  were 
employees of companies engaged in  water well  d r i l l i n g ,  o f fshore  d r i l l i n g ,
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and explora tory  d r i l l i n g ;  as such, they were not p a r t  of the employee 
popula tion  a t  r i s k  in  the land-based o i l  and gas well  d r i l l i n g  in d u s t ry .
TABLE I I - l  
PROFILE OF OIL AND GAS WELL DRILLING 
COMPANIES IN 1980 (SIC 1381)
No. of Rigs 
Owned








Adapted from U.S. Land D r i l l i n g  Contrac tors  [8] .
TABLE I I - 2  




No. of No. of No. of  Employees









^Dun and B rads t ree t  I n d u s t r i a l  P r o f i l e ,  1980, 
compiled by NIOSH [9].
^Employee counts were not a v a i l a b le  fo r  an 
a d d i t io n a l  68 f a c i l i t i e s .  Total  number of 
rep o r t ing  f a c i l i t i e s  was 4,159.
■^Includes employees of  o f f shore ,  water ,  and 
explora to ry  d r i l l i n g  companies.
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1. D r i l l i n g  A c t i v i t i e s  and Population  a t  Risk
Regardless  of company s i z e ,  the t a sk  force  employed a t  a well  s i t e  i s  
f a i r l y  smal l .  A t y p i c a l  d r i l l i n g  r i g  employs a to o l  pusher to  supervise  
the d r i l l i n g  ope ra t ion .  Depending on wel l  s i t e  l o ca t io n ,  he may be in  
charge of more than one r i g .  The d r i l l e r  ( s h i f t  foreman) i s  respons ib le  
fo r  the immediate d i r e c t i o n  of  work on the d r i l l i n g  r i g .  He opera tes  
the r i g  c o n t r o l s ,  superv ises  the changing of  d r i l l  p ipe and t r ip p in g  
ope ra t ion s ,  and d i r e c t s  any maintenance or  r e p a i r  work. His crew 
usua l ly  c o n s i s t s  of one derrickman performing ta sks  from the upper 
po r t io n  of the d e r r i c k  during t r ip p in g  opera t ions  ( the  derrickman i s  
normally the second man in  charge of  d r i l l i n g  o p e ra t io n s ;  i . e . ,  the 
r e l i e f  d r i l l e r ) ,  th ree  r o ta ry  he lpe r s  (floormen) performing those  tasks  
a s so c ia te d  with  the a d d i t io n  of  pipe j o i n t s  dur ing  d r i l l i n g  and t r i p p in g .
For la rge  ope ra t ion s ;  e . g . ,  deeper w e l l s ,  the crew usua l ly  includes  a 
motorman (usua l ly  most experienced r o t a r y  h e lp e r )  who i s  in  charge of 
the  mechanics of  the equipment and a l so  a c t s  as a floorhand during 
t r ip p in g  procedures ,  and an a d d i t io n a l  r o t a r y  h e l p e r .
An e l e c t r i c i a n  normally i s  employed on e l e c t r i c a l l y  powered d r i l l i n g  
r i g s .  Smaller d r i l l i n g  r i g s  normally r eq u i r e  an average of  f iv e  persons
per  s h i f t  (not  including  the pusher) ,  whereas seven or e igh t  persons per
s h i f t  a re  needed on a l a r g e r  ro t a r y  r i g .
D r i l l i n g  opera t ions  are  continuous (24 hours /day ,  7 days/week) u n t i l  the 
well  has been completed. When a well  i s  being d r i l l e d ,  the r i g  u su a l ly  
i s  s t a f f e d  fo r  th ree  8-hour s h i f t s ,  although in  some remote a reas  the
ope ra t ion  uses two 12-hour s h i f t s .  Approximately seven employees per
s h i f t  i s  a reasonable  es t im a te  of  the number of  persons a t  r i s k  on a 
t y p i c a l  d r i l l i n g  o p e ra t io n .  The e s t im a te  o f  seven employees per  r i g  
a l so  corresponds with  f i e l d  observa t ions  made during s i t e  v i s i t s  and 
da ta  presented  in  the NIOSH "Safety  Information P r o f i l e  Oil  and Gas 
F ie ld  Operations"  [10].
The Oil  and Gas J o u r n a l ' s  "R o tary - r ig  A c t iv i ty  by S ta te s"  [11] provides  
weekly counts ,  by S t a t e ,  of  a l l  a c t iv e  d r i l l i n g  o p e ra t io n s .  D r i l l i n g  
r i g s  a re  considered by the census take rs  to  be a c t iv e  whenever they are
d r i l l i n g ,  t r i p p in g ,  or performing any ta sk  a s so c ia te d  with  making an o i l
or gas w e l l .  In f a c t ,  a r i g  i s  considered to  be a c t iv e  unless  i t  i s
down fo r  r e p a i r  or in  s to rage  [12].  Table I I - 3  con ta ins  the yea r ly  
average of  a c t iv e  d r i l l i n g  r i g s ,  by S ta t e ,  for  the p a s t  10 ye a r s .
The average number of  a c t iv e  r i g s  and the number of  workers on a s h i f t  
can be used to  e s t im a te  the number of  workers a t  r i s k  in  o i l  and gas 
well  d r i l l i n g  o p e ra t io n s .  The reason fo r  determin ing the popula t ion  a t  
r i s k  fo r  the d r i l l i n g  indus t ry  i s  to e s t a b l i s h  an in ju ry  incidence r a t e  
fo r  those workers exposed to  the hazards  a t t e n d a n t  to  d r i l l i n g  ope ra t ion s .  For the purpose of  comparison between i n d u s t r i e s ,  a
"person ,"  as def ined by the BLS, works 2,000 hours during a y e a r .  In 
o ther  words, for  s t a t i s t i c a l  comparisons,  an in d iv id u a l  who has worked
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3.000 hours in a year  would be counted as 1.5 person-years .  A 
reasonable  es t imate  of the popula tion  a t  r i s k  in  the land-based d r i l l i n g  
indust ry  can be a r r iv ed  a t  by m ult ip ly ing  the number of employees per 
r i g  (7) by the number of s h i f t s  per day (3) by the number of  hours per 
s h i f t  (8) by the number of days per year  (365) by the average number of 
r i g s  a c t iv e  during a year  (rounded to  the ne a re s t  whole number) and 
d iv id ing  by 2,000 ( the  number of hours worked by an ind iv idua l  in a 
y e a r ) .  The es timated popula tion  a t  r i s k  in  the o i l  and gas well  
d r i l l i n g  indust ry  (1971-80) i s  shown in Table 11-4. For example, during 
1980, the Oil and Gas Journal repor ted  an average of 2,605 land-based 
a c t iv e  r i g s  [11].  The popula t ion  a t  r i s k  would then be es timated as 
79,869 person-years during 1980. I t  should be noted th a t  t h i s  es t im a te  
of  popula tion a t  r i s k  i s  l e ss  than t h a t  repor ted  in  the Dun and 
Brads t ree t  I n d u s t r i a l  P r o f i l e ,  which includes  a l l  employees in  the 
indus t ry  as well  as those involved in  of fshore  and explora tory  d r i l l i n g .
2. Trends and P ro jec t ions
Economic p ressures  and government ac t ions  have r e s u l t e d  in  a steady and 
s u b s t a n t i a l  increase  in o i l  f i e l d  a c t i v i t y  over the pas t  decade. The 
average number of a c t iv e  d r i l l i n g  r i g s  near ly  t r i p l e d  between 1972 and 
1980 (Figure I I - 6  and Table I I - 4 ) , as did the number of o i l  f i e l d  
employees in SIC 138 (Figure I I - 7 ) .  There was an increase  of 
approximately 692 d r i l l i n g  r ig s  during 1980— s e t t i n g  what was an 
a l l - t i m e  d r i l l i n g  record fo r  the indust ry  [11, 13]. The average a c t iv e  
r i g  count in  Ju ly  1981 se t  a new record of  3,681—an increase  of  more 
than 1,000 a c t iv e  r i g s  over the previous Ju ly  [14].  The popula t ion  a t  
r i s k  in  d r i l l i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  would a l so  be expected to  have increased by 
an es timated a d d i t io n a l  32,990 in July  1981 r e s u l t i n g  in  a p red ic ted  
popula tion  a t  r i s k  of approximately 112,859 person-years .  Land-based 
d r i l l i n g  opera t ions  completed 63,337 wel ls  during 1980, an average of 24 
wel ls  d r i l l e d  per r i g  (number of wells div ided by the average number of 
a c t iv e  r i g s ) ,  and almost 14,599 more than during the previous year 
(Table I I - 5 ) .
3. Trade Associa t ions  and Unions
The I n t e r n a t io n a l  Assoc ia t ion  of D r i l l i n g  Contractors  (IADC) had about
1.000 member companies in  1981 and rep resen ted  approximately 95% of a l l  
d r i l l i n g  companies. The cu r ren t  boom in  d r i l l i n g  i s  r ap id ly  increas ing  
the number of  IADC member companies but has not apprec iably  a f f e c t e d  the 
percentage of r e p re se n ta t i o n  of the t r ade  a s s o c ia t i o n .  The land-based 
d r i l l i n g  companies and member companies a re  urged by IADC to  p a r t i c i p a t e  
in  intercompany, IADC-sponsored sa fe ty  award programs and to  a v a i l  
themselves of IADC p u b l ic a t io n s  on safe  working p ra c t i c e s  in  d r i l l i n g  
ope ra t ion s .  A sa fe ty  committee a t tends  to acc iden t  preven t ion  concepts 
and compiles a year ly  ana lys i s  of d r i l l i n g  acc idents  fo r  member 
companies. IADC a l so  cosponsors a number of  e n t r y - l e v e l  ro ta ry  he lpe r  
schools th a t  teach safe  working p r a c t i c e s ,  as well  as advanced schools 
for  derrickmen, d r i l l e r s ,  and too l  pushers .
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TABLE I1-3
CENSUS OF ACTIVE DRILLING RIGS
Average Rig A c t iv i ty
Sta te 1980 1979 1978 1977 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971
Alabama 10.8 12.6 12.5 13 17 14 12 13 15 8
Alaska 13.8 13.5 15.5 15 14 14 9 5 5 5
Arkansas 26.8 10.4 13.9 15 15 14 18 15 15 15
Arizona 1.0 0.0 0.4 1 1 0 1 2 1 1
C al i fo rn ia 120.2 95.6 94.1 89 89 80 72 51 46 46
Inland 104.7 85.7 86.3 81 85 77 70 49 45 40
Offshore 15.5 9.9 7.8 8 4 3 2 2 1 6
Colorado 61.1 40.2 41.1 45 38 42 45 42 35 30
Florida 4.1 5.3 6.3 6 5 9 7 9 19 11
Idaho 2.6 1.8 3.2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
I l l i n o i s 25.4 13.1 28.4 16 22 19 7 6 14 13
Indiana 0.1 0.3 4.4 3 2 2 1 0 1 1
Kansas 120.2 66.0 75.5 67 51 57 44 28 24 29
Kentucky 1.7 0.4 3.3 2 1 1 2 1 2 2
Louisiana 427.4 347.0 338.3 292 231 227 203 205 214 194
North 54.9 34.5 39.8 45 34 31 29 23 19 16
Inland Waters 76.6 62.1 62.5 57 49 55 58 55 54 50
South 156.4 112.3 113.9 81 65 64 49 56 59 54
Offshore 139.4 138.1 122.1 109 83 77 67 71 82 74
Maryland 0.2 0.5 0.7 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Michigan 30.7 25.1 24.0 24 24 28 24 20 17 12
M iss iss ipp i 57.6 40.2 44.5 42 32 25 29 29 37 39
Montana 49.2 32.9 30.1 27 28 27 24 19 20 17
Nebraska 14.3 9.2 9.6 9 8 9 7 5 6 5
Nevada 4.6 4.1 2.9 3 2 0 1 0 0 1
New Mexico 117.6 87.5 75.5 70 54 71 79 62 55 47
New York 7.0 8.7 7.0 6 9 8 7 1 0 1
North Dakota 83.4 56.5 39.1 24 19 17 12 10 7 9
Ohio 73.7 46.3 45.6 33 26 21 30 36 22 17
TABLE I 1-3
CENSUS OF ACTIVE DRILLING RIGS (Concluded)
Average Rig A c t iv i ty
Sta te 1980 1979 1978 1977 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971
Oklahoma 397.3 246.7 258.2 233 186 177 146 115 90 90
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island
29.0 28.9 25.2 15 10 10 14 11 8 9
Offshore 2.1 4.0 4.3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
South Dakota 1.9 1.4 2.3 3 2 1 1 1 1 1Texas 987.7 770.2 855.0 779 653 637 508 376 338 291
Gulf Coast 210.5 141.3 197.0 175 160 142 128 109 95 79
Offshore 72.1 50.3 46.9 42 36 21 21 9 6 5
North 147.2 122.4 153.2 142 111 107 67 22 16 15
Panhandle 50.8 48.1 60.4 42 37 41 35 23 22 16
East 119.8 107.0 116.6 73 54 47 45 30 26 23
West Central 140.4 109.4 117.2 136 101 100 62 82 78 76
West 247.1 191.7 163.7 169 154 179 150 101 95 77Utah 42.4 28.9 32.1 30 19 26 42 38 34 17
West Virginia 37.8 29.8 27.1 17 12 10 16 20 16 17
Wyoming 155.5 147.2 136.4 118 86 107 107 70 60 45
Others 3.3 2.9 2.0 2 0 7 3 3 4 2
T o ta l1 2,910.3 
Total Land-based
2,177.2 2,258.8 2,001 1,658 1,660 1,471 1,194 1,107 976
Rigs2 2, 604.6 1,912.8 2,015.2 1,784 1,486 1,504 1,323 1,057 964 841
^Total r ig census f igu res are  shown as reported  in the Oil and Gas
Journal [11].
2Total land-based r i g s  have been c a l cu la t ed  by summing the o f fshore  and 
inland water r i g  counts and su b t r a c t in g  t h i s  f igu re  from the t o t a l  r i g  
count .
Adapted from the Oil and Gas J o u r n a l ' s  "Rotary-r ig  A c t iv i ty  by S ta te s"
i l l ] .
The In te r n a t io n a l  Union of Operating Engineers (IUOE) has a small 
membership of d r i l l i n g  c o n t r a c to r  employees th a t  encompasses about 100 
land-based r ig s  in C a l i fo rn ia .  The dear th  of labor  o rgan iza t ion  in  the 
o i l  f i e l d s  probably i s  due in  pa r t  to  the small employment s i ze  of many 
f a c i l i t i e s  and may be influenced by the f requent i n a c c e s s i b i l i t y  of well  
s i t e s ,  which a re  not uncommonly more than 2 hours from the c lo s e s t  
accommodations.
TABLE I 1-4
POPULATION AT RISK IN OIL AND GAS WELL DRILLING OPERATIONS (1971-80) 
_______________________________ (SIC 1381)___________________________
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Total
Rigs1 841 964 1,057 1,323 1,504 1,486 1,784 2,015 1,913 2,605
Estimated 
Pop.2 a t  
Risk 25 ,785 29,556 32,408 40,563 46,113 45,561 54,697 61,780 58,653 79,869
^From the Oil and Gas Journal  (Table: I I -3 ) [11].2Person-years
TABLE I I -5
OIL AND GAS WELL DRILLING ACTIVITY (1974-80)
A c t iv i ty  by Year
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Total No. 
of Wells 
Completed 32,450 37,614 37,648 44,870 46,974 48,738 63,337
Total 
Footage 
(1,000 f t ) 150,310 170,722 170,406 199,951 218,454 231,818 282,488
Average
Well
Depth ( f t ) 4,632 4,539 4,526 4,456 4,651 4,756 4,460
Average No. 
of Active Land 
Rotary Rigs 1,323 1,504 1,486 1,784 2,015 1,913 2,605















FIGURE I 1-6. TEN-YEAR GROWTH OF THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF ACTIVE U.S. LAND RIGS (1971-80)
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7. AVERAGE ANNUAL EMPLOYMENT FOR THE YEARS 1972-80 (SIC 138) 
Compiled from Bureau of Labor S t a t i s t i c s  [20-28].
CHAPTER I I I  
DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM—THE HAZARDS OF 
THE OIL AND GAS WELL DRILLING INDUSTRY
This chap ter  i s  div ided in to  two major a reas  of  emphasis: the development
of da ta  p e r ta in in g  to  the in ju ry  incidence  r a t e s  of  the o i l  and gas well 
d r i l l i n g  in dus t ry ,  and an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of  the t a sks  performed in  well  
d r i l l i n g  operat ions  t h a t  are  most hazardous to  the  popula t ion  a t  r i s k .  Also 
included i s  a d i scuss ion  of t r a in i n g  and the new employee, as well  as a 
d i scuss ion  of the c os ts  of  i n j u r i e s  to  the in dus t ry .
A. General Hazard Assessment of  the Oil  and Gas F ie ld  Services Industry
For the o i l  and gas f i e l d  se rv ices  industry  (SIC 138), the BLS rep o r ted  th a t  
between 1972 and 1980 the average yea r ly  in ju ry  and i l l n e s s  incidence  r a t e  
was about 19.5 cases  per 100 f u l l - t im e  workers (Table I I I - l ) .  For these 
same y e a r s ,  the average in ju ry  incidence  r a t a  fo r  heavy c o n s t ru c t io n ,  not 
including highway, was 18.3; fo r  bituminous coa l  mining, about 12.1; and for  
the p r iv a te  s e c to r  manufacturers  of durable  goods, about 14.9 (Table 
I I I - l ) . Although the t a sk s  performed by the o i l  and gas well  f i e l d  se rv ices  
indus t ry  are  not e n t i r e l y  equatable  to  coal  mining or  heavy c o n s t ru c t io n ,  
they are a l l  high-hazard i n d u s t r i e s  (as  evidenced by t h e i r  in ju ry  
s t a t i s t i c s )  and can be used fo r  comparative purposes.  The s e v e r i ty  r a t e  for  
the o i l  and gas f i e l d  se rv ices  industry  (SIC 138) averaged 211.8; i . e . ,  for  
every 100 employees there  were 211.8 l o s t  workdays (Table I I I - l ) .  The 
average s e v e r i ty  r a t e s  fo r  heavy con s t ru c t io n ,  bituminous coal mining, and 
the durable  goods in d u s t r i e s  fo r  the same years  were 116.5,  158.4,  and 82.5 ,  r e s p e c t iv e ly  (Table I I I - l ) .
B. Hazard Assessment of  the D r i l l i n g  Industry
National in ju ry  s t a t i s t i c s  compiled by the BLS are not a v a i l a b le  fo r  the 
s p e c i f i c  f o u r - d ig i t  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s  of the i n d u s t r i e s  t h a t  comprise SIC 138;
i . e . ,  d r i l l i n g ,  1381; exp lo ra t ion ,  1382; and o i l  f i e l d  s e rv ic e s ,  1389. Consequently,  th ree  techniques us ing d i f f e r e n t  da ta  bases were used to 
es t imate  in ju ry  incidence  r a t e s  fo r  the d r i l l i n g  indus t ry :  in ju ry
s t a t i s t i c s  tabu la ted  by the Texas Workers' Compensation S ta te  Board of Insurance (TWC), in ju ry  da ta  developed by the I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Assoc ia t ion  of 
D r i l l i n g  Contractors  (IADC), and s t a t e  in ju ry  s t a t i s t i c s  compiled by the 
Department of Labor 's  Supplementary Data System (SDS). The in ju ry  incidence  
r a t e s  c a lcu la t ed  in  t h i s  se c t io n  a re  not d i r e c t l y  comparable to  BLS r a t e s  
s ince  the popula tion  a t  r i s k  i s  l im i ted  to  the workers a t  r i s k  a t  the d r i l l i n g  opera t ions  and does not include the e n t i r e  worker popula t ion  for  
d r i l l i n g  companies ( i . e . ,  support s t a f f ,  c l e r i c a l ,  and s a l e s  personnel  in  
ad d i t io n  to  those workers a t  r i s k  in  d r i l l i n g  o p e ra t io n s ) .
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TABLE I I I - l
















All 67,245.4 5,641.0 9.7 58.9 34,481.4
Heavy Construct ion 
(Exc. Highway) 
(SIC 162) 511.9 92.3 18.3 116.5 597.5
Bituminous Coal 
(SIC 12) 210.1 24.8 12.1 158.4 344.2
Manufacturing: 
Durable Goods 11,673.2 1,735.8 14.9 82.5 9,666.2
Oil and Gas 
(SIC 138) 192.4 37.7 19.5 211.8 414.0
1 Estimated by mult ip ly ing the number of employees by the repor ted  inc iden t  r a t e  >and d iv id ing  by 100.
2 Number of t o t a l  recordable  i n j u r i e s  and i l l n e s s e s /1 0 0  f u l l - t im e  workers.
3 Number of lo s t  workdays/100 fu l l - t im e  workers.
Reported by the Bureau of Labor S t a t i s t i c s  [20 -  28].
Note: Data for  1972 were not reported  for  SIC 12, and data  for 1977 were not reported  fo r  SIC 138.
Only data  for  the years repor ted  were used to c a l c u l a t e  averages.
1. Est imates of In ju ry  Incidence Rates Based on Texas Workers' 
Compensation S ta te  Board of  Insurance Data
The f i r s t  method used to e s t imate  in ju ry  incidence  r a t e s  for  the o i l  and 
gas well d r i l l i n g  indust ry  e n t a i l s  the e x t r a p o la t i o n  of in ju ry  da ta  
reported  by the TWC to the e n t i r e  d r i l l i n g  in dus t ry .  The types of 
i n j u r i e s  repor ted  are  i n j u r i e s  r e q u i r in g  medical t reatment and/or 
indemnity payments.
D r i l l i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  in  Texas are  assumed to  be t y p i c a l  and 
r ep re se n ta t i v e  of a l l  d r i l l i n g  a c t i v i t i e s .  Texas r ep re se n t s  a cross  
sec t ion  of  major d r i l l i n g  c o n t r a c to r s  and smal l ,  o n e - r ig  companies; deep 
and shallow w e l l s ;  and la rge  and small  r i g s .  D r i l l i n g  c o n t r a c to r s  
b a s i c a l ly  operate  in  a reas  th a t  a re  expected to  produce hydrocarbons.  
The same equipment ( tongs ,  spinning chains ,  k e l l y  bushings,  d r i l l  p ipes ,  
e t c . )  i s  u t i l i z e d  in a s im i la r  manner r eg a rd le s s  of the well  s i t e  
l o ca t io n .  There i s  l i t t l e  in d ic a t io n  t h a t  the o i l  f i e l d  opera t ions  or 
the acc ident  s t a t i s t i c s  of  Texas d i f f e r  from n a t io n a l  f ig u r e s .
The in ju ry  incidence  r a t e  was es timated by e x t r a p o la t i n g  the a c tu a l  
number of compensable (medical / indemnity) i n j u r i e s  for  employees of 
d r i l l i n g  companies repor ted  in  Texas to  a l l  d r i l l i n g .  The assumption 
was th a t  i f  the r a t e  of  i n j u r i e s  in  Texas fo r  a given amount of d r i l l i n g  
a c t i v i t y  was r e p re s e n ta t i v e  of n a t io n a l  d r i l l i n g  in ju ry  r a t e s ,  and there  
was a repor ted  number of d r i l l i n g  i n j u r i e s  in  Texas,  then a reasonable  
number for compensable i n j u r i e s  nationwide could be es timated as in 
Tables I I I - 2 ,  I I I - 3 ,  and I I I - 4 .
The proport ion  of  t o t a l  d r i l l i n g  a c t i v i t y  a t t r i b u t a b l e  to  Texas, as a 
percentage  of n a t io n a l  f i g u r e s ,  was developed us ing th ree  independent 
comparison f a c to r s :  number of wel ls  d r i l l e d  (Table I I I - 2 ) ,  number ofa c t iv e  r ig s  (Table I I I - 3 )  , and well  footage (Table I I I - 4 ) . For example, 
Texas was determined to  account for  approximately 39.6% (a range of 
34.7% to 41.5%) of the Na t ion 's  d r i l l i n g  a c t i v i t y  based on the number of ac t ive  r i g s  from 1973 to  1978 (Table I I I - 3 ) .  Est imates were then made 
of the number of d r i l l i n g  employees in ju red  nationwide based on the 
number of compensable cla ims by employees of Texas d r i l l i n g  c o n t r a c to r s .
The average in ju ry  incidence  r a t e ,  based ori the a c tu a l  number of  paid 
medical and/or  indemnity claims to  employees of d r i l l i n g  companies in 
Texas, was 38.1 between 1973 and 1978 (a range of 26.5 to  49 .4 ) .  Tables 
I I I - 2 ,  I I I - 3 ,  and I I I - 4  presen t  the es timated compensable in ju ry  
incidence  r a t e s  fo r  the d r i l l i n g  indus t ry  fo r  1973 to  1978.
2. Estimates of In ju ry  Incidence Rates Based on IADC Data
A second da ta  source to  be considered when eva lua t in g  in ju ry  incidence  
r a t e s  fo r  the d r i l l i n g  indust ry  are those  developed by the IADC. Table 
I I I - 5  p resen ts  the l o s t - t im e  in ju ry  incidence r a t e s  developed by the IADC for  o i l  and gas well  d r i l l i n g  for 1975-80.
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TABLE II1-2
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES INJURED AND INJURY INCIDENCE RATES FOR OIL AND GAS WELL
DRILLING OPERATIONS BASED ON LAND-BASED WELLS DRILLED IN TEXAS
Year
Wells D r i l l ed  
in Texas1
Wells D r i l l ed  
Nationwide1
Texas as a % 
of  Nationwide2
In ju r i e s  
in  Texas3
Es t .  I n ju r i e s  
Nationwide^
Es t .  Popula t ion  Incidence 
a t  Risk^ Rate^
1973 8,422 26,543 31.7 4,499 14,192 32,408 43.8
1974 9,645 31,954 30.2 5,533 18,321 40,563 45.21975 12,309 38,151 32.3 6,360 19,690 46,113 42.7
1976 12,514 40,471 30.9 6,340 20,518 45,561 45.01977 14,421 45,238 31.9 8,625 27,038 54,697 49.4
1978 14,747 47,413 31.1 6,820 21,929 61,780 35.5T o t . /
Avg. 72,058 229,770 31.4 38,177 121,688 281,122 4 3 .37
1 From the American Petroleum I n s t i t u t e  Quarte rly  Review of  D r i l l i n g  S t a t i s t i c s  [29-34].
2 Calculated by div id ing the number of wells d r i l l e d  in  Texas by the number of wells d r i l l e d  
nationwide and m ult ip ly ing  by 100.
3 Reported by the Texas Workers' Compensation S ta te  Board of Insurance [35] (Adjusted to r e f l e c t  
land-based i n j u r i e s ) .
^ Extrapolated from the percentage of  d r i l l i n g  a c t i v i t y  and the number of i n j u r i e s  in  Texas. 
Person-years (from Table I I - 4 . )
 ̂ I n ju r i e s  per 100 person-years .  Calculated  by d iv id ing  the estimated number of i n j u r i e snationwide by the est imated popula tion a t  r i s k  and m ul t ip ly ing  by 100.
 ̂ Calculated by d iv id ing  the t o t a l  est imated number of i n j u r i e s  nationwide by the t o t a l  
estimated popula tion a t  r i s k  and m ult ip ly ing  by 100.
TABLE III-3
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES INJURED AND INJURY INCIDENCE RATES FOR OIL AND GAS WELL
















1973 367 1,057 34.7 4,428 12,761 32,408 39.4
1974 487 1,323 36.8 5,394 14,658 40,563 36.1
1975 616 1,504 41.0 6,237 15,212 46,113 33.0
1976 617 1,486 41.5 6,099 14,696 45,561 32.3
1977 737 1,784 41.3 8,351 20,220 54,697 37.0
1978 808 2,015 40.1 6,572 16,389 61,780 26.5
Tot./
Avg. 3,632 9,169 39.6 37,081 93,936 281,122 33.4 7
1 From the Oil and Gas Journal  (see Table I I —3)[11] .
2 Calculated by d iv id ing  the number of a c t iv e  r ig s  in Texas by the number of ac t ive  r i g s  nationwide
and mul t ip ly ing by 100.
Reported by the Texas Workers' Compensation S ta te  Board of  Insurance [35] (Adjusted to  r e f l e c t  
land-based i n j u r i e s ) .
4 Extrapolated from the percentage of d r i l l i n g  a c t i v i t y  and the number of i n j u r i e s  in  Texas. 
Person-years (from Table I I - 4 . )
6 I n ju r i e s  per 100 person-years .  Calcula ted by d iv id ing  the est imated number of i n j u r i e s  nationwide 
by the estimated popula tion a t  r i s k  and m ul t ip ly ing  by 100.
7 Calculated by d iv id ing  the t o t a l  est imated number of i n j u r i e s  nationwide by the t o t a l  es timated
population a t  r i s k  and m ult ip ly ing  by 100.
NOTE: The in jury  incidence r a t e  c a l cu la t ed  in  t h i s  ta b le  would be i d e n t i c a l  to the in ju ry  incidence
r a t e  c a l cu la t ed  for  Texas s ince  r i g  count i s  not only used to  develop the popula t ion  a t  r i s k  
(Tables I I - 3 ,  I I - 4 )  but i s  a lso  the bas is  fo r  the e x t r a p o la t io n  of  the estimated i n j u r i e s  
nationwide.
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES INJURED AND INJURY INCIDENCE RATES FOR OIL AND GAS WELL 









Texas as a % 
of Nationwide2
I n ju r i e s  
in Texas-^
Est .  I n ju r i e s  
Nationwide^
Es t .  Populat ion 
a t  Risk^
Incidence
Rate6
1973 44,654 129,175 34.6 4,473 12,928 32,408 39.9
1974 49,677 144,990 34.3 5,480 15,977 40,563 39.4
1975 61,484 170,041 36.2 6,293 17,384 46,113 37.7
1976 63,743 176,871 36.0 6,263 17,397 45,561 38.2
1977 75,346 204,040 36.9 8,483 22,989 54,697 42.0
1978 78,516 221,401 35.5 6,743 18,994 61,780 30.7
T o t . /
Avg. 373,420 1,046,518 35.7 37,735 105,669 281,122 37 .67
1 From the American Petroleum I n s t i t u t e  Quarte rly  Review of  D r i l l i n g  S t a t i s t i c s  [29-34].
2 Calculated by d iv id ing  the number of well footage in Texas by the number of well  footage nationwide 
and mult ip ly ing by 100.
 ̂ Reported by the Texas Workers' Compensation S ta te  Board of Insurance [35] (ad jus ted  to r e f l e c t  
land-based i n j u r i e s ) .
^ Extrapolated from the percentage of d r i l l i n g  a c t i v i t y  and the number of i n j u r i e s  in Texas.
 ̂ Person-years (from Table I I - 4 )
6 I n ju r i e s  per 100 person-years .  Calculated by d iv id ing  the estimated number of i n j u r i e s  nationwide
by the estimated popula t ion  a t  r i s k  and m ult ip ly ing  by 100.
7 Calculated by d iv id ing  the t o t a l  est imated number of i n j u r i e s  nationwide by the t o t a l  estimated
population a t  r i s k  and m ult ip ly ing  by 100.
A cciden t / in ju ry  in format ion i s  c o l l ec te d  from IADC member companies 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g  in  a yea r ly  sa fe ty  awards program [36] ,  The rep o r t in g  
format adheres to  the American National Standards I n s t i t u t e  (ANSI) Z16.1 
gu ide l ines  [37].  The i n j u r i e s  tabu la ted  under the ANSI gu ide l ines  by the 
IADC are l o s t - t im e  i n j u r i e s —those i n j u r i e s  r e s u l t i n g  in  a time loss  
beyond the day of the acc iden t .  The repor ted  employee person-hour 
f igu res  include those hours worked by a l l  company employees—support 
s t a f f ,  s e c r e t a r i a l  he lp ,  s a le s  personnel ,  as well  as those persons a t  
r i s k  in  d r i l l i n g  ope ra t ion s .
Examination of  Table I I I - 5  shows th a t  the lo s t - t im e  in ju ry  incidence  r a t e  
for  rep o r t ing  d r i l l i n g  co n t ra c to r s  in  1980 was 11.6.  National BLS 
incidence r a t e s  fo r  o i l  f i e l d  workers show th a t  l o s t - t im e  i n j u r i e s  
c o n s i s t e n t ly  account fo r  about 50% of the t o t a l  recordable  i n j u r i e s  in 
the o i l  f i e l d  [20-28].  This means th a t  the recordable  in ju ry  incidence 
r a t e  for  the IADC rep o r t in g  companies fo r  1980Ashould be approximately 23 
(about two times the repor ted  lo s t - t im e  in ju ry  incidence  r a t e  of  11 .6) .
TABLE I I I - 5
LOST-TIME INJURY INCIDENCE RATES FOR OIL AND 













I n j u r i e s 1
E s t .
Person-
y e a r s 2
Lost-t ime In jury  
Incidence Rate^ 
(per  100 person-  
years  )
1975 57 59.1 24,337 1,439 12,169 11.8
1976 92 56.2 35,961 2,020 17,981 11.2
1977 92 59.8 41,466 2,480 20,733 12.0
1978 116 63.7 54,646 3,478 27,323 12.7
1979 113 58.1 54,181 3,147 27,091 11.6
1980 131 57.8 74,972 4,330 37,486 11.6
Tot .,/
Avg. 601 59.1 285,563 16,894 142,783 11.84
1 Compiled from IADC r e p o r t s  [38-43],
2 Calcula ted by d iv id ing  t o t a l  person-hours by 2,000 person-hours per
person-year .
3 Calculated  by d iv id ing  the lo s t - t im e  i n j u r i e s  by the es timated 
person-years and m ul t ip ly ing  by 100.
^ Calculated  by d iv id ing  the t o t a l  lo s t - t im e  i n j u r i e s  by the t o t a l  
es timated person-years  and m ul t ip ly ing  by 100.
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Recognizing th a t  a po r t ion  of  the IADC employment f igu re  i s  not a t  r i s k  
in d r i l l i n g  o p e ra t io n s ,  the in ju ry  incidence r a t e  fo r  those employees a t  
r i s k  should be h ighe r .  The rep o r t ing  base for  the IADC "In jury
S t a t i s t i c s  Reports" i s  heav i ly  weighted toward the l a rg e r  c o n t r a c to r
(companies more l i k e ly  to have a c t ive  sa fe ty  and employee t r a in i n g
programs). Only f ive  companies, 4% of  the 131 c o n t r a c to r s  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  
in  1980 were es timated to  be smal l ,  one - r ig  companies.1 The median 
number of r ig s  owned by the companies not p a r t i c i p a t i n g  in  the sa fe ty  
awards program was repor ted  by the IADC to  be one. Approximately 83% 
(629 companies) of the IADC membership (approximately 760 t o t a l  
companies in  1980 [8]) did not co n t r ib u te  to  the in ju ry  da ta  base.
These n o n p a r t i c ip a t in g ,  smaller companies account for  approximately
53%2 of the worker popula tion  and are l e s s  l i k e ly  to have an a c t ive  
sa fe ty  and/or  employee t r a in i n g  program.
3. Estimates of In jury  Incidence Rates Based on SDS S t a t i s t i c s
The th i r d  method u t i l i z e s  the SDS in ju ry  da ta  base .  This da ta  base 
d i f f e r s  from th a t  used by the BLS to develop the incidence r a t e s  
presented e a r l i e r  in  Table I I I - l .  The SDS t a b u la t e s  those i n j u r i e s  th a t  
are  reported  to workers '  compensation c a r r i e r s  and subsequently to  s t a t e  
compensation insurance boards.  BLS incidence  r a t e s  are  based on a 
sample of OSHA 200 forms [44].  These forms, completed by the employer, 
r ep o r t  a l l  work-re la ted  i n j u r i e s  including those th a t  involve such 
circumstances as medical treatment  beyond " f i r s t  a i d , "  t r a n s f e r  to 
another  work assignment ,  and loss  of time from work. I t  would be 
expected th a t  SDS in ju ry  f igu re s  would be lower than BLS f igu re s  because 
i n j u r i e s  not r e s u l t i n g  in medical treatment or time loss  are  not 
included in  the SDS rep o r t s  but are f requent ly  recordable  under the BLS 
c r i t e r i a  [44].  Of the s t a t e s  which r ep o r t  SIC 1381 in ju ry  da ta  to  SDS, 
a t o t a l  of 17 s t a t e s  a l so  repor ted  average r i g  a c t i v i t y  for  the years  
1976-1980. The p ropor t ion  of t o t a l  d r i l l i n g  a c t i v i t y  based on average 
r i g  count (1976-1980) for  these s t a t e s ,  as a percentage of n a t io n a l  
f ig u r e s ,  was 18.4% compared to 38.7% for  Texas (Table I I - 3 ) .
1 Calculated by d iv id ing  repor ted  annual person-hours [43] by the est imated 
number of person-hours necessary to run a 21-person r i g  365 days; i . e . ,  21 
workers fo r  8 hours /day fo r  365 days/year  = 61,320 person-hours per r i g
per  year .
2 The IADC rep o r t s  t h a t  74,971,823.01 person-hours  [43] are  included in  i t s  
1980 r e p o r t .  I f  a "person", as def ined by the BLS, works 2,000 hours per 
year ,  then 37,486 (74,971,823.01 divided by 2,000) person-years  are
included in  the 1980 r e p o r t .  These f igu re s  include a l l  person-years  and
are not l im i ted  to the popula tion a t  r i s k .  The ac tua l  popula tion a t  r i s k  
in  d r i l l i n g  opera t ions  has been est imated to be 79,869 person-years  in
1980 (Table I I - 4 ) .  The IADC rep or t  r e p re se n t s ,  a t  most, 47% of the 
indust ry  popula t ion .
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The SDS data  were analyzed to  determine the in ju ry  incidence  r a t e  fo r  
the s t a t e s  r e p o r t ing  to  SDS. Table I I I - 6  summarizes the a n a ly s i s  and 
shows the average in ju ry  incidence r a t e  in  these  s t a t e s  to  be 21.8.
4. Summary of In jury  Incidence Rates for  Oil  and Gas Well D r i l l i n g
Because n a t io n a l  in ju ry  incidence f ig u re s  have not been compiled and 
repor ted ,  th ree  da ta  sources and th ree  techniques have been used to  
e s t imate  the in ju ry  incidence  r a t e s  fo r  o i l  and gas well  d r i l l i n g  
i n j u r i e s .  Two es t imat ing  techniques used the a c tu a l  numbers of  paid 
in ju ry  claims (medical and/or  indemnity) repor ted  to the TWC and the SDS.
The f i r s t  e s t imat ing  technique used a c tu a l  workers '  compensation in ju ry  
claims for  employees of o i l  and gas well  d r i l l i n g  c o n t ra c to r s  t h a t  were 
paid in  the S ta te  of Texas. The percentage of  nationwide d r i l l i n g  
a c t i v i t y  which Texas represented  was determined u t i l i z i n g  th ree  
technology v a r i a b l e s .  Ex t rapo la t ing  in ju ry  f igu res  to  a l l  d r i l l i n g  
a c t i v i t i e s  shows th a t  the average incidence  r a t e  of  compensable i n j u r i e s  
r equ ir ing  medical treatment was 38.1 (Tables I I I - 2 ,  -3 ,  - 4 ) .
The second es t im at ing  method i s  based on the annual s a fe ty  awards 
compet it ion  held by the IADC. P a r t i c i p a t i n g  companies, rep re sen t ing  
about 47% of the employment f igu re s  and 17% of  the member companies in 
1980, repor t  only d i sab l in g  “( lo s t - t im e )  i n j u r i e s  and compute the 
incidence r a t e s  based on t o t a l  employment f ig u re s  (popula t ion  a t  r i s k  
plus support s t a f f ) .  The IADC d i sa b l in g  ( l o s t - t im e )  in ju ry  incidence  
r a t e  for  o i l  and gas well  d r i l l i n g  averaged about 11.8 between 1975 and 
1980 (Table I I I - 5 ) .
The t h i r d  method i s  based on the 1976-1980 SDS in ju ry  da ta  base which 
includes accident in format ion from a 1 7 - s t a t e  sample rep re se n t in g  only 
18.4% of  the d r i l l i n g  nationwide (Table I I - 3 ) .  I t  was es t imated  th a t  
the in ju ry  incidence r a t e  in  these  s t a t e s  was 21.8 (Table I I I - 6 ) .
I t  i s  the conclusion of  t h i s  study t h a t  r eg a rd le s s  of which da ta  source 
and es t imat ing  method a re  used, workers in  the o i l  and gas well  d r i l l i n g  
indust ry  are in ju red  a t  an unacceptably high r a t e .
C. F a t a l i t y  S t a t i s t i c s
The number of a c t ive  o i l  and gas well  d r i l l i n g  r i g s  in  the S ta te  of  Texas 
between 1973 and 1978 accounted fo r  approximately 39.6% of  the d r i l l i n g  in  
the United S ta tes  (Table I I I - 3 ) .  Table I I I - 7  p re sen ts  da ta  fo r  these  years  
on the number of  worker f a t a l i t i e s ,  repor ted  by the TWC, in  the o i l  and gas 
well  d r i l l i n g  indust ry  [35].  There were 148 deaths  in  the Texas d r i l l i n g  
indus t ry  during these 6 y e a r s—an average of  approximately 25 deaths  per  year .  Since Texas rep re se n ts  approximately 39.6% of  the n a t i o n a l  d r i l l i n g  
a c t i v i t y ,  based on a c t iv e  r i g s ,  an average of 63 f a t a l i t i e s  per  year  of 
workers in  the o i l  and gas well  d r i l l i n g  indus t ry  may be es timated by 
e x t r a p o la t in g  the average number of deaths  per  year  in  Texas to  the e n t i r e  indus t ry .
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TABLE II1-6
ESTIMATED AVERAGE INJURY INCIDENCE RATES FOR OIL AND GAS WELL DRILLING (SIC 1381)
IN SDS REPORTING STATES BASED ON SDS INJURY STATISTICS FOR 1976-1980
No.Years 
I n ju r i e s  
S ta te  Reported
No. Reported
I n ju r i e s
1976-19801
Adjusted No.




E s t .  Pop. 




ALASKA 5 1236 1236 71.8 2201.4 56.1
ARIZONA 1 2 10 3.4 104.2 9.6
ARKANSAS 4 89 111 81.1 2486.5 4.5
COLORADO 5 1236 1236 225.4 6910.8 17.9
IDAHO 5 106 106 9.6 294.3 36.0
INDIANA 4 22 28 9.8 300.5 9.3KENTUCKY 5 434 434 8.4 257.5 168.5
MARYLAND 5 8 8 2.4 73.6 10.9MICHIGAN 5 836 836 127.8 3918.3 21.3
MISSISSIPPI 1 258 1290 216.3 6631.8 19.5
MONTANA 5 2280 2280 167.2 5126.4 44.5
NEBRASKA 5 359 359 50.1 1536.1 23.4
N.MEXICO 3 698 1163 404.6 12405.0 9.4
NEW YORK 3 106 177 37.7 1155.9 15.3
OHIO 2 806 2015 224.6 6886.2 29.3
S.DAKOTA 4 34 43 10.6 325.0 13.2
UTAH 5 743 743 152.4 4672.6 15.9
TOT./AVG. 9253 12075 1803.2 55286.1 21 .86
1 Reported by the Bureau of Labor S t a t i s t i c s ,  Supplementary Data System [45],
2 Adjusted to r e f l e c t  t o t a l  i n j u r i e s  for  s t a t e s  repor t ing  for  le s s  than f ive  years .
 ̂ Total  r i g  a c t i v i t y  for  SDS repor t ing  s t a t e s  [11] (Table I I - 3 ) .
^ Calculated by m ult ip ly ing  the number of employees per r ig  (7) by the number of s h i f t s  
per day (3) by the number of hours per s h i f t  (8) by the number of days per year  (365) by
the average number of r ig s  and d iv id ing  the r e s u l t  by 2,000 ( the number of hours worked by
an indiv idual  in a ye a r ) .
 ̂ I n ju r i e s  per 100 person-years .  Calculated  by d iv id ing  adjus ted  i n ju r i e s  fo r  SIC 1381 by 
the estimated popula tion  a t  r i s k ,  m u l t ip l i e d  by 100.
6 Calculated by div id ing  t o t a l  ad jus ted  i n j u r i e s  for SIC 1381 by the t o t a l  est imated popula tion  a t  r i s k ,  m u l t ip l i ed  by 100.
Thir ty-seven f a t a l i t i e s  were reported by the o i l  and gas well  d r i l l i n g  
companies p a r t i c i p a t i n g  in  the IADC sa fe ty  awards program for  1980 [43].  I f  
the p a r t i c i p a t i n g  companies in  the 1980 IADC rep o r t  rep re sen t  about 47% of 
the employment f igu re s  fo r  d r i l l i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  and 37 deaths  were repor ted ,  
then 79 deaths can be es timated for  the e n t i r e  d r i l l i n g  indus t ry .
TABLE I I I - 7
FATALITIES THAT OCCURRED IN TEXAS OIL AND GAS WELL DRILLING OPERATIONS 






Texas as a % 
of Nationwide2
F a t a l i t i e s  
in  Texas-*
Est .  F a t a l i t i e s  
Nationwide^
1973 367 1,057 34.7 27 78
1974 487 1,323 36.8 26 71
1975 616 1,504 41.0 17 41
1976 617 1,486 41.5 20 48
1977 737 1,784 41.3 32 771978 808 2,015 40.1 26 65
Avg. 605 1,528 39.6 25 63
1 From the Oil and Gas Journal [11].
2 Calculated by dividing the active rigs in Texas by the active rigs 
nationwide and multiplying by 100.
3 Reported by the Texas Workers' Compensation State Board of Insurance [35] 
(Adjusted to reflect only land-based fatalities).
^ Estimated by extrapolating the percentage of total active rigs in 
Texas and the reported fatalities [35] to the entire industry.
D. Hazardous Tasks Performed in  Well D r i l l i n g  Operations
An ana lys i s  of d e t a i l e d  accident and in ju ry  r ep o r t s  was performed to 
determine causa t ive  f a c to r s  in  d r i l l i n g  a cc ide n t s .  The acc iden ts  included 
in the ana lys i s  tended to  be r ep re se n ta t i v e  of  the more se r ious  
even ts—d e ta i l e d  summaries of minor i n j u r i e s / a c c i d e n t s  a re  not commonly 
a v a i l a b le .  However, the comparison of acc iden t  causa t ive  f a c to r s  with 
accident a na ly s i s  developed by IADC in  i t s  r e p o r t s ,  as well  as the SDS 
ana lys i s  of acc ident  types ,  led to  the conclus ion t h a t  the a na ly s i s  i s  
r ep re se n ta t iv e  of acc iden ts  th a t  occur during d r i l l i n g  opera t ions .
The ana lys i s  of 738 acc ident  and in jury  r e p o r t s  in d ica ted  th a t  approximately 
82% of the reported  i n j u r i e s  and f a t a l i t i e s  were d i r e c t l y  a t t r i b u t a b l e  to  
d r i l l i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  such as t r ip p in g ,  adding d r i l l  p ipe ,  and to rquing the 
d r i l l  s t r i n g  (Table I I I - 8 ) . The remaining i n j u r i e s  (18%) were a ssoc ia ted  
with tasks  performed in  many i n d u s t r i e s  such as using handtools ,  4.3%; 
performing pump in spec t ion  and maintenance, 1.9%; and o th e r ,  8.5%.
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TABLE I I I - 8  
DRILLING OPERATIONS AND INJURY DISTRIBUTION
F a l l s  F a l l s  Mud Pump
D r i l l i n g  Hand- from on Tank Inspec t ion  and 
A c t i v i t i e s  t o o l s  Ladders Stairway Tasks Maintenance Burns Other
No. of
Reported
Injuries 603 32 2 12 5 14 7 63
Percentage
of Total 81.7 4.3 0.3 1.6 0.7 1.9 1.0 8.5
Compiled from 738 acc iden t  r e p o r t s  of OSHA i n v e s t i g a t i o n s ,  company acc iden t  
r e p o r t s ,  workers '  compensation r e p o r t s ,  and published case h i s t o r i e s  (Tables 
I I I - 9  and 111-10) [10, 46-49].
After  f u r th e r  ref inement of the 603 f a t a l i t y  and in ju ry  r e p o r t s  (Table 
I I I - 9 )  a t t r i b u t a b l e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  to well  d r i l l i n g  a c t i v i t i e s ,  the major 
a c t i v i t i e s  ( t a sk s ,  t o o l s ,  and equipment) c o n t r ib u t in g  to  o i l  and gas well  
d r i l l i n g  acc idents  were found to  be as follows:
o Handling of d r i l l  p ipes ,  c o l l a r s ,  and cas ings  r e s u l t e d  in  22.2% of  the  
acc idents  and 16% of  the repor ted  f a t a l i t i e s .
o Tong opera t ions  r e s u l t e d  in  15.3% of  the acc iden ts  and 10% of  the 
repor ted  f a t a l i t i e s .
o Derr ick opera t ions  r e s u l t e d  in  8.3% of  the acc iden ts  and 31% of  the repor ted  f a t a l i t i e s .
o Cables and chains were involved in  8.0% of  the  acc iden ts  and 6% of  the 
repor ted  f a t a l i t i e s .
o Eleva tor  opera t ions  r e s u l t e d  in  6.3% of  the acc iden ts  and 4% of  the 
reported  f a t a l i t i e s .
Table I I I - 9  p resen ts  a d e t a i l e d  a n a ly s i s  of  acc iden t  r e p o r t s  s p e c i f i c  to  
d r i l l i n g  a c t i v i t i e s ,  and Table 111-10 p re sen ts  an a n a ly s i s  of  acc iden ts  th a t  
occurred while tasks  t y p i c a l  of  o th e r  i n d u s t r i e s  were being performed. Case 
h i s t o r i e s  r e p re s e n ta t i v e  of  these  acc iden ts  a re  presented  in  Appendix A.
The IADC, in i t s  "Char l ie  Report fo r  1980", c l a s s i f i e s  t o t a l  i n j u r i e s  
a s soc ia ted  with r i g  a c t i v i t y  or  equipment (Table I I I - l l )  [43] .  In  1977 
through 1979 the IADC a l s o  repor ted  major c a t e g o r i e s  (Table 111-12) [40-42] ,  
which a re  s im i la r  to those used by the  SDS fo r  r e p o r t in g  s t a t e  in ju ry  d a ta ;  
e . g . ,  caught in  or  between, s t ruck  by or  a g a i n s t ,  f a l l s  of  personnel ,  
o ve rexer t ion ,  f a l l i n g  o b j e c t s ,  f ly in g  o b j e c t s ,  and temperature  extremes. 
Fur ther  examination of  Table I I I - l l  shows t h a t  approximately 48% of the
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TABLE II1-9
TYPES AND CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS SUSTAINED DURING TASKS
UNIQUE TO WELL DRILLING OPERATIONS1




Struck by/ Caught in /  
aga ins t  between
Overexer-




F a l l  to 
Working 
Surface
F a l l  to Nonclas- 
Below s i f i a b l e T0TAL(%) F a ta l
Tongs 53 35 3 1 92(15.3) 10
D r i l l  p ipes ,  
c o l l a r s ,  casing 51 62 13 2 3 3 134(22.2) 17
Elevators 12 21 1 4 38 (6.3) 4
Slips 3 9 11 23 (3.8)
Catheads, c a t l i n e s 4 5 1 10 (1.6)
Kelly 4 3 3 10 (1.6)
Spinning chains 5 1 1 7 (1.2) 2
Cables, Chains, 
Ropes, Lines 23 8 5 1 3 3 5 48 (8.0) 6
Travel ing blocks 14 2 16 (2.7) 4
Rotary tab le 4 4 2 10 (1.6) 2
Hose, Pipe, 
Flow l ine 16 5 2 1 1 2 27 (4.5) 6
1 Seven hundred t h i r t y - e i g h t  acc ident  r ep o r t s  have been compiled from OSHA in v e s t ig a t io n s ,  company
accident r e p o r t s ,  workers '  compensation r e p o r t s ,  and published case h i s t o r i e s  [10, 46-49];  603 of the 
accident r ep o r t s  r e l a t e  d i r e c t l y  to well d r i l l i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  (Table I I I - 8 )  and are  analyzed in  th i s  
t a b l e .  An ana lys i s  of the remaining 135 accident r ep o r t s  i s  presented in  Table 111-10.
TABLE II1-9
TYPES AND CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS SUSTAINED DURING TASKS









Caught in /  Overexer- Substance 
between t i o n ( l i f t )  in  Eye
F a l l  to 
Working 
Surface
F a l l  to  Nonclas- 
Below s i f i a b l e
Pipe rack 4 4 (0.7)
Swivel 3 1 4 (0.7) 1
Snubs 3 2 3 1 9 (1.5)
J e t s 2 2 (0 .3 )
Boards 3 3 (0.5)
D r i l l  b i t s 2 2 (0.3)
Brakes 4 4 (0.7) 1
BOP 9 5 2 1 1 3 1 22 (3.6) 6
Derrick 1 7 41 1 50 (8 .3) 33
Rig f loor 5 5 (0 .8) 1
Substruc ture 3 3 (0 .5 ) 1
Mousehole, Rathole 2 2 3 7 (1 .2)
TABLE II1-9
TYPES AND CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS SUSTAINED DURING TASKS
UNIQUE TO WELL DRILLING OPERATIONS (Concluded)
Type of AccidentTool/equipment 
Associated with 
Accident
Foreign F a l l  to 
Struck by/ Caught in /  Overexer- Substance Working aga ins t  between t i o n ( l i f t )  in  Eye Surface F a l l  to Below
Nonclas- 
s i f i a b l e TOTAL(%) Fata l
Vee-door 2 2 (0.3)
Cel la r 4 4 (0.7) 1
Ladder in to  Ce l la r 2 2 (0.3)
Valve cap on 
mud tank 3 3 (0.5) 2
Drawworks 1 1 2 (0.3) 2
Rigging 4 4 (0.7)
Welding, Cutting 1 1 2 (0.3)
Reserve p i t 1 1 (0.2) 1
Motor vehic le 3 3 (0.5) 3
Other 7 10 7 7 19 50 (8 .3) 2
TOTAL
(%)
220 176 55 13 31 68 40 603 105
(36.5) (29.2) (9 .1 )  (2 .2)  (5 .1)  (11.3) (6 .6 )  (100.0) (17.4)
TABLE I11-10
TYPES AND CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS SUSTAINED DURING TASKS
NOT UNIQUE TO WELL DRILLING OPERATIONS1
Accident Types Handtools Ladders Stairways Mud Tank Pump Burns Other Total(%) F a ta l
Foreign substances 
in  the Eye 3 10 13 (9.6 )
F a l l  to working 
surface 2 8 3 2 6 21(15.6)
F a l l  to  below 1 4 7 3 15(11.1) 1
Struck by/agains t 25 14 39(28.9)
Caught in/between 2 4 8 14(10.4)
Contact with 
temperature extremes 5 5 (3.7 )
Overexertion 1 4 5 (3.7 )
Puncture 3 3 (2 .2 )
Heat exposure 1 2 3 (2.2)
E lec t rocu t ion 1 1 3 5 (3.7 ) 4
Motor vehic le 3 3 (2 .2)

















1 Seven hundred t h i r t y - e i g h t  acc ident  r ep o r t s  have been compiled from OSHA in v e s t ig a t io n s ,  company accident  
r e p o r t s ,  workers '  compensation r e p o r t s ,  and published case h i s t o r i e s  [10, 46-49];  135 of  the accident 
repor t s  concerned a c t i v i t i e s  not unique to  well  d r i l l i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  (Table I I I - 8 )  and are analyzed in 
th i s  t a b l e .  An a n a ly s i s  of the remaining 603 accident r ep o r t s  i s  presented in  Table I I I - 9 .
repor ted  acc idents  involved equipment and/or  machinery th a t  i s  d i r e c t l y  
a ssoc ia ted  with t r i p p in g  and d r i l l  s t r i n g  lengthening procedures;  e . g . ,  
tongs,  13.0%; cab les ,  chains ,  and ropes,  8.4%; s l i p s ,  3.2%; p ipe ,  16.8%;
e le v a to r s ,  4.5%; and ro ta ry  t a b l e s ,  1.8%. S im ila r  r e s u l t s  repor ted  by the 
Union of Soviet S o c i a l i s t  Republics (USSR) r e sea rch e rs  show th a t  more than 
50% of the acc idents  involved adding d r i l l  pipe to  the s t r i n g  [50, 51].
This study suggests t h a t  the sp e c i f i c  handl ing of d r i l l  p ipes ,  c o l l a r s ,  and 
cas ings  was respons ib le  fo r  more i n j u r i e s  than any o ther  ta sk  (22% of the 
a c c id e n t s ) ,  and th a t  tongs were involved in more acc iden ts  (15%) than any 
o ther  type of equipment or  too l  (Table I I I - 9 ) .  Two s tu d ie s  of of fshore  
d r i l l i n g  acc idents  a l so  repor ted  th a t  tongs were the most hazardous piece of 
equipment [52, 53].  F a l l s  of personnel  accounted fo r  almost 15% of the
i n j u r i e s ,  and overexer t ion  caused an a d d i t io n a l  6% of the i n j u r i e s  repor ted  
during 1980 by the IADC (Table I I I - l l )  [43].  F a l l s  were determined by t h i s
study to be respons ib le  for  16% of the i n j u r i e s  (Table I I I - 9 ) .
TABLE I I I - l l
INJURIES ASSOCIATED WITH RIG ACTIVITY OR EQUIPMENT, 1980









Hand Tools 155 4.73
Air Tugger 13 .40
Vehicles 30 .92
Motors or Generators 41 1.25
Fans 2 .06
Clutches or Brakes 19 .58
Si ips 106 3.23
Falling Objects 147 4.48
Cranes 16 .49
Belts or Pulleys 42 1.28
Personnel Falls 490 14.95
Overexertion 182 5.55
Rotary Tables 60 1.83
Temperature Extremes 25 .76
Harmful Substances 74 2.26
Other 406 12.38
TOTAL 3278 100.00
Adapted from the I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Associa t ion  of  D r i l l i n g  C on trac to rs '  
"Char lie  Report for  1980" [43],
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The percentage  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of acc ident  types ,  as r epor ted  by both the IADC 
and SDS for  the 3-year  pe r iod ,  1977-1979, i s  h igh ly  c o r r e l a t e d  (Table 
111- 12) .
TABLE I I I - 12
TYPE OF ACCIDENT OR EXPOSURE FOR OIL AND GAS WELL 
DRILLING ACTIVITIES (1977-79)







Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Struck by or  aga ins t 1,913 22.4 5,118 20.7 1,078 19.7
F a l l s  of personnel 1,725 20.2 3,592 14.6 829 15.2
Caught in  or Between 1,694 19.9 4,162 16.9 975 17.9
Overexertion 920 10.8 2,841 11.5 602 1 1 .0
F a l l in g  ob jec ts 602 7.1 2,925 11.9 660 12.1
Flying ob jec ts 273 3.2 645 2.6 221 4.1
Temperature extremes 265 3.1 748 3.0 169 3.1
All o thers 1,130 13.3 4,648 18.8 927 16.9
TOTAL 8,552 100.0 24,679 100.0 5,461 100.0
1 Compiled from rep o r t s  of the I n t e r n a t io n a l  Assoc ia t ion  of D r i l l i n g  
Contractors  (IADC) [40-42].
2 Reported by the Bureau of Labor S t a t i s t i c s ,  Supplementary Data System 
(SDS) [45].
E. How I n j u r i e s  Occur in  D r i l l i n g  Operations
Inherent in  a l l  t a sks  i s  the p o t e n t i a l  t h a t  an acc ident  w i l l  occur,  although 
the acc ident  p o t e n t i a l  may be g r e a te r  fo r  some ta sks  than fo r  o th e r s .  
Accidents ,  in  tu rn ,  may r e s u l t  in  i n j u r i e s ,  some more severe than o th e r s .  
In jury  s e v e r i ty  i s  r e f l e c t e d  by the na tu re  of the in ju ry  (amputation, 
f r a c t u r e ,  l a c e ra t io n )  and by the amount of time the in ju red  employee i s  
unable to work.
A hazard has been def ined as "a th ing or cond i t ion  th a t  might operate  
aga in s t  success or sa fe ty :  a pos s ib le  source of  p e r i l ,  danger ,  du re ss ,  or d i f f i c u l t y "  [54].  In t h i s  r e p o r t ,  which takes an o p e ra t io n a l  approach to 
the concept of hazard , those t a sks  which a re  more l i k e ly  to  r e s u l t  in  severe 
i n j u r i e s  to  workers are  considered the more hazardous t a sk s .
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I n j u r i e s  th a t  r e s u l t  from hazards  unique to  o i l  and gas well  d r i l l i n g  
opera t ions  can be broadly c l a s s i f i e d  in to  two major c a t e g o r i e s :  those
in j u r i e s  incurred from t a s k - s p e c i f i c  acc iden ts  and those i n j u r i e s  incurred  
during more c a t a s t ro p h ic  events  such as blowouts, d e r r i c k  c o l l a p s e ,  and 
hydrogen s u l f id e  exposures.
1. Task-Specific  Accidents
The f i r s t  major category  of  acc iden ts  i s  r e p re s e n ta t i v e  of  inc iden ts  
th a t  occur during t a s k - s p e c i f i c  o pe ra t ion s .  Accident case h i s t o r i e s ,  
ty p ic a l  to these  ope ra t ion s ,  are presented  in  Appendix A. This major 
category has been f u r th e r  subdivided in to  acc iden ts  t h a t  occur during 
d r i l l i n g  ope ra t ions ,  d e r r i c k  t a sk s ,  and m a te r i a l s  handl ing a c t i v i t i e s .
a.  D r i l l i n g  opera t ions  have been f u r th e r  ca tegor ized  by the to o l s  
or equipment used in  performing the  t a sk ,  such as:
(1) S l ip s
Slips a re  the toothed wedges t h a t  a re  pos i t ioned  between the 
d r i l l  pipe and the master bush in g / ro ta ry  t a b l e  to  suspend the 
d r i l l  s t r i n g  in  the well  bore when i t  i s  not supported by the 
h o i s t .  Most of  the acc iden ts  a t t r i b u t a b l e  to  s l i p  opera t ions  
occur in r e l a t i o n s h ip  to  m a te r i a l s  handl ing; s t r a in e d  backs 
and shoulders a re  common. Furthermore, the working su rface  
may be wet and s l ip p e r y ,  c o n t r ib u t in g  to muscle s t r a i n s ,  as 
well  as to  acc iden ts  such as f a l l s  and dropping the s l i p s  onto 
the f e e t .  Lack of  communication between the d r i l l e r  and the 
employees engaged in  the s l i p  ope ra t ions  and lack  of 
coord ina t ion  between employees engaged in the t a sk  c o n t r ib u te  
to  acc iden t  p o t e n t i a l s  in  s l i p  handl ing .
(2) Tongs
Tongs a re  the l a r g e ,  counterweight-suspended wrenches used to  
"break out"  the torqued couplings on the d r i l l  p ipe .  Both 
s e t s  o f  tongs have sa fe ty  l i n e s ;  when breakout force  i s  put on 
the tongs,  employees should s tep  back from the ou ts ide  rad iu s  
of the tongs in  the event a tong s l i p s  or  a s a fe ty  l i n e  s l i p s  
or b reaks .  In these  in s ta n c es ,  employees pos i t ioned  in  the 
path of  t r a v e l  can s u f f e r  se r ious  in ju ry .
Another l i k e ly  acc iden t  can occur when the d r i l l e r  a c tu a te s  
the wrong tong leve r  and an unsecured tong swings ac ross  the 
r ig  f lo o r  a t  an uncon tro l led  v e lo c i t y .  Sometimes the wrong 
lever  i s  pu l led  because the le ve rs  are  not placed in  such a 
manner as to  make them r e a d i ly  d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e ,  and sometimes 
because the d r i l l e r  i s  d i s t r a c t e d  or  fa t igued .
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A common acc iden t  a t t r i b u t a b l e  to tongs can occur when an 
employee has h i s  hand or  f in g e r  in the wrong place  as he 
a ttempts  to  swing and l a t c h  the tong onto the d r i l l  pipe 
r e s u l t i n g  in  crushing i n j u r i e s  and amputations of the f i n g e r s .
(3) Elevators
E leva to rs  are a se t  of clamps a f f ix ed  to  the b a i l s  on the
swivel below the t r a v e l in g  block. They are  used to  clamp each 
s ide of  a d r i l l  pipe ( the  pipe i s  b e l l ed  in  t h i s  a rea)  and
hold the pipe as i t  i s  pu l led  from the well  bore .
A number of acc iden ts  and a s so c ia te d  i n j u r i e s  can occur during 
the l a tc h in g  and un la tch ing  t a s k s —finge r s  and hands can get 
caught and crushed in  the e l e v a to r  la tc h  mechanisms. The more 
severe i n j u r i e s  involve improper at tachment of the pipe to  the 
e le v a to r .  I f  the pipe i s  overhead when the la tch in g  mechanism 
f a i l s ,  then the pipe may f a l l  on employees working on the
d r i l l  f l o o r .
(4) C a t l ines
C a t l ines  are  used on d r i l l i n g  r i g s  to h o i s t  m a te r i a l .  The
revolving cathead on the drawworks powers the f r i c t i o n  pul ley  
system. An employee wraps a rope, usua l ly  1-1/4 inches in 
diameter ,  around the cathead and tens ions  the l i n e .  The
t i g h t e r  the rope and the more wraps around the ca thead ,  the
f a s t e r  the m a te r ia l  i s  h o i s te d .
Accidents th a t  occur during c a t l i n e  opera t ions  may in ju r e  the 
employee doing the r igg ing  as well  as in ju r e  the o p e ra to r .  
Minimal h o i s t in g  con t ro l  causes sudden and e r r a t i c  load
movements, which may r e s u l t  in  hand and foot i n j u r i e s .
(5) Working su rfaces
The r i g  f lo o r  i s  the working su rface  fo r  most tasks  performed 
in  well  d r i l l i n g  o p e ra t io n s .  This su rface  i s  f requen t ly  wet 
from c i r c u l a t i n g  f lu id  and/or  water used to wash i t  down. 
P rev a i l in g  weather may f u r th e r  inc rease  the s l i p p e r in e s s  of the su r face .
Employees must l i f t ,  push, and p u l l  heavy items as a ro u t in e  
p a r t  of t h e i r  assignments.  S lippery working su rfaces  can 
increase  the l ike l ihood  of back i n j u r i e s  and o ther  
ove rexer t ion  i n j u r i e s .  S l ips  and f a l l s  may r e s u l t  in  s p ra in s ,  
s t r a i n s ,  contus ions ,  and l a c e r a t i o n s .  Exposed moving p a r t s
( ro ta ry  ta b le  and k e l l y  bushing) may compound the in ju ry  
p o t e n t i a l  and s e v e r i ty .
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A ddi t iona l ly ,  the r a th o le  (al though u sua l ly  an e leva ted  tube) 
and mousehole, used to  temporar ily  s t o r e  the k e l l y  bar  and 
d r i l l  p ipe ,  may be uncovered when not in  use.  Stepping in to  a 
f loo r  hole  can r e s u l t  in  f r a c tu r e s  and sp ra in s .
The c e l l a r  i s  a p i t  in  the ground below the d e r r i ck  
s t r u c t u r e .  Hydrogen s u l f i d e ,  i f  r e l e a se d ,  and water  may 
accumulate in  t h i s  low area .  Ladder access  in to  the c e l l a r  i s  
a p o t e n t i a l  acc ident  source,  as i s  lack of  proper guarding.
b. Derr ick Operations
The derrickman on a well  d r i l l i n g  opera t ion  performs h i s  ta sks  from 
var ious  e leva ted  work plat forms in  the mast.  He i s  exposed to 
f a l l s  when not u t i l i z i n g  f a l l  p r o te c t io n  equipment while climbing 
the d e r r i c k  ladder ,  while working with the pipe s tands ,  and while 
moving from the ladder  to  h i s  p la t form  s t a t i o n .  The derrickman is  
a lso  exposed to  crushing i n j u r i e s  from s h i f t i n g  stands of pipe and 
e le v a to r  la tch ing  t a sk s .
Adequate and continuous f a l l  p ro te c t io n  i s  a p r e r e q u i s i t e  fo r  the 
sa fe ty  of employees working on a d e r r i c k .  Conditions beyond the 
con t ro l  of the derrickman (wind, v i b r a t i o n ,  pipe movement) make 
even momentary unpro tected  exposures hazardous.
c.  M ate r ia ls  Handling
The most common type of  acc iden t  t h a t  occurs in  m a te r ia l s  handling 
opera t ions  i s  the "caught between" s i t u a t i o n ;  e . g . ,  when a load i s  
being handled and a f in g e r  or  toe ge ts  caught between two o b je c t s .  
Roll ing stock ( d r i l l  pipe and c o l l a r s )  can s h i f t  and/or  f a l l  from a 
pipe rack or  truckbed. Employees must be a l e r t  to  the hazards 
a t tendan t  to pipe handl ing and racking.
V e r t i c a l  and n e a r - v e r t i c a l  s torage  of d r i l l  pipe on the inc l ined  
ramp req u i res  adequate s l ippage  p r o te c t io n  and employee procedural 
t r a in in g  for  safe  handl ing.
Improper r igg ing  of loads can r e s u l t  in  load s h i f t s  and ob jec ts  
f a l l i n g  on those below. M ate r ia ls  handl ing i s  a support a c t i v i t y ,  
so safe  m a te r ia l s  handl ing procedures f requen t ly  are not given the 
necessary emphasis.
2. Catas trophic  Events
Catas t rophic  acc iden ts  involve the d e s t r u c t i o n  of the d r i l l i n g  r i g  
and/or  i n j u r i e s  to m u l t ip le  employees. Blowouts, d e r r i c k  c o l l a p s e ,  and 
hydrogen s u l f id e  acc iden ts  are  included in  t h i s  ca tegory . Even though these  acc idents  f requen t ly  may involve lo ss  of  l i f e  as well  as the 
major d e s t r u c t i o n  of equipment, the a c tu a l  number of c a s u a l t i e s
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r ep resen t  only a small  percentage of the t o t a l  well  d r i l l i n g  
occupational in ju ry  incidence and s e v e r i ty  r a t e s  [3, 55].
Although not a common occurrence,  d e r r i c k  or mast c o l l ap se  most 
f requent ly  happens during r igging-up and rigging-down procedures.  The 
g r e a t e s t  s t r a i n s  are exer ted  on the mast components during these 
ope ra t ions .  Derr ick frames subjected  to  abuse during movement may be 
damaged and wrecked. Inspec t ion  of  the d e r r i c k  s t r u c t u r e  i s  important 
for  the d e te c t io n  of weld weakness, ox ida t ion ,  and bent members [6, 
7] .  Weight i n d ic a to r s  and recorders  allow the d r i l l e r  to  stay w i th in  
mast load to le ra nc es ;  consequent ly,  they must be maintained and 
inspec ted .  Manufacturers '  r i g  c a p a c i t i e s  and guying requirements  
should always be followed.
F. Costs of I n ju r i e s
Workers' compensation insurance c a r r i e r s ,  r ep re sen t ing  o i l  and gas well  
d r i l l i n g  companies in 15 S ta te s  and accounting fo r  approximately 81X1 of 
the t o t a l  number of a c t iv e  r i g s ,  made ac tua l  compensation payments (medical 
and indemnity) averaging $28,840,230 per year  between 1971 and 1978 (Table 
111-13). Since data  were not a v a i l a b le  from every s t a t e  for  the e n t i r e  time 
span, a very conserva t ive  es t im a te  of the medical/ indemnity  expenditure  per 
employee a t  r i s k  in  the d r i l l i n g  industry  between 1971 and 1978 i s  
approximately $686 per employee (average number of  employees between 1971 
and 1978 was 42,058 (Table I I - 4 ) ;  t h i s  f igu re  divided in to  the t o t a l  
repor ted  d o l l a r s  per year  spent on medical and indemnity fo r  employees of 
d r i l l i n g  companies— $28,840,230 (Table 111-13)— is  $685.73) [35, 56].
Compensation payments for  in ju red  employees accounted fo r  8.6% of the 
corporate  p a y ro l l  in  these  s t a t e s —a range of  26.2% of the t o t a l  p a y ro l l  in 
Louis iana to 3.8% in Indiana (Table 111-13).  Addi tiona l i n d i r e c t  c o s t s  of 
employee i n ju r i e s  ( e . g . ,  new employee t r a i n i n g ,  a d m in is t r a t io n ,  and overhead) a re  es timated by the National Safety Council to be more than four times the ac tua l  medical /  indemnity payments, or approximately $115,000,000 
per year  for  the o i l  and gas well  d r i l l i n g  indus t ry  during the 8-year  per iod 
(1971-78) (Table 111-13) [57].
For the s t a t e s  ind ica ted  in  Table 111-13 ( re p re se n t in g  approximately 80% of 
the t o t a l  footage d r i l l e d )  (Tables I I I - 4  and 111-13),  the average incurred  
workers '  compensation lo ss  per foot  of  well  d r i l l e d  was $0.21.
G. Train ing and the New Employee
T r a d i t i o n a l l y ,  t r a in in g  of o i l  f i e l d  employees has been by on- the- job  
exposure under the guidance of an experienced hand and the superv is ion  of  a 
fu l l y  q u a l i f i e d  d r i l l e r ;  years  were requ ired  fo r  advancement from floorhand 
to  d r i l l e r .  In the pas t  i t  was unus'ual for  a young person to be a d r i l l e r ,
^Number of a c t iv e  land-based r i g s  fo r  rep o r t ing  years (Table I I - 3 )  as a 
percentage of t o t a l  land based a c t iv e  r i g s .
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TABLE 111-13 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION LOSSES INCURRED BY THE 






Losses l ($ /yea r )
Average
P a y ro l l1
($ /year)
Payro l l  Paid 
in  Compensa­
t io n  Losses (%)
Average Well 
Footage D r i l l e d 2 
( f t . / y e a r )
Compensa­
t i o n  Losses per Foot^($)
Alabama 1973-77 329,985 5,004,462 6.6 1,123,655 0.29
Alaska 1972-77 1,203,597 18,152,949 6.6 446,814 2.69
Arkansas 1973-77 416,865 5,692,735 7.3 1,963,036 0.21
Colorado 1973-76 1,083,862 13,718,224 7.9 5,823,623 0.19
I l l i n o i s 1972-77 608,125 7,019,205 8.7 2,564,963 0.24
Indiana 1973-77 46,891 1,240,933 3.8 856,158 0.05
Kansas 1972-77 1,544,177 22,037,448 7.0 10,743,261 0.14
Louisiana 1973-77 3,139,169 11,997,301 26.2 16,477,052 0.19
Michigan 1972-77 1,203,170 8,762,933 13.7 2,241,429 0.54
M iss iss ipp i 1972-76 755,648 14,131,438 5.3 3,905,173 0.19
Montana 1971-77 536,564 7,176,740 7.5 2,383,769 0.23
New Mexico 1973-77 1,755,866 20,647,992 8.5 6,709,484 0.26
Oklahoma 1973-77 6,698,880 70,225,608 9.5 20,826,149 0.32
Texas 1971-78 9,105,563 140,258,688 6.5 62,236,657 0.15
Utah 1973-76 411,868 9,674,385 4.3 1,533,450 0.27
Total 28,840,230 355,741,041 139,834,673
Average 1,922,682 23,716,069 8.6 9,322,312 0.214
1 Compiled from rep o r t s  by the National Council of Compensation Insurance [56] and the Texas 
Workers' Compensation S ta te  Board of  Insurance [35] (Adjusted to  r e f l e c t  land-based compensation 
losses  and p a y r o l l ) .
2 Compiled from the American Petroleum I n s t i t u t e  Quarterly  Review of D r i l l i n g  S t a t i s t i c s  [29-34] 
( fo r  years 1973-78).
3 Calculated by d iv id ing  average incurred compensation loss by average well  footage d r i l l e d  fo r  
repor t ing  s t a t e s .
4 This s t a t i s t i c a l  a na ly s i s  incorpora tes  a weighting f a c to r  t h a t  a t t r i b u t e s  g r e a t e r  r e p re se n ta t i o n  
to 1,000,000 fe e t  d r i l l e d  than to 100,000 f e e t  d r i l l e d .
but with the present leve l  of d r i l l i n g  a c t i v i t y  i t  has become a ne ce ss i ty  
[58] .  Sk i l l ed  hands a re  now a t  a premium and te c h n ic a l  development may lag 
behind job advancement. I n s u f f i c i e n t  crew t r a in i n g  and lack of experienced 
hands have been t a rge ted  by indus t ry  exper ts  as the " g r e a t e s t  problem facing 
the indust ry  today" [59, 60].
A 1979 study of Canadian o i l  f i e l d  a cc iden t s ,  conducted for  the Alber ta  
Div is ion of Occupational Safety and Heal th,  concludes:
The data suggests that accidents will be reduced when people 
who work on well sites are selected properly, oriented well, 
trained completely, retrained constantly, motivated always, and 
retained to become career oil field staff.
Selecting properly from a more qualified pool of applicants 
will begin to occur when escalation of activity in the industry 
decreases, or levels out, or when better retention of workers 
reduces the need for constant replacements. At the present 
time manpower needs are so urgent that normal selection 
procedures are often by-passed.
Orientation would be improved by industry cooperating with 
educational institutions in providing information and courses 
to prospective employees about opportunities in the oil 
fields. Recruitment should include exposure to packaged audio 
visual orientation material that would take the surprise out of 
first days on the job.
Training must compensate for lack of experience when new men, 
because of necessity, are promoted rapidly. The industry will 
be challenged to research best methods and to implement 
excellent programs.
Remaining aware of danger, as familiarity kills caution, 
requires constant retraining in a variety of ways in order to 
retain interest. This constitutes another developmental thrust 
for training institutions and personnel.
Motivation to work safely and to stay with the industry must 
come from the companies. The opportunity to be employed year 
around, developing pride in working for a good company, 
experiencing satisfaction with job conditions, knowing that the 
work is meaningful and in being rewarded generously should 
lessen the movement of workers through the industry. It will 
assist in raising public opinions about oil field work to the 
status of a respected career. This should reduce the number of 
workers who say they are in it for the money only.
Government cooperation with company management in addressing 
the high priority strategic failure paths identified in this
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study should he lp  to reduce the number of s e v e r i ty  and 
acc idents  in  the Alber ta  o i l  f i e l d s  [61].
A d i sp ro p o r t io n a te ly  high percentage of i n j u r i e s  a re  su s ta ined  by new 
employees. The IADC determined t h a t  61% of  the repor ted  d r i l l i n g  i n j u r i e s  
fo r  1979 happened to  persons employed fo r  6 months or  l e s s  (Table 111-14). 
An a na lys i s  of more than 738 acc ident  r e p o r t s  compiled from OSHA 
in v e s t i g a t i o n s ,  company acc iden t  r e p o r t s ,  workers '  compensation r e p o r t s ,  and 
published case h i s t o r i e s  [10, 46-49] of i n j u r i e s  sus ta ined  by employees
during well  d r i l l i n g  opera t ions  showed th a t  about 72% of the in ju red  workers 
had been employed for  l e s s  than 6 months (Table 111-15).  Furthermore, 45% 
of the in ju red  employees a c t u a l l y  had been employed fo r  1 month or  l e s s .  
Other resea rchers  have noted s im i la r  r e l a t i o n s h ip s  between length  of 
employment and in ju ry  incidence  r a t e s .  For example, a Canadian study of 
wel l  d r i l l i n g  acc idents  showed t h a t  58% of those in ju red  in  1977 had been 
employed fo r  l e s s  than 6 months [62] .  Recent s tu d ie s  of acc iden ts  th a t  
occurred during o ffshore  d r i l l i n g  operat ions  have repor ted  t h a t  76.5% of 
those in ju red  were employed fo r  l e s s  than 1 y e a r ,  and 54.8% of the i n j u r i e s  
occurred to employees with l e s s  than 6 months' experience  [52, 53].  A study 
r ep o r t ing  on worker turnover  and sa fe ty  found t h a t  the new workers were the 
most vulnerable  to  acc iden ts  [63] .  These s tu d ie s  did  not determine what 
proport ion  of the work force  was made up of  new employees or whether the 
tasks  ass igned to  new employees posed a g r e a t e r  exposure to  hazards .  I t  
should be noted th a t  in  the d r i l l i n g  indust ry  the new employee t r a d i t i o n a l l y  
advances from the p o s i t i o n  of a ro ta ry  he lpe r  to  a derrickman and even tua l ly  
to the p o s i t i o n  of d r i l l e r .  The tasks  performed by a r o ta ry  he lpe r  ( e . g . ,  
handl ing and to rquing d r i l l  pipe during d r i l l i n g  and t r i p p in g ,  tongs,  
c a t l i n e s ,  and s l i p s )  have been demonstrated by t h i s  study to  be p re c i s e ly  
those most f requent ly  a ssoc ia ted  with worker i n j u r i e s ;  t h e r e f o r e ,  employees 
new to  these d r i l l i n g  ta sks  should be t r a in e d  in  proper  o p e ra t io n a l
procedures .  Similar  t a s k / i n j u r y  r e l a t i o n s h ip s  were repor ted  in  s tu d ie s  of 
o ffshore  d r i l l i n g  opera t ions  [52, 53, 64],  as well  as in  a Canadian study of 
d r i l l i n g  acc idents  [62],
Some d r i l l i n g  c o n t r a c to r s  have implemented ex tens ive  t r a in i n g  programs by 
us ing courses developed by the American Petroleum I n s t i t u t e  (API), the
Petroleum Extension Service  of the Univers i ty  of Texas (over 200 
aud io -v isua l  programs),  and the IADC, as well  as t h e i r  own multimedia 
in t roduc t ions  to  d r i l l i n g  and i t s  hazards .  A month-long school fo r  d r i l l i n g  
r i g  ro ta ry  he lpe rs  in  South Texas r e p o r t s  t h a t  fo r  approximately 500 persons 
who graduated a f t e r  1975, only th ree  se r ious  d i s a b l in g  acc iden ts  have been 
recorded and two of these  were snakebi te  in c id en ts  [65] .  Louisiana 
i n i t i a t e d  a s im i la r  8-week t r a in i n g  course in  1980 [66] .  This t rend  i s
u n l ik e ly  to  immediately a f f e c t  the many small  f irms in  the in d u s t ry ,  s ince  
new employees may be h i red  a t  the well  s i t e s  without  the b e n e f i t  of
pre l iminary  t r a in in g  and o r i e n t a t i o n .
However, one major drilling contractor recently implemented a mobile 
training unit to teach safety to crews drilling in remote locations.
Although these crews still exhibit the highest turnover rate, they have gone
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TABLE 111-14 
INJURY BREAKDOWN BY LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT







In ju r i e s 2,925 552 578 738
Percent
of Total 61 12 12 15
Compiled from the 1979 IADC "Char l ie  Report" [42].
TABLE I I I - 15 
REPORTED ACCIDENTS AND LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT1






Accidents 234 97 46 56 89
Percent 
of  Total
45 18 9 11 17
1Seven hundred t h i r t y - e i g h t  acc ident  r e p o r t s  have been com­
p i le d  from OSHA in v e s t i g a t i o n s ,  company acc iden t  r e p o r t s ,  
workers '  compensation r e p o r t s ,  and published case h i s ­
t o r i e s ;  216 did not include length  of  employment and are  
th e re fo re  not included in  t h i s  tab le  [10, 46-49].
from the h ighes t  to the lowest lo s t - t im e  acc iden t  r a t e s  fo r  the rep o r t in g  
company [67].
H. Conclusion
Although n a t io n a l  in ju ry  s t a t i s t i c s  are  not a v a i l a b le  fo r  the o i l  and gas 
well  d r i l l i n g  indus t ry  (SIC 1381), th ree  techniques ,  us ing d i f f e r e n t  da ta  
bases ,  were used to  e s t imate  the in ju ry  incidence r a t e s  fo r  the d r i l l i n g  
in d u s t ry .  The da ta  bases and e s t im a t ing  techniques r e p o r t  d i f f e r e n t  types
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of i n j u r i e s  ( l o s t - t i m e ,  compensable, SDS recordab le )  and, as such, are  not 
e n t i r e l y  equatable .  However, r eg a rd le ss  of the type of in ju ry  or the 
e s t im a t ing  technique, the magnitude of  the problem, occupational s a fe ty  
during o i l  and gas well  d r i l l i n g  o p e r a t io n s , i s  ex tens ive .  Workers were 
in ju red  a t  the following average estimated incidence  r a t e s :
o Compensable in ju ry  incidence  r a t e  (TWC) :: 38.1
o Disabling lo s t - t im e  in ju ry  incidence r a t e :  11.8.
o Estimated in ju ry  incidence r a t e  for  17 SDS s t a t e s :  21.8
The evidence f u r th e r  in d ic a t e s  th a t  a s u b s t a n t i a l  percentage  of  the well  
d r i l l i n g  i n d u s t r y ' s  i n j u r i e s  occur while ta sks  a s soc ia ted  with t r i p p in g ,  
to rqu ing ,  and j o i n t  spinning are  being performed. Handling d r i l l  pipe and 
cha ins ,  opera t ing  tongs,  and working from and climbing the d e r r i c k  c o n t r ib u te  
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  to  d r i l l i n g  i n j u r i e s .  M ate r ia ls  handl ing ,  l i f t i n g ,  and f a l l i n g  
( to  a leve l  below and to  the working su rface)  c o n t r ib u te  f u r t h e r  to  the 
i n d u s t r y ' s  high in ju ry  incidence and se v e r i ty  r a t e s .
Ind iv idua l  companies t h a t  submit t h e i r  in ju ry  da ta  to  the IADC rep o r t  va r ied  
l o s t - t im e  in ju ry  frequency r a t e s  (per  m i l l i o n  person-hours )—ranging from 0 to 
more than 200 [38-43].  The d i v e r s i t y  of repor ted  in ju ry  r a t e s  could be
in d ic a t iv e  of a v a r i a b le  corpora te  approach to worker s a f e ty .  The high in ju ry  
incidence  and se v e r i ty  r a t e s  found in  the o i l  and gas well  d r i l l i n g  indust ry  
and the uniqueness of the processes  and technologies  used in  these  d r i l l i n g  
opera t ions  in d ic a t e  the need fo r  the development of comprehensive sa fe ty  
recommendations including the need fo r  employee t r a in i n g  and sa fe ty  awareness.
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CHAPTER IV 
COMPREHENSIVE SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR OIL AND GAS WELL DRILLING
According to  an eva lua t io n  of  e x i s t i n g  S ta te  (Alaska, C a l i f o r n ia ,  Michigan, 
Utah, and Wyoming), i n t e r n a t i o n a l  (Canada), and the consensus of  indust ry  
(API, ANSI, NFPA) sa fe ty  s tandards ,  presented in  Appendix B, most of the 
ope ra t ions ,  t a sk s ,  and equipment u t i l i z e d  in  well  d r i l l i n g  ope ra t ion s  are  
covered by a t  l e a s t  one e x i s t i n g  sa fe ty  s tandard .  For these  in s ta n c es ,  the 
app l icab le  s tandard , or a conso l ida t ion  of  the e x i s t i n g  s tandards ,  has been 
incorporated  in to  sa fe ty  recommendations. For opera t ions  not covered in  any 
s tandards ,  such as guarding k e l l y  bushings,  e le v a to r  l a tc h in g  procedures ,  
p o s i t i o n in g  of s l i p s ,  techniques fo r  t r a n s f e r  of  d r i l l  p ipe from pipe  racks 
to vee-door,  and water rescue equipment fo r  r ese rve  p i t s ,  recommendations 
are  based on d i r e c t  observa t ion  of indus t ry  in  ope ra t ion ,  in format ion from 
indust ry  expe r t s ,  and good sa fe ty  p r a c t i c e s .  No attempt has been made to 
p resen t  s a fe ty  recommendations fo r  t a s k s ,  t o o l s ,  equipment, or  opera t ions  
common to  other  i n d u s t r i e s ;  e . g . ,  hand too ls ,  genera l machine guarding,  
sa n i t a ry  f a c i l i t i e s ,  welding, or  b l a s t i n g .  Safety  s tandards  and sa fe  work 
p ra c t i c e s  fo r  these  a reas  are adequately addressed in  OSHA General Industry  Standards (29 CFR 1910) and should be appl ied  to  the d r i l l i n g  in dus t ry .
The sa fe ty  recommendations fo r  o i l  and gas d r i l l i n g  opera t ions  have been 
organized in to  th ree  major a reas :
A. General s a fe ty  recommendations
B. Safety gu ide l ines  fo r  well  d r i l l  machinery and equipmentC. Safe work p r a c t i c e s
A. General Safety Recommendations
1. Employee I n s t r u c t i o n ,  Train ing , and Test ing
When i n i t i a l l y  employed, a worker should rece ive  i n s t r u c t i o n  and t r a in i n g  
p e r t in e n t  to the hazards ,  s a fe ty  p re ca u t io n s ,  safe  work p r a c t i c e s ,  and use 
of personal p ro te c t iv e  equipment app l icab le  to  the type of work performed.
The i n s t r u c t io n s  should adequately o r i e n t  and a l e r t  the new employee to :
o The bas ic  p r in c ip l e s  of  a well  d r i l l i n g  ope ra t ion ,  including  the 
safe  work p r a c t i c e s  and hazards a s soc ia ted  with  r i g  equipment 
o The purpose and opera t ion  of  blowout prevention 
o Hydrogen s u l f id e  and r e s p i r a to r y  p r o te c t io n  
o F i re  preven t ion  and con t ro l  
o Confined spaces and en try  procedures 
o Personal p r o te c t iv e  equipment.
55
Each new employee should rece ive  t r a in i n g  in  the sa fe  use of  a l l  equipment 
or to o l s  th a t  are  necessary fo r  use and the sa fe  performance of  ass igned 
t a s k s .  The employer should r e q u i r e  th a t  the worker demonstrate h i s  a b i l i t y  
to sa fe ly  operate  the to o l  or equipment p r i o r  to  us ing i t  in  a d r i l l i n g  
s i t u a t i o n .  I f  a new employee has been c e r t i f i e d  as q u a l i f i e d  to  opera te  the 
equipment or  too l  (by an approved t r a in i n g  f a c i l i t y ) ,  then the  t r a in i n g  
po r t ion  of t h i s  recommendation i s  not r eq u i r ed .  As an employee advances to 
new p o s i t io n s  and t a sks ,  he should demonstrate h i s  knowledge and a b i l i t y  to
sa fe ly  operate  the equipment and perform the ta sks  before  he i s  r equ ired  to
perform them in  a d r i l l i n g  s i t u a t i o n .  R et ra in ing  should be conducted as 
needed to ensure th a t  employees a re  ab le  to  perform t h e i r  t a sks  in  a safe  
manner.
2. F i r s t  Aid and Emergency Communication
Well s i t e s  may be loca ted  in  remote and in a c c e s s ib l e  a r e a s .
A n t ic ipa t io n  of the emergencies l i k e ly  to ocpur and app rop r ia te
contingency planning for  them may save the l i v e s  of in ju red  employees. 
Employers should develop and post a d e t a i l e d  emergency plan s u i t a b l e  fo r  
the cu r ren t  lo ca t io n  of the well  s i t e ,  the surrounding popula t ion ,  
formation p re ssu re s ,  and contaminants l i k e ly  to  be encountered.
a. First Aid
D r i l l e r s ,  too l  pushers ,  su pe rv i so r s ,  and persons in d i r e c t  charge
of crews in  f i e l d  opera t ions  should have a c u r re n t  c e r t i f i c a t e  of
f i r s t - a i d  t r a i n i n g .  There should be a t  l e a s t  one employee with a 
cu r ren t  c e r t i f i c a t e  of  f i r s t - a i d  t r a in i n g  a t  a l l  well  s i t e s
employing fewer than 15 persons .  At wel l  s i t e s  employing more than 
15 persons,  the re  should be a t  l e a s t  two employees with  c u r re n t  
c e r t i f i c a t e s  of f i r s t - a i d  t r a in i n g .
F i r s t - a i d  equipment should be provided. This equipment should be 
stored  in  s a n i t a r y  p l ac es ,  p ro tec ted  from weather ,  a v a i l a b le  to  a l l  
s h i f t s ,  and convenient ly  lo ca ted .  The f i r s t - a i d  k i t  should be a t  
l e a s t  a 24-unit  s ize  and should be inspected  and rep len ished  weekly 
or whenever 25% of  a u n i t  has been used. Addi t iona l  f i r s t - a i d
equipment should include one s e t  of  i n f l a t a b l e  arm and leg s p l i n t s ;two a ll -wool b la n k e t s ,  or b lanke ts  equal in  s t r e n g th  and f i r e
r e s i s t a n c e ;  and one s t r e t c h e r .
The s t r e t c h e r  should be designed to adequately  support  an in ju red  
worker during handl ing and t r a n sp o r t a to n .  In case the ordinaryc o l l a p s ib l e  type i s  not adequate to support  the worker during 
handling and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,  a basket s t r e t c h e r  with adequate 
s t r a p s  and harness should be provided.
Provis ions should be made p r i o r  to  commencement of  the p r o je c t  for  
prompt t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  of an in ju red  person to a phys ic ian  or 
h o s p i t a l .  An e f f e c t i v e  communication system should be e s ta b l i s h e d
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to contac t  and d i r e c t  the necessary medical/emergency teams to the 
proper lo ca t io n .  Transpor t  of s e r io u s ly  in ju red  workers should not 
be undertaken by the employer un less  personnel t r a in e d  in moving 
in ju red  persons a re  p resen t  and/or  the in ju red  would be f u r th e r  
harmed by the de lay .  I f  the employer i s  going to t r a n s p o r t  an 
in jured  p a r ty ,  then the veh ic le s  provided by the employer should:
o Be of s u f f i c i e n t  s ize  and s u i t a b i l i t y  to  accommodate a 
s t r e t c h e r  and accompanying f i r s t - a i d  a t t e n d a n t  w i th in  the 
body of the veh ic le  
o Be designed and equipped so tha t  the re  i s  a means of ora l  
communication between the ope ra to r  of the veh ic le  and the 
in jured  worker and accompanying f i r s t - a i d  a t tendan t  
o P ro tec t  the in ju red  worker and the f i r s t - a i d  a t t e n d a n t  from 
the elements 
o Be c lean .
Whenever p o s s ib le ,  any s e r io u s ly  in ju red  worker being t r a nspo r ted  
should be accompanied by a t  l e a s t  one person in  a d d i t io n  to the 
d r iv e r .  The d r iv e r  or the accompanying person should have v a l id  
f i r s t - a i d  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s .
In areas where access by conventional  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  i s  not 
poss ib le  or the cond i t ions  of  the road or t e r r a i n  a re  de t r im en ta l  
to the welfare  of the in ju red  worker, an a l t e r n a t e  means of 
t r a n s p o r t a t io n  should be arranged for  by the employer.  A 
h e l i c o p te r  se rv ice  would be one example of an accep table  
a l t e r n a t e  means of t r a n s p o r t a t io n .
b. Emergency Communication
More than one means of communication may be necessary to ensure 
prompt he lp  in  case of acc idents  or  emergencies.
Telephone numbers of phys ic ians ,  h o s p i t a l s ,  and ambulances should 
be conspicuously pos ted .  E x p l i c i t  d i r e c t i o n s  to the well  s i t e  
should be included on the posted no t ic e  (people tend to  fo rge t  
names and lo c a t io n s  during medical emergencies) .  Ambulance and/or  
medical t r a n sp o r t  s e rv ic e s  should be kept informed of  the r i g ' s  
lo ca t io n  and the b e s t  access ro u te s .
In remote a reas  where te lephones are not p r a c t i c a l ,  rad io  equipment 
th a t  i s  capable  of communication with a s t a t i o n  (manned company 
base s t a t i o n ,  p o l i c e ,  or emergency base s t a t i o n )  in  one of the 
l a r g e r  communities should be provided.  Radio c a l l  signs  and 
frequency s e t t i n g s  should be posted. Radio schedules should be 
maintained and coordinated  by personnel  on d r i l l  s i t e s  with  the 
nearby community s t a t i o n s .
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Personal protective equipment should comply with current ANSI 
standards.
a. Clothing
Loose, ragged, or poorly fitted clothing should not be worn. 
Rotating parts (catheads, kelly bushings, spinning chains) may snag 
the clothing and cause injuries. Gloves are commonly worn by 
drilling employees and should be discarded when they become ragged 
or torn.
If the clothing worn by an employee becomes contaminated by a 
hazardous substance, the employee should remove the clothing 
without undue delay. The clothing should not be worn again until 
the hazardous substance has been removed. Additionally, If the 
clothing worn by an employee becomes wet with gasoline, naphtha, 
kerosene, light distillate, or light oils, the employee should not 
remain, or be required to remain, in a location where his clothing 
is in danger of igniting.
Employees should not be permitted to work with bare heads, bare 
arms, or other portions of their bodies uncovered in areas where 
they may be exposed to burns from corrosives or hot substances. 
Skin absorption of chemicals is not unusual and may result in skin 
rashes, chemical burns, and/or systemic poisoning.
Employees should not be permitted to wear jewelry or other 
adornments subject to snagging. Rings frequently snag on equipment 
or tools, which may result in the finger being pulled off.
Employees with long hair should keep it contained in a suitable 
manner while working. Hair and beard styles should not interfere 
with the wearing of head, eye, face, or respiratory protective 
equipment. As a condition of employment, employees working in 
medium or high hazard hydrogen sulfide environments should not be 
allowed to wear beards since the facial hair lying between the 
sealing surface of a respirator facepiece and the wearer's skin 
will prevent a good seal.
b. Foot Protection
Safety-toed boots should be worn in the working area.
c. Head Protection
Safety hats (hardhats) should be worn by each person in the work 
area. Hardhats should be secured by a chinstrap when worn in the 
derrick structure. When cold weather conditions dictate,
3. Personal Protective Equipment
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i n d u s t r i a l  p r o te c t iv e  w in te r  l i n e r s  fo r  the hardha ts  should be made 
a v a i la b le  to workers.
d. Eye P ro te c t io n
Properly  f i t t e d  goggles,  face s h i e l d s ,  o r  o the r  eye p r o te c t io n  
equipment,  appropr ia te  to  the work being done, should be provided 
by the employer and worn by workers handl ing ,  or exposed to ,  
m a te r ia l  l i a b l e  to  in ju r e  or i r r i t a t e  the eyes ,  or  when engaged in  
any work in  which th e re  i s  an eye hazard from f ly in g  o b j e c t s ,  
in ju r io u s  l i g h t ,  hea t  r a y s ,  or o the r  type of  r a d i a t i o n .
o Goggles or face sh ie ld s  should be worn when mixing mud or  
chemicals.
o Goggles and/o r  face sh ie ld s  should be worn when us ing a 
g r inder .o Cutting goggles (of  app rop r ia te  dens i ty )  should be worn when 
us ing a c u t t i n g  to rch .  Goggles p r o te c t  the  eyes from 
f la sh  burns and s lag ,  
o Welders should wear welding shields. .  Helpers and coworkers 
should be p ro tec ted  from " f l a s h e s "  by dark f l a s h  g l a s s e s .  I f
the welding i s  of some d u ra t io n ,  then  the use of f la sh
screens i s  d e s i r a b l e .  Welders o r  h e lp e r s  performing chipping 
operat ions  should be p ro tec ted  from s lag  "pop" by goggles 
and/or  face s h i e l d s .
Where harmful chemicals are  being used, r e a d i l y  a cc e s s ib le  
f a c i l i t i e s  for r ap id  f lu sh ing  of  the eyes and/or  sk in  should be 
a v a i l a b le .  Eyewash f a c i l i t i e s  should be provided on the d r i l l  
f lo o r  as well  as in the mud-mixing a rea .  At a minimum, one quar t  
of potab le  water ,  p ro te c te d  from f re e z in g ,  should be immediately a v a i l a b le  in those a re a s .  An a d d i t io n a l  four  qua r t s  of  f lu sh ing
l iq u id  should be r e a d i ly  a v a i l a b le  to  cont inue  f lush ing  the eye.
e. Hearing P ro te c t io n
Whenever no ise  exposure on a t ime-weighted average (TWA) i s  more 
than 90 db(A) [68] ,  worker p ro te c t io n  should be ensured e i t h e r  by 
using engineering c o n t ro l s  which reduce no ise  l e v e l s ,  or  by 
providing and req u i r in g  the use of  a pp rop r ia te  p r o t e c t i v e  equipment.
Areas and opera t ions  where a p p ro p r ia te  engineer ing  c o n t r o l s /  noise  
abatement techniques should be considered are :
o Engines -  layou t ,  sound b a r r i e r s ,  employee i s o l a t i o n ,  or 
proximity to  r i g  f lo o r  
o E l e c t r i c a l  gene ra to rs  -  layou t ,  sound b a r r i e r s ,  lo ca t io n  
o Power t r a n s f e r  ( b e l t s ,  p u l l e y s ,  compounds) -  sound b a r r i e r .
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Hearing p ro te c t io n  should be provided to a l l  employees working a t  
the d r i l l  s i t e .  Disposable earplugs should be r ea d i ly  a v a i l a b le  a t  
the doghouse or d r i l l  f l o o r .  A l t e r n a t i v e ly ,  ind iv idua l  earp lugs  or 
ear  muffs could be d i s t r i b u t e d  a t  the time of  employment. Ear 
muffs should be supplied to ,  and worn by, employees working on or 
near engines ,  t r ansm iss ions ,  compounds, or  genera to rs  t h a t  expose 
workers to  excess ive sound l e v e l s .
4. F a l l  P ro tec t ion
F a l l s  from e levated  a reas  account fo r  a r e l a t i v e l y  low percentage of  the 
acc iden ts  th a t  occur in d r i l l i n g  ope ra t ion s ;  however, those acc iden ts
th a t  do occur usua l ly  are  severe or f a t a l .  Most of the f a l l s  occur
while e re c t in g  the d e r r i c k ,  climbing the d e r r i c k  ladde rs ,  or working 
from one of the p la t form s.  Adequate worker p ro te c t io n  can be provided 
during most, i f  not a l l ,  of  these  s i t u a t i o n s  by the use of s a fe ty  b e l t s ,  
l i f e l i n e s  and lanyards,  s a fe ty  n e t s ,  and climbing devices .
a. Safety Bel ts
When engaged in work 10 fe e t  o r  more above the d e r r i c k  f lo o r ,  a 
worker should use a sa f e ty  b e l t  a t tached  to a lanyard adequately  
secured to the s t r u c t u r e ,  un less  he i s  p ro tec ted  by another  
approved method. Workers engaged in  racking pipe a t  the s tabbing 
board, f inge r  board, o r  o the r  p la t form should be provided with ,  and
wear, a sa fe ty  b e l t .  The use of  a b e l ly  bus te r  does not e l im ina te
the need for a s a fe ty  b e l t .
b. L i f e l in e s  and Lanyards
L i f e l in e s  and lanyards  should be a minimum of 1 /2-inch nylon, 
3 /4- inch  manila,  or e q u iv a len t ,  and should have nominal breaking 
s t reng th  of 5,400 pounds [68].  Safety  b e l t  lanyards  should have a 
maximum length to provide for  a f a l l  of no more than 6 f e e t  [68] .
When an employee i s  a t  the stabbing board, the f a l l  p r o te c t io n  
lanyard should be secure ly  a t tached  to :
o A manila or wire rope with a breaking s t re n g th  not l e s s  than
9,000 pounds s t r e tc h e d  across  the d e r r i c k  a t  a l o c a t io n  
approximately 7 fee t  above the stabbing board
o A so l id  support secured in  the d e r r i c k  a t  a lo ca t io n
approximately 7 f e e t  above the s tabbing board
o A cross-member of  the d e r r i c k  s t r u c t u r e  a t  a po in t  
approximately 7 fee t  above the stabbing board [69]
o The d e r r i c k  board h a n d ra i l  behind the worker.
c. Safety Nets
Safety ne ts  should be provided as an a l t e r n a t i v e  when work a reas  
are  more than 25 f e e t  above the ground or water  su r fa ce ,  or  o ther
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surfaces  where the use of  ladders ,  s c a f f o ld s ,  ca tch  p la t form s,  
temporary f l o o r s ,  s a f e ty  l i n e s ,  or  s a fe ty  b e l t s  i s  im p ra c t i c a l .  
Operations should not be under taken u n t i l  the ne t  i s  in  place  and 
has been t e s t e d  [68].  To provide adequate worker p ro te c t io n :
o Nets should extend 8 f ee t  beyond the edge of the work 
su rface  where employees are  exposed and should not be 
more than 25 fee t  below such edge, 
o The mesh s i z e  of  ne ts  should not exceed 6 inches by 6 inches .  
Al l  new ne ts  should meet accepted performance s tandards  of 
17,500 foot-pounds minimum impact r e s i s t a n c e ,  as determined 
and c e r t i f i e d  by the manufacturers ,  and bear  a l a b e l - o f -p ro o f  
t e s t .  Edge ropes should provide a minimum breaking s t r e n g th  
of 5,000 pounds, 
o Forged s t e e l  sa fe ty  hooks or shackles should be used to 
f a s ten  the net to  i t s  supports ,  
o Connection between net panels should develop the f u l l  
s t re n g th  of  the n e t .
Nets can be augmented by the a d d i t io n  of deb r i s  and/or  s l ag  n e t t in g  
th a t  p ro te c t s  employees from t o o l s ,  b o l t s ,  and hot s l ag  f a l l i n g  
from above.
d. Climbing Devices
Ladder-climbing or f a l l - a r r e s t i n g  devices should be used on the 
d e r r i c k  ladder .  Derrickmen should always climb the ladder  rung by
rung and not be permit ted to " r ide"  the climbing device.
5. Confined Workspaces
The most important concept to  follow when e n te r ing  a confined space i s
to  NEVER TRUST YOUR SENSES. What appears harmless may in  f a c t  be
deadly.  Employers and workers should consider  each confined space to  be 
l i f e  th re a ten ing .  In gene ra l ,  confined spaces a re  enclosed a re a s ,  
having l imited  a c c e s s /e g re s s ,  t h a t  may be sub jec t  to  the formation of 
toxic  atmospheres.
a.  Life-Threa tening Hazards
(1) Toxic gases and vapors
Tanks, c e l l a r s ,  and enclosures  are a l l  examples of a reas  th a t  
can be su b jec t  to  the accumulation of tox ic  gases .  Hydrogen 
su l f id e  may be a contaminant of petroleum formations and as 
such may be re leased  in  deadly concen t ra t ions  during well  
d r i l l i n g  ope ra t ions .  C e l la r s ,  shale  shakers ,  and depos i t ion  
areas are  sub jec t  to bui ldup of the hydrogen s u l f i d e .  Such 
areas ,  when confined or  enclosed, should be t r e a t e d  as 
DEADLY. Carbon monoxide i s  produced by incomplete combustion
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of carbon products .  I t  i s  a l i k e l y  byproduct of  compressors 
or o ther  gaso l ine  and d i e s e l  engines .  Enclosed or  confined 
a reas  ad jacen t  to  an engine exhaust should a l so  be t r e a t e d  as 
contaminated.
(2) Flammables and/or  explos ives
Tanks, c e l l a r s ,  and enclosures  a re  a l so  sub jec t  to  the 
accumulation of f l a mmable  vapors (hydrogen s u l f i d e  i s  a lso  
combustible and explosive  a t  concen tra t ions  between 4.5% and 
45% in a i r ) .  The hydrocarbon gases being d r i l l e d  fo r  a re  a lso  
h ighly  explosive  when mixed with a i r .  Tanks and c e l l a r s  a t  
well  s i t e s  should be considered explosive  u n t i l  t e s t s  prove 
otherwise.
(3) Lack of oxygen
The OSHA accep table  minimum oxygen le v e l  i s  19.5% of the 
atmosphere. [70]
b. Entry in to  Confined Spaces
Entry in to  a confined space should not be permit ted  u n t i l  a formal 
w r i t t e n  document i s  completed and signed by the too l  pusher.  This 
document should include what p repara t io ns  have been made, the 
r e s u l t s  of t e s t s ,  the work to be done, to o l s  to be used, and 
p recaut ions  to  be taken.  All  personnel  involved with  the  en t ry  
should be made f a m i l i a r  with these  f a c t s .  A copy of t h i s  document
should be maintained a t  the job s i t e .
P r io r  to  e n t ry ,  the atmosphere of the conf ined space should bete s t e d  from the ou ts ide  fo r  f lam m ab i l i ty , t o x i c i t y ,  and oxygen 
content to  ensure the absence of  m a te r ia l  harmful to personnel.  
Re tes t ing  should be done a t  i n t e r v a l s  f requent enough to  ensure 
t h a t  t h i s  condi t ion  i s  mainta ined whi le  the  space i s  occupied
[71] ,  There should be prov is ions  fo r  immediately secur ing  and
posting a warning ag a in s t  unauthorized  en try  a t  the entrance  t o  any 
confined space t e s t e d  and found unsafe .
Where i t  i s  impossible or  im prac t i ca l  to  ob ta in  sa fe  c o n d i t io n s ,
approved personal p ro te c t iv e  equipment th a t  p ro te c t s  a g a in s t  a l l  
en try  modes for m a te r i a l s  in  ques t ion  should be used. Equipment
th a t  may be necessary fo r  sa fe  en t ry  may include [71]:
o S e l f -con ta ined  b rea th ing  appara tus  (NIOSH/MSHA approved) 
o Safety  harness  and l i f e l i n e s  o Communication system 
o Lights
o R esusc i ta t ion  equipment 
o P ro te c t iv e  c lo th in g .
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Proper preparation should be the objective— protective equipment is 
the insurance.
The f i r s t  person en te r ing  a confined space th a t  con ta ins ,  or  i s  
known to have conta ined, a harmful substance should wear a sa fe ty  
b e l t  with a l i f e l i n e  a t tached  th a t  i s  manned by an employee having 
the equipment and c a p a b i l i t y  to  e f f e c t  a t imely rescue .  I f  i t  can 
be a scer ta ined  th a t  condi t ions  are as t e s t e d  and can be maintained 
a t  th a t  l e v e l ,  work can proceed without  sa fe ty  b e l t s .  In a l l  
cases ,  the rescue c a p a b i l i t y  should be maintained a t  the 
appropr ia te  en try  a rea  to a s s i s t  in  case of emergency.
While any employee i s  in  a confined a rea ,  a standby person should 
remain a t  the entrance opening. The a t tendan t  should be provided 
with sa fe ty  equipment s im i la r  to  t h a t  required  for  employees in s ide  
the a rea .  NOTE: I f  a worker i s  overcome by a tox ic  atmosphere,
th a t  same toxic  atmosphere w i l l  a f f e c t  unprotected persons en te r ing  
the area  to  perform a rescue .  Attendants  and/or  rescue personnel  
should be fu l l y  equipped (with a ready standby person) before
e f f e c t in g  an emergency en t ry .
It may be necessary to remove materials such as sludge, polymers, 
or other materials from a confined space. This task may liberate 
vapors and/or gases that could change the test results obtained 
earlier. Monitoring, ventilation, and/or protective equipment 
should be provided and used to properly handle this task.
6 . Signs and Labeling
Warning signs should be posted to denote any unusual or hazardous 
s i t u a t i o n .  Warning s igns  should be posted in a reas  where the use of
personal p ro te c t iv e  equipment i s  necessary .  I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  signs  should 
be conspicuously posted to  loca te  emergency equipment. Containers  of 
poisonous, to x ic ,  flammable, and/or  explosive  m a te r ia l  should be
properly  labeled and a p p rop r ia te ly  s to red  according to  con ten t .  Signing 
must conform to OSHA standards .
7. Hydrogen Sulfide Environments
All well  d r i l l i n g  s i t e s  should be c l a s s i f i e d  in to  areas  of p o t e n t i a l  
and/or  a c tua l  exposure to  hydrogen s u l f i d e  by the d e f i n i t i o n s  ou t l in ed  
below. The sa fe ty  recommendations made are a minimum. The American 
Petroleum I n s t i t u t e  (API) "RP 49: Recommended P rac t ic e  fo r  Safe
D r i l l i n g  of Wells Containing Hydrogen Su lf ide"  [72] d e t a i l s  
recommendations in  more depth and should be followed in  a l l  medium and 
high exposure a reas .
D e f in i t io n s  of hydrogen su l f id e  hazard areas  and the p recaut ions  to  be 
taken are as follows [73]:
a. No Hazard Area— any well that will not penetrate a known
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hydrogen su l f id e  formation. No sp ec ia l  hydrogen s u l f id e  
equipment i s  needed.
b. Low Hazard Area—any well  t h a t  w i l l  pe n e t r a t e  a formation
conta in ing hydrogen s u l f i d e  th a t  could r e s u l t  in  atmospheric 
concen tra t ion  of 10 ppm or  le s s  and/or  in  which the hydrogen 
su l f id e  zone has been e f f e c t i v e ly  sealed o f f  by casing/cement ing 
and/or  cementing method. The following are  recommended fo r  low 
hazard a reas :
o Two 30-minute, se l f -co n ta in e d  b rea th ing  apparatus for  
emergency escape from the contaminated a rea  only.
c. Medium Hazard Area—any well  t h a t  w i l l  p e n e t ra t e  a formation
conta in ing hydrogen s u l f id e  and i s  not def ined as a low or  no
hazard area ,  including a l l  explora to ry  (wildca t)  well  s i t e s .
The following are  recommended fo r  medium hazard a reas :
o NIOSH/MSHA approved manifold a i r  masks with emergency 
escape cy l inde rs  for  each employee
o Two NIOSH/MSHA approved, 30-minute,  s e l f - co n ta in e d  b rea th ing  
apparatus fo r  emergency escape from the contaminated area  
only
o Two wind socks and st reamers 
o Oxygen r e s u s c i t a t o r
o A proper ly c a l i b r a t e d ,  metered hydrogen s u l f id e  de te c t io n  
instrument 
o Audible and v i s u a l  alarm system.
d. High Hazard Area—any opera t ion  expected to  br ing  f ree  hydrogen 
s u l f id e  gas to the su r face .  The following a re  recommended fo r  
work in  high hazard a reas :
o Two NIOSH/MSHA approved, 30-minute, s e l f - co n ta in e d  brea th ing  
apparatus for  emergency escape from the contaminated a rea  
only
o Three wind socks and st reamers 
o Oxygen r e s u s c i t a t o r
o Two hydrogen s u l f id e  d e te c to r s .  One should be a proper ly  
c a l i b r a t e d ,  metered d e te c t io n  ins t rument ,  and the o ther  
should be a pump type with d e te c to r  tubes ,  
o A separa te  audib le  and v i s u a l  warning system 
o Employees should not be permit ted  on lo c a t io n  without 
hydrogen s u l f i d e  sa fe ty  t r a i n i n g .  Employees may be 
permit ted on lo ca t io n  for  s p e c i f i c  hydrogen su l f id e  t r a in i n g  
purposes not to include genera l r i g  t r a i n i n g ,  
o Two means of egress  a t  each lo ca t io n  in  a high hazard area  
should be provided, 
o A means of communication or i n s t r u c t i o n  for  emergency
procedures should be e s t a b l i sh e d  and maintained on lo c a t io n  
along with the names and telephone numbers of the person or
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persons to  be informed in  case of emergencies,  
o Signs should be posted 500 f e e t  from the  lo ca t io n  on each 
road leading to  the lo ca t io n  warning of the hydrogen s u l f i d e  
hazard.
o All  hydrogen s u l f i d e  sa fe ty  equipment should be checked to 
ensure read iness  before  each tou r  change.
e. Employee Instructions
Employees p resen t  a t  a l l  medium and high hazard hydrogen s u l f i d e  wel ls  should be in s t r u c te d  in the use of the hydrogen s u l f id e  
sa fe ty  equipment provided o n s i t e .  Hydrogen s u l f id e  sa fe ty  
in s t r u c t i o n  should be given by a q u a l i f i e d  pe r so n (s ) .  The 
in s t r u c t i o n  of personnel  should inc lude ,  as a minimum, the 
following elements:
o The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of hydrogen s u l f id e  and i t s  hazards  
o Proper f i r s t - a i d  procedures to  be used in  a hydrogen s u l f i d e  
knockdown
o Use of personal p r o te c t iv e  equipment
o Use and opera t ion  of a l l  hydrogen s u l f i d e  monitor ing systems 
o Correc tive  a c t ion  and shutdown procedures.
8 . Illumination and Lighting
Lighting around a derrick should be sufficient to provide illumination 
at all times of at least:
o An average of  5 footcandle  ( fc )  power on the whole of the 
de r r i ck  f l o o r ,  with no l e s s  than 3 fc power a t  any poin t  
o 5 fc power a t  the f in g e r  board, mud pumps, and catwalk 
o 3 fc power a t  the shale  shaker,  s ta i rw ays ,  and o the r  working 
areas
o A minimum of 3 fc power a t  a l l  o ther  walking and working surfaces  [69].
(NOTE: The above are  minimum recommendations. Many c ircumstances ,
including weather ,  may warrant h igher  l i g h t i n g  v a lu e s . )
Vehicle l i g h t s  should not be used in l i e u  of r i g  l i g h t s  fo r  l i g h t i n g  of 
r i g  opera t ions  except in  emergency. Lamps and r e f l e c t o r s  should be
cleaned f requen t ly .  Light beams should be d i r e c t e d  toward the o b jec ts  
to  be i l lum ina ted  and away from the eyes of the workmen. All  l i g h t
cords and p lug - in s  should be kept in  good cond i t ion .
9. F i re  and Explosion Prevent ion and Detect ion
a. General Requirements
The employer should develop a f i r e  p ro te c t io n  program to  be
followed throughout a l l  phases of  the ope ra t ion .  Appropriate
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f i r e f i g h t i n g  equipment should be provided. Access to the
f i r e f i g h t i n g  equipment should be maintained a t  a l l  t imes.  A 
minimum of four f i r e  ex t ingu ishe rs  having a minimum r a t i n g  of 40 
B:C should be convenient ly  loca ted  a t  the r i g .  Addi t ional  
ex t ingu ishers  should be provided fo r  the doghouse, the c e l l a r ,  the 
genera tor  a rea ,  and any flammable l i q u id  s to rage  a re a s .
F i r e f i g h t i n g  equipment should be p e r io d i c a l l y  inspected  and
maintained in  ope ra t ing  cond i t ion  a t  a l l  times [74].  A record 
should be kept showing the da te  when f i r e  ex t ingu ishe rs  were l a s t  
inspected ,  t e s t e d ,  or r e f i l l e d .  A f te r  any use ,  f i r e  p ro te c t io n  and 
f i r e f i g h t i n g  equipment should be made se rv iceab le  and re tu rned  to 
i t s  proper lo ca t io n .
b. Fire Prevention
Smoking, open flames, or spark-producing equipment should be 
p roh ib i ted  in  a reas  sub jec t  to contamination or accumulation of 
flammable l i q u id s  or  gases .  Areas for  the p r o h ib i t io n  of smoking 
and open flame should include a l l  a reas  w i th in  75 f e e t  [73] of the:
o Well head or shale shaker, whenever potentially hydrocarbon- 
bearing formations are exposed in the well 
o Degasser while it is operating 
o Fuel storage areas.
The following procedures should be followed in areas where smoking 
and open flames are prohibited:
o Striking matches anywhere should be prohibited, 
o Cigar/cigarette lighters and smoking materials should not 
be permitted, 
o "No Smoking" or "No Open Flame" signs should be 
conspicuously posted.
Exhaust pipes  from i n t e r n a l  combustion engines ,  loca ted  w ith in  75 
fee t  of any well  bore or in o ther  nonsmoking a re a s ,  should be so 
const ructed  and used th a t  any emission of flame or spark i s  
suppressed.
Engine-driven l ig h t  p l a n t s  should be loca ted  a t  l e a s t  75 f e e t  from 
the well  bore unless  properly  p ro tec ted  to  prevent them from 
becoming a source of i g n i t i o n  and should have an adequate overload 
sa fe ty  device.
Welders' torch lighters of the spark type should be prohibited in 
areas where the atmosphere is contaminated by flammable vapors or 
gases or where sources of ignition are forbidden, unless sheathed 
or otherwise protected against accidental operation.
Employee heating devices involving the use of an open flame or
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exposed e l e c t r i c a l  element should not be allowed in  any crew 
doghouse loca ted  on the d e r r i c k ,  mast f l o o r ,  or  w i th in  75 f e e t  of 
the well  bore .  Heaters should be sa fe ly  loca ted  more than 75 fee t  
from the well  bore or  have an explosion-proof  design.
c. Flare  P i t s  and F lare  Lines
Flammable waste vapors or  gases should be burned or  c o n t ro l l e d  to 
prevent hazardous concen tra t ions  from reaching sources of  i g n i t i o n  
or otherwise endangering employees. When a f l a r e  i s  used to burn 
flammable waste gases or vapors ,  the following p recaut ions  should 
be taken:
o F lare  p i t s  should be l i t  from the upwind s ide .  When there  
i s  no wind or when the wind d i r e c t i o n  i s  undetermined, no 
at tempt should be made to  l i g h t  the p i t  unless  the opera to r  
can p o s i t i o n  h imself  in  an e x p lo s iv e - f ree  a rea .  The use of hand-thrown rags or s im i la r  flaming ob jec ts  should not be 
permit ted [73].  
o Rel iab le  and safe  means of remote i g n i t i o n  should be 
provided when hydrocarbon gases a re  re leased  to  the a i r  
through f l a r e s .
o F la res  should be located in  such a manner th a t  unburned gases 
or vapors w i l l  be d ispersed  without  c re a t in g  a hazard to 
employees.
o Means should be provided to prevent the prolonged escape of hazardous q u a n t i t i e s  of unburned gases or vapors from f l a r e  
i n s t a l l a t i o n s .  Automatic warning devices are accep tab le ,  
provided they are  t e s t e d  a t  such reg u la r  i n t e r v a l s  th a t  t h e i r  
opera t ion  w i l l  be assured, 
o Where a f l a r e  has been ex t inguished ,  and the means of
ig n i t in g  the f l a r e  has f a i l e d ,  employees should not en te r  or 
be required  to  e n te r  the involved area  fo r  the purpose of 
r e l i g h t i n g ,  u n t i l  t e s t s  have e s ta b l i sh e d  th a t  the a rea  i s  
f ree  from flammable gases or  vapors ,  
o All  combustible m a te r ia l  should be c leared  fo r  a safe  
d i s tance  from the f l a r e  p i t  or  end of  the f l a r e  [75].
d. Lightning and S ta t i c  E l e c t r i c i t y
Each s t a t io n a r y  and por tab le  s t e e l  d e r r i c k  and mast in  use where 
flammable vapors or gases are p resen t  (or may escape to  the 
atmosphere in  s u f f i c i e n t  quan t i ty  th a t  the ig n i t i o n  would endanger
the sa fe ty  of employees) should be e f f e c t i v e ly  grounded to  a ground
p ip e l in e ,  well  cas ing ,  or o ther  equ iva len t  source of grounding. 
Where not e f f e c t i v e ly  grounded or  bonded by con tac t  or  connection, 
provis ions  should be made to  prevent the accumulation of a s t a t i c
e l e c t r i c a l  charge, which could c re a te  a source of i g n i t i o n  in  the
presence of flammable vapors or gases.
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Conductors, used fo r  bonding and grounding s t a t io n a r y  equipment or 
conductors,  should be of  copper wire  no sm al le r  than No. 8 American 
Wire Gauge. Bonding and grounding clamps or  c l i p s  should be 
a t tached  with secure and p o s i t i v e  m eta l - to -m e ta l  c on tac t .
e .  Flammable and Combustible Liquids
Only approved con ta ine rs  and p o r ta b le  tanks should be used for  
s torage  and handl ing of  flammable and combustible l i q u i d s .  
Approved sa fe ty  cans should be used fo r  the handl ing and use of 
flammable l i q u id s  in  q u a n t i t i e s  g r e a t e r  than 1 ga l lon  [68] .
No persons (except those having necessary d u t ie s  or  those 
au thor ized  by the employer) should be permit ted  w i th in  the v i c i n i t y  
of a job or ope ra t ion  where the atmosphere i s  known to  be 
contaminated with  hazardous concen tra t ions  of  flammable vapors or 
g a s e s .
M ater ia l  used fo r  c leaning should not have a f l a sh p o in t  l e s s  than 
100° F; th e r e f o r e ,  gaso l ine  and naphtha should not be used [73].  
Smoking or  open flames should not be allowed w i th in  75 f e e t  of  the 
handl ing of flammable l i q u id s .  Oxygen should not be s to red  or  used 
in  the v i c i n i t y  of flammable l i q u id s .
Any engine being re fue led  should be shut o f f  during such 
r e f u e l i n g .  An e l e c t r i c a l  bond should be mainta ined between 
con ta iners  when a flammable l i q u id  i s  being t r a n s f e r r e d  from one to 
the o th e r .  Dispensing nozzles  and valves  should be of the 
s e l f - c l o s i n g  type [73] .
Except fo r  the fue l  in  the tanks of the ope ra t ing  equipment, no flammable fue l should be s to red  w i th in  75 f e e t  of a wel l  bore .  
Drainage from any fue l  s to rage  should be in a d i r e c t i o n  away from 
the well  and equipment. S p i l l s  should be immediately cleaned up[73],  The area  around a l l  s to rage  f a c i l i t i e s  should be maintained 
reasonably f ree  of  o i l ,  g rease ,  and o the r  combustible m a t e r i a l s .
Fuel s to rage  tanks should be p ro te c te d  by crash  r a i l s  o r  guards to  
prevent physica l  damage un less  by v i r t u e  of t h e i r  l o c a t io n  they 
have t h i s  p r o te c t io n .  Adequate berms should be placed around 
s to rage  tanks [70].
10. E l e c t r i c a l
a. E l e c t r i c a l  Hazard Zones
Areas of the d r i l l i n g  r i g  a re  c l a s s i f i e d  in to  " e l e c t r i c a l  hazard 
zones" based on the ope ra t ive  p o t e n t i a l  of  r e l e a s e  and accumulation 
of flammable gases [74].  E l e c t r i c a l  equipment used in these  zones 
must conform to OSHA re g u la t io n s  [70].
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All  temporary, 120-vol t ,  s ing le -phase ,  15- to 20-ampere f l e x i b l e  
e l e c t r i c a l  cords and r e c e p ta c l e s  must conform to  OSHA grounding and 
bonding requirements  by having a g round-fau l t  c i r c u i t  i n t e r r u p t e r  
system or an assured equipment grounding program [70].
11. Blowout Prevent ion
Employees should be adequately  t r a in e d  to  proper ly  respond in  the event 
of a "k ick ."  Employees should recognize the importance of the 
c i r c u l a t i n g  f l u i d  in  c o n t r o l l i n g  formation p ressure  and the r e l a t i o n s h i p  
of increas ing  mud r e t u r n  r a t e s  and subsequent p i t  gain in  increas ing  
formation p ressure .
A blowout p reven te r  opera t ing  t e s t  should be performed on each round t r i p  
but not more than once per  day [76] .  Blowout prevent ion equipment should 
be in accordance with the U.S. Geological Survey requirements.  Blowout 
prevention equipment should be s u b s t a n t i a l l y  cons t ruc ted  and secure ly  
fas tened in  p lace.  Blowout prevent ion equipment should be maintained in  
a manner th a t  w i l l  assu re  i t s  proper  func t ion ing  through the d r i l l i n g  
opera t ion .  Unobstructed access  to a l l  blowout p reven te r  c o n t ro l s  should 
be maintained.  Blowout preven ter  c o n t ro l s  should be c l e a r l y  i d e n t i f i e d  
as to  t h e i r  proper  func t ion .
D r i l l i n g  opera t ions  should not proceed u n t i l  blowout prevention  equipment 
i s  found, upon t e s t ,  to  be se rv ic ea b le .  Addi t iona l  recommendations fo r  
blowout prevention equipment systems, in spec t ion ,  and t e s t i n g  are 
contained in API "RP 53: Recommended P rac t i c e  fo r  Blowout Prevent ion
Equipment Systems" [76] and should be followed.
A k e l ly  cock (upper sa f e ty  va lve)  should be placed between the k e l l y  and 
ro ta ry  swivel,  and a lower k e l l y  va lve  should be used below the k e l l y .  
Such stopcocks or c o n t ro l s  should be of adequate s t r e n g th  to  withstand 
the p ressu res  and s t r e s s e s  imposed on them under normal use and p re d ic ta b le  circumstances [76].
I f  the b l ind  rams are c losed  fo r  any purpose,  the valves  on the choke 
l i n e s  or  r e l i e f  l i n e s  below the b l in d  rams should be opened p r io r  to 
opening the rams to bleed o f f  any p re ssu re .  Employees should not be 
permit ted  to stand near  or  over the opening in  the r o ta ry  t a b l e  when the 
b l ind  rams or  d r i l l  pipe rams are  opened. Choke l in e s  or  r e l i e f  l i n e s  
should be secured or  t i e d  down to  prevent whipping under p ressure  su rges .
Addi tional c o n t ro l s  may be i n s t a l l e d  wherever d e s i r e d ,  provided,  however, 
t h a t  such a d d i t io n a l  c o n t ro l s  can in  no way i n t e r f e r e  with the proper 
c los ing  funct ion  of  the c o n t ro l s  requ ired  by the se c t io n  above. Such 
a d d i t io n a l  c o n t ro l s  need not be sh ie lded  or  s h e l t e r e d .  I t  i s  recommended 
th a t  a d d i t io n a l  c o n t ro l s  be loca ted  a t  a point convenient ly  near  the 
d r i l l e r ' s  s t a t i o n  so as to  f a c i l i t a t e  quick a c t ion  in  case of  emergency.
b. Grounding and Bonding
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12. Inspec t ion ,  Tes t ing ,  and Maintenance of Rig Components
A record or  log o f  a l l  in sp e c t io n s ,  t e s t i n g ,  maintenance, and adjustments  
and r e p a i r s  should be kept a t  the well  s i t e .
a. Inspec t ion
(1) I n i t i a l  in spec t ion
o P r io r  to  i n i t i a l  use ,  a l l  new and a l t e r e d  r i g s  should be inspected  to  ensure compliance with the recommenda­
t io n s  made in  s e c t io n  B.,  Safety  Guidelines fo r  Well 
D r i l l i n g  Machinery and Equipment.
o The in sp e c t io n  procedure fo r  r i g s  in  r eg u la r  s e rv ic e  i s  
divided i n to  two c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s  based on the i n t e r v a l s  
a t  which in spec t ions  should be performed. The 
i n t e r v a l s  depend on the na tu re  of  the c r i t i c a l  
components of  the d r i l l i n g  r i g  and the degree of  t h e i r  
exposure to  wear,  d e t e r i o r a t i o n ,  o r  malfunct ion. The 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s  a re :  " f requen t"  in sp e c t io n s ,  which
should be performed a t  d a i l y  to  monthly i n t e r v a l s  and 
a f t e r  every r ig -u p ,  and "per iod ic"  in sp e c t io n s ,  which 
should be performed a t  1- to  12-month i n t e r v a l s .
(2) Frequent in spec t ion
o The following items should be inspected fo r  de fec t s  a t  
d a i l y  to  monthly i n t e r v a l s  or  as s p e c i f i c a l l y  in d ic a ­
ted ,  including observa t ion  during opera t ion  fo r  any 
de fe c t s  t h a t  might appear between reg u la r  in sp e c t io n s :
-  A l l  func t io na l  ope ra t ing  mechanisms, fo r  malad­
justment i n t e r f e r i n g  with  proper ope ra t ion  (d a i ly )  and fo r  excess ive  wear of components
-  The weight i n d i c a t o r ,  fo r  a sc e r t a in in g  whether the i n d i c a t o r  i s  recording the estimated weight of  the 
d r i l l  s t r i n g  (d a i ly )
-  Lines ,  t anks ,  va lves ,  d ra in  pumps, and o the r  p a r t s  
o f  a i r  o r  hydrau l ic  systems, fo r  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  or 
leakage (d a i ly )
-  Hooks, fo r  c racks ,  more than 15% in  excess of 
normal th ro a t  opening, or  more than a 10 degree tw i s t  from the  plane of the unbent hook ( d a i l y ) ;  
i f  any of  these  d e fe c t s  are  observed the hooks 
should be d i scarded .
-  Hoist  or load attachment cha ins ,  including end 
connect ions ,  fo r  excess ive  wear, t w i s t ,  d i s t o r t e d  
l inks  i n t e r f e r i n g  with proper func t ion ,  or s t r e t c h  
beyond m anufac tu re r ' s  recommendations (d a i ly )
-  Rope s l i n g s ,  inc luding  end connect ions ,  for  
excess ive  wear, broken w ires ,  s t r e t c h ,  k ink ing ,  or
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tw is t ing  (da i ly )
-  Rope reeving,  for  noncompliance with manufac­
t u r e r ' s  recommendations.
o All  d e f i c i e n c i e s  should be examined c a r e f u l ly  and a
de terminat ion made as to whether they c o n s t i t u t e  a sa fe ty  
haza rd .
(3) Per iodic  in spec t ion
B ai l s ,  e l e v a to r  l i n k s ,  upper side  hook saddles ,  A-leg p ins ,  
and housing should be inspected  fo r  flaws a t  l e a s t  once each 
year  and each time the d e r r i c k  or mast i s  r igged up. All
de r r i cks  should be v i s u a l l y  inspected  each year  of use.  A 
w r i t t e n  repor t  of these in spec t ions  should be kept on f i l e  
[77].
A complete in spec t ion  of the h o i s t i n g  mechanism should be 
performed p e r io d i c a l l y  a t  1- to 12-month i n t e r v a l s  depending 
on a c t i v i t y ,  s e v e r i ty  of se rv ic e ,  and environment or as
s p e c i f i c a l l y  ind ica ted  below. I f  any of the following
d e f ic i e n c ie s  e x i s t ,  the member should be e i t h e r  replaced or 
r e p a i r e d :
o Deformed, cracked, or corroded members 
o Loose b o l t s  or r i v e t s  
o Cracked or worn sheaves and drums
o Worn, cracked, or d i s t o r t e d  p a r t s  such as p in s ,  b ea r ­
ings ,  s h a f t s ,  gears ,  r o l l e r s ,  and locking or clamping 
devices
o Excessive wear on brake system p a r t s ,  l i n in g s ,  pawls,  
and r a t c h e t s
o Load in d ic a to r s  over t h e i r  f u l l  range, for  any s i g n i f ­
ican t  inaccurac ies  
o Gasoline,  d i e s e l ,  e l e c t r i c ,  or  o ther  powerplants for 
improper performance or noncompliance with app l icab le  
s a fe ty  requirements 
o Excessive wear of chain d r ive  sprockets  and excess ive 
chain s t r e t c h  
o E l e c t r i c a l  appara tus ,  for s igns  of  p i t t i n g  or  any
d e t e r i o r a t i o n  of c o n t r o l l e r  c o n ta in e r s ,  l im i t  switches ,  
and pushbutton s t a t i o n s .
b. Testing
(1) Lead t e s t
P r io r  to i n i t i a l  use,  a l l  new, ex tens ive ly  r ep a i re d ,  and/or
a l t e r e d  r ig s  should be t e s t e d  under the d i r e c t i o n  of an
authorized person. Before the d r i l l i n g  l i n e  i s  i n s t a l l e d  on
the drum of the drawworks, the brake l i n in g  should be se t  or
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"burned in" by s e t t i n g  the brake and r o t a t i n g  the drawworks 
unless  otherwise sp ec i f ie d  by the manufacturer of the brake 
l i n in g .  After  p ressure  i s  appl ied  on the brake, the engines 
should be loaded to  almost s t a l l .  Next, the d r i l l i n g  l i n e  
should be i n s t a l l e d  on the drum of  the drawworks and the 
d r i l l i n g  l i n e  st rung through the t r a v e l in g  block and the crown 
block. The d e r r i c k  should then be r a i se d  a few inches o f f  of 
the d e r r i ck  s tand ,  held in  th a t  p o s i t i o n  fo r  s evera l  minutes,  
and checked for  excess s t r a i n  on the mast,  s u b s t ru c tu re ,  and 
a l l  h o i s t in g  l i n e s  and component p a r t s .
(2) Operat ional t e s t s
P r io r  to  i n i t i a l  use ,  a l l  new and a l t e r e d  h o i s t i n g  mechan­
isms should be t e s t e d  to  ensure the sa fe  ope ra t ion  of:
o All  h o i s t i n g  and lowering equipment 
o All  l im i t  switches and locking and sa fe ty  devices .
c .  Maintenance
A preventive  maintenance program based on the d r i l l i n g  r i g  manu­
f a c t u r e r ' s  recommendations should be e s ta b l i s h e d .  Adjustments and 
re p a i r s  should be made only by des igna ted ,  q u a l i f i e d  personnel.
When maintenance or s e rv ic ing  i s  to  be accomplished on e l e c t r i c a l  
l i n e s ,  a i r  l i n e s ,  gas l i n e s ,  or o the r  l i n e s  conta in ing  hazardous 
m a te r i a l s ,  the l i n e  being worked on should be rendered safe  by 
di sconnect ing , emptying, purging,  or o ther  means before  work i s  
begun.
Energized systems ( e l e c t r i c a l ,  mechanical,  or  thermal) should be 
locked out and tagged p r io r  to  i n i t i a t i n g  maintenance or  r e p a i r  
work.
Af te r  adjustments and r e p a i r s  have been made, the r i g  should not be 
operated u n t i l  a l l  guards have been r e i n s t a l l e d ,  sa fe ty  devices 
r e a c t iv a t e d ,  and maintenance equipment removed.
d. Adjustments and Repairs
Adjustments should be maintained to  ensure c o r re c t  funct ion ing  of 
components. The following are  examples:
o All  func t iona l  opera t ing  mechanisms 
o Limit con tro l s  




Repairs or  replacements should be made promptly as needed fo r  safe  
o pe ra t ion .  The fol lowing are  examples:
o Hooks showing d e fec ts  should be d isca rded .  Repairs by 
welding or reshaping are  not accep tab le ,  
o Load attachment chains  and rope s l in g s  showing d e fec ts  
o All  c r i t i c a l  p a r t s  th a t  a re  cracked,  broken, ben t ,  or 
excess ive ly  worn.
B. Safety Guidelines fo r  Well D r i l l i n g  Machinery and Equipment
1. General Recommendations
S e t t in g  depths of a l l  cas ing s t r i n g s  should be determined by tak ing  in to  
account formation f r a c tu r e  g rad ien ts  and the maximum a n t i c ip a t e d  p ressure  
to be maintained w i th in  the well  bore [73, 78].
I f  and when i t  becomes necessary to  run a product ion tub ing ,  such cas ing 
should be cemented by the pump and plug method and should be proper ly  
t e s t e d  by the pressure  method before  cement plugs a re  d r i l l e d  [73, 78].
D r i l l i n g  should not commence u n t i l :
o All  guards,  including those fo r  the drawworks, are  in place  on a l l  
equipment to be operated 
o All  p la t forms, s ta i rways ,  and h a n d r a i l s  a re  secured in  p o s i t i o n  
o The mast i s  secured;  i f  p ins  are  used, they should be secured by 
sa fe ty  pins.
The escape l ine  with buggy (geronimo) should be i n s t a l l e d  before  the derr ickman 's  f i r s t  exposure in  the d e r r i c k ,  u sua l ly  a t  the time of the 
f i r s t  t r i p .  Machinery or equipment should be cons t ruc ted ,  p ro te c te d ,  
p laced , opera ted , and maintained to a f fo rd  reasonable  sa fe ty  from acc iden t  
to  persons in  and around d r i l l i n g  f a c i l i t i e s .
Machinery and equipment should be operated only by persons au thor ized  by 
the employer.
Cleaning and o i l i n g  machinery while i t  i s  in motion should be p ro h ib i t ed  
in  a l l  cases where exposure to  harmful con tac t  with moving p a r t s  i s  
p o s s ib le .  Before any machinery or equipment i s  to be r e p a i r e d ,  i t  should 
be shut down. The power should be d isconnected , the c o n t ro l  device tagged 
and locked out or  otherwise  made in ope ra t ive ,  and the key r e t a in e d  on the 
person making the r e p a i r s .  Tags used fo r  t h i s  purpose should warn a g a in s t  
s t a r t i n g  such machinery. Before any person s t a r t s  any machinery or equipment, he should make c e r t a i n  t h a t  no person w i l l  be endangered by the 
equipment 's  being put in to  motion.
All b e l t s ,  gears ,  s h a f t s ,  p u l l e y s ,  sp rocke ts ,  sp in d le s ,  drums, flywheels ,  
or  o the r  r e c ip ro c a t in g  and r o t a t i n g  p a r t s ,  with the except ion of the 
ro ta ry  t a b l e ,  k e l l y ,  k e l l y - d r i v e  bushing,  and cathead,  should be guarded
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unless  they are guarded by lo ca t io n ;  i . e . ,  so pos i t ioned  as to  prevent 
any person from coming in  con tac t  with them. Spec i f ic  s a fe ty  recommendations fo r  the design, guarding, and opera t ion  of the k e l ly  
bushings,  catheads ,  and ro ta ry  t a b le s  a re  made in  app l icab le  c a t e g o r i e s .
On ro ta ry  d r i l l i n g  r i g s ,  every counterweight above the d e r r i c k  or  mast 
f loor  and located in s ide  the mast when not fu l l y  encased or running in 
permanent guides,  should be a t tached  to  the frame of the d e r r i c k  with a 
separa te  wire rope or chain sa fe ty  l i n e ,  adequate to prevent the 
counterweight from coming w i th in  8 fee t  of the f lo o r .
Tools, machine p a r t s ,  or  m a te r ia l  of any kind should not be kept in  a 
de r r i ck  or mast above the f lo o r  un less  they are in  use,  i n  which case 
reasonable  p recaut ions  should be taken to  prevent t h e i r  f a l l i n g  on 
persons below. Where pipe hooks are  used above the d e r r i c k  f l o o r ,  every 
pipe hook should be secured to the d e r r i c k  in  a manner th a t  w i l l  prevent 
the hook from f a l l i n g .
Whenever i t  i s  reasonably p r a c t i c a b l e ,  the engine room, pump house, 
d e r r i c k  f lo o r ,  and racking plat form should be adequately enclosed to  a 
s u f f i c i e n t  he igh t  to provide s u i t a b le  p r o te c t io n  fo r  workers during sea­
sons of inclement weather .
Machines designed fo r  a f ixed lo ca t io n  should be secure ly  anchored to  
prevent v i b r a t i o n a l  walking or moving.
An emergency stop device should be provided for  each prime mover for  
d r i l l i n g  machinery. The device should be one t h a t ,  once placed in  the 
stop p o s i t i o n ,  should be manually r e s e t  to the s t a r t i n g  or  running p o s i ­
t i o n  before the prime mover can be s t a r t e d .
2. Weight Ind ica to rs
A weight i n d ic a to r  should be provided and used on every d r i l l i n g  r i g  and 
should be so cons t ru c ted ,  i n s t a l l e d ,  and maintained th a t  i t  w i l l  
r e g i s t e r  +5% of the load suspended from the h o i s t i n g  l i n e s .  C a l ib ra t io n  
of the weight in d ic a to r  should be performed by comparing the in d ica ted  
d r i l l  s t r i n g  weight with the c a lcu la ted  weight.  The c a l i b r a t i o n  should 
be performed monthly, a f t e r  each r ig  r e l o c a t i o n ,  or more f requen t ly  as 
d i c t a t e d  by d r i l l e r  experience . The r e s u l t s  should be recorded. Any 
weight i n d ic a to r  hung above the f lo o r  should be secured to  the d e r r i c k  
by means of a wire rope, sa fe ty  l i n e ,  or chain,  or equivalen t  means.
3. Derricks and Masts
a. General
Derricks and masts should have a permanent nameplate a t tached  to 
the s t ru c tu re  in d ic a t in g  the fol lowing:
o Name of manufacturer
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o Model number and s e r i a l  number
o Rating including s t a t i c  hook load capac i ty  with number of
l in e s
o Whether guying i s  app l icab le  and, i f  so,  the recommended
guying p a t t e r n  [74, 79, 80].
(NOTE: Derricks or masts const ructed  before  t h i s  sa fe ty
recommendation should have t h i s  same informat ion recorded and 
a v a i lab le  a t  the well  s i t e . )
Every de r r i ck  and i t s  component p a r t s  should be cons t ruc ted  to  
conform to  good engineer ing p r a c t i c e s  and should be maintained in  
safe  cond i t ion .  B ol ts ,  nu ts ,  and p ins  on e l e v a to r s ,  wire l i n e s ,  
and c a t l i n e s ,  as well  as sheave and o the r  anchor b o l t s  in  the 
de r r i ck  or mast, should be secured with c o t t e r  pins  and 
lockwashers,  or equiva len t  means.
b. Foundations
Every d e r r i ck  in  ope ra t ion  should be supported by a foundat ion.  
The d e r r i c k  or mast and foundation should not be loaded beyond i t s  
design capac i ty .  Where necessary to avoid exceeding the sa fe  
bear ing capac i ty  of s o i l  on the lo c a t io n ,  supplemental foo t ing  
should be provided to  d i s t r i b u t e  concentra ted  loads from the 
d e r r i ck  or mast and mast mount to  the ground. The area  and type of 
supplemental footing should be capable of d i s t r i b u t i n g  the gross  
weight of the d e r r i c k  or mast under maximum a n t i c ip a t e d  hook load 
and loads imposed during r a i s i n g  and lowering of the s t ru c tu re
[74] .  Table IV-1 in d ic a t e s  the ty p ic a l  safe  bear ing capac i ty  of 
severa l  types of  s o i l s .
Foundation pads fo r  d r i l l i n g  r i g s  should be graded and adequately 
dra ined. Location s i t e s  should be const ruc ted  and maintained so 
th a t  o i l ,  water,  d r i l l i n g  f l u i d ,  and o ther  f l u i d s  w i l l  d r a in  away 
from the working a rea .
All  a u x i l i a ry  p a r t s  of  d e r r i ck s  should be s u b s t a n t i a l l y  const ructed  
and maintained in  a sa fe  cond i t ion .
Reasonable provis ions should be made to  prevent d e r r i ck s  from 
co l laps ing  as a r e s u l t  of wind v e lo c i t y .  This may be accomplished by using e i t h e r  one or  both of the following methods:
o Using an adequate number of  s u f f i c i e n t l y  st rong guy l in e s  
arranged and anchored as sp ec i f ied  by the r i g  manufacturer or 
in  accordance with accepted engineer ing p ra c t i c e s  
o Const ruct ing the d e r r i ck  and foundations to  r e s i s t  
over turn ing in accordance with accepted engineering 
p r a c t i c e s .
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TABLE IV-1 
SAFE BEARING CAPACITY OF SOILS
Type of Soil
Safe Bearing Capacity 
(pounds/sq ft)
Soil ledge of hard rock, such as granite, trap, etc. 50,000-200,000
Sound shale and other medium rock requiring blasting
for removal 20,000-30,000
Hard pan, cemented sand, and gravel difficult
to remove by picking 16,000-20,000
Soft rock, disintegrated; in natural ledge difficult
to remove by picking 1 0 ,000-20,000
Compact sand and gravel requiring picking for removal 8 ,000-12,000
Hard clay requiring picking for removal 8 ,000-10,000
Gravel, coarse sand in natural thick beds 8 ,000-10,000
Loose, medium, and coarse sand; fine, compact sand 3,000-8,000
Medium clay, stiff but capable of being spaded 4,000-8,000
Fine, loose sand 2,000-4,000
Soft clay 2 ,0 0 0
Source: Mark's Standard Handbook for Mechanical Engineers [81].
c. Anchors and Guying
Expanding anchors, pipe anchors, concrete anchors, or anchors 
otherwise engineered to prevent overturning should be used in 
accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations. Trees, rocks, 
driven stakes, or other temporary, movable objects should not be used 
for anchoring. Soil conditions, terrain, and use of surrounding land 
will determine the most applicable, type of anchor. All anchors 
should satisfy the following conditions:
o All installed ground anchors, permanent or temporary, should 
meet the pullout recommendations for the conditions of 
service. The anticipated climatic conditions, including wind 
forces, for the geographic area should be a prime con­
sideration in determining the anchor pullout recommendations 
and pattern spacing. Anchor breaking strength and pullout 
safety factors should be in accordance with the recommenda­
tions included in API "Spec 4E: Specification for Drilling
and Well Servicing Structures" [82]. 
o Where soil is corrosive, metal components or permanent ground 
anchors should be galvanized or otherwise protected against 
corrosion [78].
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Pull tests for all permanent-type ground anchors should be made for 
the geographical area and size and type of anchor involved. Rep­
resentative pull tests should be conducted along the anchor working 
plane. Records of representative anchor pull tests for the area 
should be maintained.
Permanent anchors should be visually inspected by the user prior to 
each use. If significant damage or deterioration is apparent on
inspection, anchors should be pull tested.
Temporary ground anchors should be of such type and so installed to
provide pullout strengths that exceed the maximum anticipated guy
line pull of the equipment to be used and conditions of service. 
Records of representative anchor pull tests for the area and size 
and type of anchor should be maintained by the installing company.
Portable masts, both structural and pole type, that require use of 
external guy lines to assure overturn stability should have the 
external guy lines in place immediately following raising of the 
mast.
Guy lines should be maintained in good condition sufficient for the 
loads to be incurred. Guy line strength, including auxiliary 
devices such as chains, boomers, and clamps, should be capable of 
withstanding loads for the anticipated service conditions.
Guy lines should be visually inspected prior to each rig-up. Guy 
lines should be removed from service and replaced if in any length 
of 10 diameters the total number of visible broken wires exceeds 
10% of the total number of wires in the line, or if the guy line 
shows other signs of excessive wear, corrosion, or defect.
If a derrick or mast requires guying, neither should be rigged up 
on a worksite unless the anchors have been installed and tested in 
accordance with these recommended safe work practices.
Prior to imposing any load on a derrick or mast, all recommended 
load guys should be tensioned.
d. Gin Poles
A g i n  p o l e  s h o u l d  c o n s i s t  o f  no l e s s  t h a n  two u p r i g h t  members 
s u p p o r t i n g  a h o r i z o n t a l  h e a d e r  member,  and t h e  h e a d e r  s h o u l d  e x t e n d  
i n  a  h o r i z o n t a l  p l a n e  a c r o s s  t h e  a p p r o x i m a t e  c e n t e r  o f  t h e  o p e n i n g  
i n  t h e  d e r r i c k  t o p  [ 7 5 ] .  A g i n  p o l e  s h o u l d  be i n s t a l l e d  on 
s t a n d a r d  d e r r i c k s  when i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  i n s t a l l ,  remove ,  o r  l i f t  
a crown b l o c k  o r  t o  h o i s t  o r  l o w e r  any  m a t e r i a l  t h r o u g h  t h e  o p e n i n g  
i n  t h e  d e r r i c k  t o p  t h a t  i s  t o o  heavy  t o  be  h a n d l e d  m a n u a l l y .
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The minimum clearance between the bottom of the horizontal header 
member of the gin pole and the tops of the beams on the derrick top 
that support the crown block should be no less than twice the 
overall height of the crown block or other material being handled.
A gin pole should be designed and constructed to sustain the 
maximum compression load imposed thereon.
When a standard derrick gin pole is used to install a crown block, 
access should be provided to the top of the derrick gin pole by 
means of a fixed ladder.
4. Escape Equipment
An auxiliary means of escape should be provided from the finger board of 
a standard-type derrick, from the pipe-racking platform on others, and 
from temporary stabbing boards. This auxiliary means of escape should 
be a specially rigged escape line by which an employee can reach the 
ground safely if a blowout, fire, or other emergency in or around the 
derrick should cut off his escape by way of the derrick or mast ladder.
o The escape line on masts and derricks that are 110 feet or more 
in height should be a 1/2-inch minimum diameter wire line in good 
condition. A safety trolley or buggy equipped with a cam-type 
brake should be installed on the derrick exit line and kept at the 
level of the derrickman's working platform (monkey board). When 
the derrickman mounts the trolley, the cam brake holds the 
trolley in place until it is released by pushing the handle 
forward. With this type of trolley, he can easily control the 
speed of his descent, 
o The escape buggy should be secured in a manner to ensure easy, 
but not premature, release, 
o The derrick exit line and trolley should be in operational condi­
tion before drilling begins, 
o Tension on the escape line should be periodically checked and 
adjusted to ensure safe landing of the user. Tension should be 
such that a person descending on the escape line can stop 20-25 
feet from the anchor point. The ground anchor point of the 
escape line should be located a minimum lateral distance from 
derrick or mast equal to the height above ground to the point 
where the escape line is fastened to the derrick or mast.
Tension lines should not be tied to power poles, pipelines, 
trees, rocks, vehicle bumpers, or other equipment [74].
The escape buggy should not be tested by "test runs." A daily visual 
inspection by the derrickman and testing for freedom of movement and 
braking are adequate. Other means of escape, such as an escape chute or 




Every floor, platform, walk, or runway should be kept reasonably free of 
drilling fluids, mud, oil, grease, or other substances that create a 
slipping hazard or prevent or hamper the escape of workers in an 
emergency. The rig floor should be constructed of material designed and 
maintained to be slip resistant when wet or dry.
Every rig floor should completely cover the space within the perimeter 
of the derrick or the outer boundary of the floor when it extends beyond 
the perimeter of the derrick, except for openings necessary for the 
installation of equipment used in connection with the operations. When 
the openings are not occupied by the equipment or when it is not 
necessary to keep them open, they should be covered .or otherwise guarded 
to prevent workers from accidentally stepping or falling in. 
Specifically, ratholes and mouseholes should be covered unless occupied 
by the kelly or drill pipe or constructed with a tube that extends 18 
inches or more above the rig floor.
6 . Platforms
With the exception of the stabbing board, every platform erected on the 
inside of a derrick should completely cover the space from the working 
edge of the platform back to the legs and girts of the derrick. All 
elevated platforms should be constructed to withstand four times the 
maximum intended load. All platform planks and other components should 
be secured adequately to prevent displacement.
a. Crown Platforms
On every jackknife derrick, a platform at least 2 feet wide should 
be provided on at least one side of the crown block. This platform 
should be equipped on its outer edges with a two-rail guard railing 
and a toeboard. Smaller platforms may be used if the employees are 
provided with, and required to use, safety belts and lanyards.
Every standard derrick used for drilling, except a jackknife 
derrick, should have a continuous outside derrick platform at least 
2 feet wide completely around the derrick at an elevation no more 
than 2 feet above and no more than one girt (not to exceed 8 feet) 
below the monkey board. This platform should be equipped on its 
outer edges with a two-rail guard railing and toeboards [75].
Additional access platforms should be provided with openings that 
should be at least 30 inches by 30 inches to permit the passage of 
workers climbing derrick ladders. Standard railings around the 
outer edges of the platforms and toeboards should be 4 inches high 
around the inside and outside edges of the platform, except at 
access points.
Direct access should be provided to each outside derrick platform
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by the main derrick ladder, by an auxiliary derrick ladder from any 
lower outside derrick platform to which the main derrick ladder 
does not provide direct access, or by extending the outside derrick 
platform to the main derrick ladder.
b. Racking Platforms
A monkey board should be provided in a standard derrick or mast at 
each elevation where an employee is normally required to handle 
pipe or other equipment racked in the derrick tower.
The working edge of monkey boards should be placed to permit 
sufficient clearance for safe passage of the traveling block and so 
that the elevator can be easily reached. A monkey board should not 
be positioned so that the hoisting line running to the hoist drum 
runs through, or is in contact with, the platform unless provisions 
are made to prevent the line from dangerously abrading the platform 
and to guard employees working on the platform from contact with 
the line.
Every monkey board on a standard derrick should completely cover 
the space from the working edge back to the legs and derrick 
girts. The monkey board or racking platform on a mast should be 
securely fastened to a structural member or mast legs and 
completely surround the working area. Every monkey board should be 
secured to the derrick with bolts or equivalent fastenings to 
resist being shifted or accidentally dislodged under normal 
operating conditions.
A vertical clearance of at least 6-1/2 feet should be maintained 
above the decking of each monkey board [77]. Access to a monkey 
board on a standard derrick that is more than four feet above the 
outside derrick platform that serves it, and to which the main 
derrick ladder does not provide direct access, should be provided 
by means of an auxiliary derrick ladder. The ladder should run 
from the platform below to a point no less than 3-1/2 feet above 
the monkey board.
A standard finger or finger brace should not be used as a racking 
platform except when it meets the recommendations for one and 
provides a safe working space between the traveling block or 
hoisting lines and the pipe racked in the derrick tower.
c. Stabbing Boards
A stabbing board should be provided for and used by employees when 
a platform is necessary for regular operating duties and the work 
cannot be safely performed from a fixed platform or monkey board.
A stabbing board should be at least 12 inches wide and should be 
strong enough to safely withstand the total weight of persons,
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equipment, or material that may be required or permitted to be 
placed thereon. When it is in position, the ends of a stabbing 
board should be fastened in a manner that will prevent the board 
from accidentally shifting off its supports or falling on the 
floor. Placing the boards across a girt without firmly securing 
the ends is not adequate because they are easily displaced.
A safety line should be attached to each end of the stabbing board 
and secured to the derrick structure to prevent pieces from falling 
to the floor below in the event of accidental breakage or 
displacement.
After the stabbing board is used, it should be removed from the 
derrick.
7. Guardrails
The outer edges of all floors, platforms, walks, and runways that are 
four feet or more above the ground or another floor level, except entry- 
and exitways and loading and unloading areas, should be guarded with 
standard guardrails [70]. The Vee-door or other material access ways to 
platforms or the rig floor should be guarded by a chain or cable capable 
of withstanding 200 pounds applied at the midpoint. The chain should be 
in place at all times except when material, such as drill pipe, is 
actually being moved through the platform access way.
A standard railing should not be used for other than personnel 
protection purposes.
A guardrail used and/or needed for the purpose of actual or potential 
containment of equipment or material should be of such construction and 
strength as to effectively contain the full load or stress expected to 
be applied. (For example, if 25 pieces of 6-inch pipe are contained by 
a guardrail, or any attachment to the guardrail, such guardrail and 
attachment should be capable of safely holding that quantity of pipe, 
plus an additional allowance for at least two employees, assuming 200 
pounds per employee) [78],
Toeboards should be provided to prevent material from falling off 
whenever the floor, platform, walkway, or runway is 10 feet or more 
above the next floor level or when persons are likely to be below. The 
hole opening resulting from the removal of the rotary table for 
installation of the blowout preventer is exempted.
Standard toeboards should be a minimum of 4 inches in vertical height 
from the top edge to the level of the floor, platform, walkway, or 
runway. Toeboards should be securely fastened in place and not have 
more than 1/4-inch vertical clearance above floor level. They may be 
constructed of any substantial material, either solid or with openings, 
not to exceed 1 inch in greatest dimension [70].
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I f  m a t e r i a l  i s  s t a c k e d  t o  su ch  h e i g h t  t h a t  a s t a n d a r d  t o e b o a r d  d o e s  n o t  
p r o v i d e  p r o t e c t i o n ,  s u b s t a n t i a l  p a n e l i n g  o r  s c r e e n i n g  from f l o o r  t o  
i n t e r m e d i a t e  r a i l  o r  t o p  r a i l  h e i g h t  s h o u l d  b e  p r o v i d e d  a s  r e q u i r e d .
Rig floors, derrick walks, and engine room floors should not be used as 
s t o r a g e  platforms for idle equipment or material that is not for 
immediate use, unless it is properly racked or stored to avoid 
obstruction or congestion of the work area or access way.
8 . Exits and Stairs
Where the difference in elevation is more than 18- inches between the 
ground and other working levels, platforms, or floors, an exit should be 
provided by means of a stairway, ramp, walkway, or a combination of 
these. Typical areas that should be provided with safe exits are:
o A place along an edge of the drawworks enginehouse floor or 
platform that is as remote from the derrick floor as operating 
conditions will permit. This exit should be readily accessible 
from all areas of the enginehouse unless an alternate accessible 
exit remote from the derrick floor is provided, 
o The end of the catwalk furthest from the derrick floor 
o The junction of the derrick floor and Vee-door ramp 
o The junction of the drilling fluid ditch walk and derrick floor.
E v e r y  runway should be at least 2 feet in width. When guardrails are 
provided on a runway, the clearance on the runway should still be at
l e a s t  18 inches wide [68].
Derrick floors at wells having no connection walk, platform, or other 
floor should have at least one means of exit provided if the derrick 
floor is more than 18 inches but less than 4 feet above ground level.
When the derrick floor is more than 4 feet above ground, two means of
exit should be provided and located so that they offer alternative means 
of escape in case of emergency. One means of exit should be provided by 
a stairway, ramp, walkway, or a combination of these. A ladder may be 
used as the other means of exit. Where the derrick floor is 20 feet or 
more above ground, an additional, rapid means of descent, such as a 
slide, should be provided as a third exit for emergency use only and so 
posted [73].
A l l  "EXIT" d o o r s  o f  a d r i l l i n g  r i g  s h o u l d  o p e n  o u t w a r d s  and s h o u l d  n o t  
be  h e l d  c l o s e d  w i t h  a l o c k  o r  an  o u t s i d e  l a t c h  when workmen a r e  work ­
ing  on t h e  r i g .
Standard railing should be provided on the open sides of all exposed
stairways and stair platforms with four or more risers. Every stairway, 
ladder, ramp, runway, floor, and platform should be kept reasonably free 
of objects and substances that may create a slipping or tripping hazard, 
or prevent or hinder the escape of workers in an emergency.
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9. Ladders
Every derrick should be equipped with a fixed ladder or ladders arranged 
to provide access from the floor level, or from the vehicle bed on which 
it is mounted, to the crown safety platform and to any intervening fixed 
platforms.
Fall protection should be provided and used by all persons climbing the 
derrick ladder(s). If the ladder is not constructed with approved cages 
and landing platforms, then a ladder climbing device or a fall arresting 
device should be provided. Platforms should be provided wherever fixed 
ladders are offset laterally, unless a ladder climbing safety assist 
device is utilized.
Where sections of ladders are spliced, they should be supported at the 
splice so the ladder will be aligned and the splice will not be stressed 
beyond its safe working limit.
Along the length and width of the back of the ladder, a space of at 
least 7 inches should be maintained clear of all obstructions that
present a tripping hazard, prevent safe footing, or prevent a secure 
handhold to the ladder rungs or steps.
A ladder should not lean backwards from a vertical position. A ladder 
should not lean sideways more than 5-3/4 degrees (1 foot horizontal in 
10 feet vertical). Ladders from cantilever-type masts should not lean 
sideways more than 3 degrees or approximately 1 foot horizontal in 20 
feet vertical [77].
Ladders should be constructed so that the rungs or steps are approxi­
mately horizontal at the normal operating position of the derrick. The 
distance between rungs should be uniform [77]. Every ladder should be 
substantially constructed and secured to the derrick with bolts, 
brackets, or equivalent safe fastenings.
The top end of each terminating ladder or ladder section providing
access to any fixed platform in or on a derrick should extend at least 
3-1/2 feet above the platform unless suitable handholds are provided 
[68]. An opening to permit the passage of employees climbing the ladder 
should be provided in every platform through which the ladder passes.
o The width of the opening should be at least 22 inches but no 
more than 30 inches, 
o The ladder should be placed midway along the width of the open­
ing.
o The openings should be clear and unobstructed for at least 30 
inches outward on the climbing side.
10. Mud Pits, Tanks, and Reserve Pits
Portable tanks should be located wnere it is not possible for employees
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or equipment to come into contact with overhead powerlines.
All discharge lines should be properly secured. All fixed mud guns used 
for jetting should be pinned or whip checked when unattended. Hoses 
used for jetting operations should be manned when operational, and an 
employee should be stationed at the pump control to shut down the 
pressure in the event of an emergency [78].
When it is necessary for an employee to enter a mud tank that has 
contained toxic fluid, the safety recommendations presented in section
5.b., Entry into Confined Spaces, should be followed.
Standard railings should be provided on the inside of all mud tank 
walkways. Where such walkways are 4 feet or more above ground level, 
both sides should be provided with standard railings. Guardrails should
be installed on both sides of walkways located over mud tanks.
Reserve pits should be:
o Equipped with a standard ring buoy and 90 feet of line
o Equipped with a readily accessible rescue hook similar to the
type used at swimming pools 
o Guarded if located in a high-traffic area
o Lighted well enough to ensure that employees will not inadver­
tently fall into them at night.
11. Pumps and Pressure-Relieving Safety Devices
All pressure vessels, safety pressure relief valves, pumps, fittings, 
piping, and hoses should be constructed, installed, operated, inspected, 
and repaired to conform to the ASME "Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code". 
[83]
Pumps should not be operated at unsafe speeds or in excess of their safe 
working pressure. Every power-driven piston or plunger-type pump should 
have the manufacturer's specification plate or markings showing the 
manufacturer's ratings of the pump. Where there is a likelihood of 
developing a pressure in the pump in excess of its safe working 
pressure, the pump should be equipped with an adequate 
pressure-relieving safety device such as a direct spring-loaded safety 
valve, a shear pin-set safety valve, a rupture disk, or other equivalent 
device.
Pressure-relieving devices should be installed and maintained as follows:
o There should be no intervening stop valves between the pump and 
its pressure-relieving device or between the pressure-relieving 
device and the point of discharge, 
o The point of discharge from pressure-relieving devices should be 
at a place where the safety of employees is not endangered by the 
discharge fluids.
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o Pressure-relieving devices should be set to relieve at a pressure 
not in excess of the maximum allowable safe working pressure of 
the pump [77].
Every shear pin-set safety valve should have a metal plate affixed to it 
with holes drilled in it as a gauge for each size shear pin to be used 
with the valve and a table with stamped or raised letters and figures 
showing the pressure at which each size shear pin will shear.
Shear pins used in pressure-relief devices should be of a design and 
strength specified by the manufacturer. Allen wrenches or other 
hardened steel items should not be substituted. Every shear pin-set 
safety valve should have the valve stem and the shear pin enclosed in a 
manner that will prevent accidental contact with the valve stem and 
prevent the shear pin from flying when sheared.
Adequate drainage should be provided to prevent the accumulation of oils 
or drilling fluids around pump bases.
The piping on the discharge side of the pressure-relief device should be 
securely tied down.
The use of hydraulic, pneumatic, or gas pressure inside a pump to remove 
pump liners should not be permitted. This does not mean that the use of 
hydraulic or pneumatic tools made for this purpose is unsafe.
No pump should be set in motion when the fluid-end cylinder head is not 
secured in place unless precautions are taken to prevent injury to 
employees.
Every pump should be equipped with a bleeder pipe and valve through 
which the pressure in any part of the pump can be bled off to 
atmospheric or as near atmospheric pressure as is practicable, unless 
other piping and valves connected to the pump can be effectively used 
for this purpose.
Each disk used in a rupture disk-type, pressure-relieving device should 
have stamped on it the approximate pressure at which it will rupture, or 
be identified by an equivalent means.
Before beginning the removal of any cap, plug, plate, or cover from a 
pump or otherwise opening a pump, the pressure within the pump should be 
bled off to atmospheric or as near atmospheric pressure as is 
practicable.
Employees should be instructed in the dangers of high pressure systems 
and the sudden release of contained pressure.
12. Circulating Hose and Standpipe
The upper end of the standpipe should be securely fastened to the
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derrick or mast leg or to the derrick or mast girts, unless other 
adequate support is provided [75].
The standpipe end of the rotary hose should be secured to the stand­
pipe or to the derrick or mast, and the other end to the swivel by a 
substantially constructed clamping device and safety chain or wire 
rope. The hose coupling is exposed to high pressure and vibration, a 
combination that can result in coupling disconnect [75].
The safety chain should be strong enough to safely support the rotary 
hose, contained circulating fluids, and dynamic circulating fluid pres­
sures in the event of a coupling separation.
The ends of connecting hose sections should be secured together (whip 
checked) by means of clamps and a safety chain or wire rope. The clamps 
should be tightly fitted to and near the ends of the connecting hose 
sections, and the chain or wire rope securely fastened to each of the 
clamps.
When hose is used under pressure in a fluid circulating system of a well 
(in addition to that section between the swivel and standpipe), the ends 
of each section should be secured to the end of the adjoining hose or 
pipe in the manner described above [75].
13. Cellars
Stairways, runways, and ladders providing entry to a cellar should be 
substantially constructed to conform with good engineering practices and 
should be kept in safe condition. Well cellars, well floors, and ground 
areas adjacent to derricks should be kept free of oil accumulation that 
might create or aggravate fire hazards.
Cellars more than 6 feet deep and/or containing hazardous substances or 
water should be guarded with standard guardrails unless guarded by 
location [74].
When employees are required to be in a cellar, the cellar and the exits 
from it should be kept reasonably free of water, oil, drilling fluid, 
and other like substances that may endanger them. Loose equipment or 
material, except what is in use or about to be used, should not be kept 
in the cellar or in the shaft or exits.
14. Pipe and Pipe Racks
Every pipe and equipment storage rack and platform should be designed, 
constructed, and placed on substantial foundations and maintained to 
safely support the loads placed on it.
Each finger of a finger board should be bolted, welded, hinged and 
pinned, or attached by other equivalent means to its support beam and be 
capable of restraining the maximum intended load.
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Pipe racks should be set level laterally on a stable foundation. They 
may slope front to back to facilitate laying down or picking up pipe 
[78].
Adequate provision should be made to prevent pipe, drill collars, drill 
stems, or similar round, rolling stock material from accidentally 
rolling off any storage rack. This may be achieved by nailing chock 
blocks to the decking of the rack and to the planks or spacers used 
between the layers of pipe or other material on the rack, or by other 
equally effective means.
When pipe is being transferred between pipe racks, catwalks, or trucks, 
the temporary supports or skids should be so constructed, placed, and 
anchored so that they will support their loads [78].
Pipe joints temporarily placed on the inclined ramp or Vee-door area 
should be:
o Chocked a t  t h e  b a s e  t o  p r e v e n t  k i c k b a c k
o P o s i t i o n e d  a t  t h e  u p p e r  end i n  a man ner  t o  p r e v e n t  them from 
f a l l i n g  s i d e w a y s .
15. Blocks
All traveling blocks and their component parts should be substantially 
constructed to conform with good engineering practices and maintained in 
a safe condition. Traveling blocks, crown blocks, and related equipment 
should not be subjected to any load in excess of their design 
limitations.
a .  Crown B lo c k s
Each sheave assembly of a crown block should be provided with a 
complete metal-bearing housing, a metal strap, or an equivalent 
housing, securely fastened to the crown block beams so that the 
sheaves, sheave bearings, or housings cannot accidentally be 
dislodged under normal operating conditions [84].
Each crown block should be securely fastened in place with bolts, 
metal clamps, or equivalent fastenings that will prevent it from 
being accidentally shifted or dislodged. Each crown block sheave 
should be securely fastened in place in a manner that will prevent 
it from jumping out of its bearings or becoming accidentally 
shifted or dislodged.
b. Traveling Blocks
The sheaves of a traveling block should be equipped with adequate 
guards that will prevent accidental contact by an employee with the 
sheaves or with the nip point where the hoisting lines run on and 
off the sheaves.
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Every traveling block sheave guard should be securely fastened to 
the traveling block to prevent it from becoming accidentally dis­
placed under the most severe operating conditions, such as jarring 
on a stuck string of pipe, contact with the finger boards, or pipe 
standing in the derrick.
Every traveling block hook or other hook or line suspended from the 
traveling block, to which an elevator, elevator link, swivel bail, 
or other equipment is attached, should be equipped with a safety 
latch or device that will provide a completely and securely closed 
hook or link. The latch or device should be adequate enough to 
prevent material from becoming accidentally disengaged when used 
under the most severe operating conditions, such as jarring on a 
stuck string of pipe, or impact with the finger boards or pipe 
standing in the derrick [73].
Every  t r a v e l i n g  b l o c k ,  t r a v e l i n g  b l o c k  h ook ,  e l e v a t o r  and e l e v a ­
t o r  l i n k ,  o r  s i m i l a r  t r a v e l i n g  e q u ip m e n t  s h o u l d  be  f r e e  o f  
p r o j e c t i n g  b o l t s ,  n u t s ,  p i n s ,  o r  o t h e r  p a r t s  on w hic h  t h e  c l o t h i n g  
o f  workmen m i g h t  be  c a u g h t  o r  t h a t  may f o u l  t h e  d e r r i c k  members  o r  
o t h e r  eq u ip m en t  o r  m a t e r i a l  i n  t h e  d e r r i c k .
The h o i s t i n g  hoo k  s h o u l d  be  e q u i p p e d  w i t h  a  s a f e t y  l a t c h  o r  o t h e r  
e q u i v a l e n t  d e v i c e  t o  p r e v e n t  a c c i d e n t a l  r e l e a s e  o f  t h e  l o a d  b e i n g  
h o i s t e d  o r  l o w e r e d .
T r a v e l i n g  b l o c k s  s h o u l d  n o t  be  moved w h i l e  t h e  c rown b l o c k  i s  b e i n g  
l u b r i c a t e d .
16. Drawworks, Hoisting Lines, and Operations
The drawworks should not be operated without all guards in place. The 
front of the drawworks should be guarded by means adequate to prevent a 
worker from falling into the drum except during such operations as cut­
ting or inspecting a drilling line.
a .  H o i s t i n g  Ropes
API "RP 9B: Recommended Practice on Application, Care, and Use of
Wire Rope for Oil Field Service" [85] should be followed.
Rope s h o u l d  be s e c u r e d  t o  t h e  drum a s  f o l l o w s :
o No less than five wraps of rope should remain on the drum 
when the hook is in its extreme low position, 
o The rope end should be anchored securely to the drum.
Whenever rope is exposed to temperatures at which fiber cores would 
be damaged, rope with an independent wire rope or wire strand core 
or other temperature-resistant core should be used. Replacement 
rope should be the same size, grade, and construction as the
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original rope furnished by the drilling rig manufacturer, unless 
otherwise recommended by a wire rope manufacturer due to actual 
working condition requirements. A ton-mile program for wire rope 
use and replacement should be followed [84].
b. Rope Inspection
When any o f  the  fo l lo w in g  c o n d i t i o n s  a re  p r e s e n t ,  a w ire  rope 
should  be immedia tely removed from s e r v i c e :
o Reduction of rope diameter below nominal diameter due to 
loss of core support, internal or external corrosion, or 
wear or scraping of one-third the original diameter of out­
side individual wires 
o Ten randomly distributed broken wires in one rope lay, or 
five broken wires in one strand in one rope lay 
o Evidence of heat damage
o Corroded or broken wires at end connections 
o Corroded, cracked, bent, worn, or improperly applied end 
connections
o Severe kinking, crushing, cutting, bird caging, or 
unstranding.
All rope that has been idle for a period of a month or more due to 
shutdown or storage of a rig on which it is installed should be 
given a thorough inspection before it is placed back in service. 
This inspection should be for all types of deterioration. The 
following limitations apply to the use of wire rope:
o Eye splices made in any wire rope should have not less than 
three full tucks. However, this recommendation should not 
operate to preclude the use of another form of splice or 
connection which can be shown to be as efficient and which 
is not otherwise prohibited [68]. 
o Eyes in wire rope bridles, slings, or running line should 
not be formed by wire rope clips or knots, 
o The "Flemish eye," "farmer’s eye," "contractor's standby", 
or any other knot should not be used in any wire rope, 
o When U-bolt wire rope clips are used for form eyes, spacing 
and number of all types of clips should be in accordance 
with Table IV-2. Clip bolts should be retightened after the 
rope has been in use for 1 hour. Clips should be applied so 
that the "U" portion of the clip contacts the dead end of 
the rope [68],
c. Deadline Anchors
Deadline anchors for hoisting lines should be so constructed, 
installed, and maintained that their strength equals or exceeds the 
working strength of the hoisting line.
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TABLE IV-2
NUMBER AND SPACING OF U-BOLT WIRE ROPE CLIPS
Improved Plow S t e e l , Number o f  C l i p s Minimum
Rope D ia m e t e r Drop O t h e r S p a c in g
( i n c h e s ) Forged  M a t e r i a l ( i n c h e s )
1 / 2 3 4 3
3/8 3 4 3-3/4
3/4 4 5 4-1/2
7/8 4 5 5-1/4
1 5 6 6
1-1/8 6 6 6-3/4
1-1/4 6 7 7-1/2
1-3/8 7 7 8-1/4
1-1/2 7 8 9
Source: OSHA Construction Industry Standards,
29 CFR 1926/1910 [68].
Provisions should be made to prevent the deadline from becoming 
accidentally disengaged from the tiedown.
d. Line Spoolers or Winches
Metal parts of line spoolers and line stabilizers should be guarded 
against contact with the hoisting line by rubber or other suitable 
nonmetallic material. Moving parts of power takeoff (cathead) line 
spoolers should be guarded.
Every overhead sheave or pulley on which a line spooler counter­
weight rope runs should be mounted in steel or iron brackets that 
are securely fastened to its support by bolts, wire cable, or 
adequate welding.
Control for line spoolers should be of the "deadman" type.
17. Catheads and Catlines
a. Manual Catheads
If a cathead is mounted on the end of a shaft that projects beyond 
the guard for other moving parts of machinery, the shaft end, key, 
or other device for securing the cathead to the shaft should be 
covered with a smooth thimble. The thimble cover should be of such 
design that a rope cannot wind around it.
There should be at least 20 inches of working area between the
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outer flanges of a cathead and a substructure guardrail or prefab 
wall [75].
Every cathead on which a rope is manually operated should have a 
reasonably smooth surface and should be free of projections on 
which employees' clothing may be caught. Cracked or broken 
catheads should not be used.
The horizontal friction surface of every cathead on which a rope is 
manually operated should be of uniform diameter between the inner 
and outer flanges, within a 1/4-inch tolerance. A cathead on which 
a rope is manually operated should be replaced or rebuilt when wear 
has created grooves or deformations in excess of three-sixteenths 
of an inch below the true surface line.
Every cathead on which a rope is manually operated should be 
equipped with an antirope-fouling device that will separate the 
beginning of the second wrap of rope from the first wrap at the 
point where the first wrap begins contact with the cathead. The 
device should be so designed and fitted in place that its inner 
edge is not more than three-eighths of an inch at any point from 
the friction surface of the cathead. Antirope-fouling devices and 
rope guides should be maintained free of sharp edges that could cut 
or abrade the ropes in use on the cathead.
Every cathead on which a rope is manually operated should have a 
suitable rope guide that will hold the on-running break rope, 
spinning rope, snapping-up rope, and kelly pull-back rope in align­
ment with their normal running position against the inner flange of 
the cathead.
b. Automatic Catheads
Rotating and reciprocating parts of every automatic cathead not 
protected by guards used for other moving parts of the machinery 
should be protected by shield guards. Openings of such sizes as 
are necessary for the run of the rope to the cathead are permitted.
Every cathead that uses chain should be equipped with a manually 
operated cathead clutch or with another device that is adequate 
enough to keep the rotation of the cathead under control when it is 
in use. The clutch or device should be of the "nongrab" type and 
should release automatically when not manually held in the engaged 
position.
Wire rope lines used on automatic catheads should be designed to 
withstand the stresses imposed on them. End fastenings for a wire 
rope used on an automatic cathead should be made in accordance with 
the manufacturer's recommendations. A "contractor's standby" (half 
hitch and clips) should not be used as an end fastening on the rope.
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c. Catlines
Catlines and high lines should be designed to safely lift or 
otherwise handle the loads. The maximum allowable working loads 
should be based on manufacturers' tables.
A post or guard should be provided to deflect cathead lines away 
from the driller's position. Where posts are of the rotating type, 
the top and bottom ends should be guarded to contain the post in 
case the shaft fractures.
A catline grip should be provided and used to keep the catline 
tight when the line is not in use.
18. Chains and Spinning Chains
All chains should be discarded or repaired if:
o They have been stretched to the point where links bind, kink, or 
lock
o There is a link showing more than 10% distortion or when a link 
has been broken [75] 
o There is a link with metal reduced by wear, at any point, to less 
than 90% of its original cross-sectional area [75],
Chains that have been connected together for use as a spinning line 
should be connected and used as follows:
o A section of unbroken chain fastened to the cathead may be con­
nected to a section of unbroken chain of smaller size, 
o The connector link should be located where it will not come in 
contact with pipe being rotated, 
o If there is a broken link in a spinning chain and the other links 
of the chain are not deformed or weakened, it is permissible to 
repair the chain with a tempered connecting link of the proper 
size for that chain, 
o A cold-shut connecting link that is not tempered should never be
used to repair a chain of any kind.
In the event of rupture of a link in the section of larger chain, both 
sections of chain should be discarded at once from further use as a 
spinning line. No part of any chain that has been broken should be used 
in a spinning line. To eliminate any necessity for use of broken chain, 
every rig where chain is used in a spinning line should be provided with 
spare chain in good condition. Every chain used in a spinning line 
should have a fiber tailrope between 8 and 12 inches in length fastened
to the pipe end of the chain.
Connections between lengths of cathead chain, tong chains, and spinning
chain should be of the connecting link or swivel type and of strength
equal to the lighter chain. Connecting links and swivels should be of a
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size and type suitable for the chain in use.
I f  c h a i n s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  s i z e s  a r e  c o n n e c t e d  t o g e t h e r  f o r  u s e  i n  a 
s p i n n i n g  l i n e ,  a s p a r e  c h a i n  o f  l i k e  s i z e  s h o u l d  be  p r o v i d e d  f o r  e a c h  
c h a i n  so  c o n n e c t e d .
19. Elevators
Elevators should be equipped with a positive locking/latching device 
designed to prevent drill pipe or casing from prematurely disengaging. 
Every drill pipe casing and tubing should be provided with a comple­
mentary (to the elevator latch) collar or protrusion designed to prevent 
elevator links/latches from becoming accidentally disengaged.
Elevators should be free of projections that could catch on derrick 
structure or rigging items.
20. Slips
The handles of drill pipe slips should be long enough to extend at least 
2 inches beyond the greatest radial dimension of the drill pipe elevator 
box (except in those instances where the handles would be so long they 
would project beyond the inner edge of the circular guard covering the 
top outer surface of the rotary table). In such cases they should be as 
long as possible without projecting beyond the inner edge of the guard 
[77]. Any slip hook used for lifting should be equipped with a safety 
latch.
21. Tongs, Tong Backup Posts, Kelly Pull-Back Posts, and Safety Lines
Each pipe tong should be attached to the derrick or a back-up post by 
means of a wire rope known as a safety line. This safety line should 
have a breaking strength above the capacity of the pull that is exerted 
on the tongs by means of the automatic cathead. Both ends of the safety 
line should be secured by the required number of clamps (Table IV-2) 
properly installed, with the U-bolt of the clamp on the dead end of the 
cable.
The wire rope and connections should be frequently inspected and 
replaced according to the manufacturer's specifications. Special atten­
tion during inspection should be paid to wire rope rot from weathering 
and to cable clamp tightness.
Each to n g  t o  which a  b r e a k i n g  o r  m ak in g -u p  l i n e  i s  a t t a c h e d  and  b e i n g  
u s e d  on a c a t h e a d  s h o u l d  h a v e  a  s a f e t y  l i n e  a t t a c h e d  t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  
t o n g s  b e i n g  p u l l e d  t o  t h e  c a t h e a d  and  a l s o  t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  t o n g s  f rom 
t r a v e l i n g  w i t h  t h e  r o t a t i n g  p i p e  i n  c a s e  t h e  b r e a k i n g  l i n e  s h o u l d  f a i l .
Tong backup posts, kelly pull-back posts, and tong safety lines should 
not be secured to derrick or mast girts or to derrick or mast legs 
unless the legs are so constructed and the lines so attached that the
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stresses imposed will not result in structural damage to the legs [77].
A kelly pull-back post with device attached, onto or through which to 
run the pull-back rope, should be provided for pulling the kelly back to 
the rathole. The pull-back post should be secured either to the derrick 
foundation, side sills, or floor sills and should not be attached to or 
come in contact with the derrick legs, girts, or braces.
Tong dies should be inspected regularly and replaced as a set as they 
become worn. The tongs should be inspected and greased before each 
tripping operation.
22. Power Tongs
The control device on power tongs should be designed or guarded to 
prevent accidental activation [77]. The power input pressure line used 
on power tongs should be disconnected before any repair, replacement, or 
other work of a similar nature is done on tongs, chains, dies, or their 
component parts [73, 74].
High pressure lines (hydraulic or air) should have a safety pressure 
relief valve that should never be set higher than the manufacturer's 
specifications for the working pressure of the lines or valve [74].
Hydraulic tongs should be backed up with a safety device able to 
withstand the full torque of the power tool.
23. Kelly Bushings, Rotary Tables, and Machine/Equipment Guarding
All belts, gears, shafts, pulleys, sprockets, spindles, drums, fly­
wheels, or other reciprocating or rotating parts, with the exception of 
the kelly and the cathead, should be guarded by a guard of sufficient 
strength to prevent any person from coming in contact with them, unless 
they are guarded by location [73]. The kelly bushing should be guarded 
when the outer and/or upper exposed surface(s) have corners, bolts, 
grabs, handles, "J" hooks, or other projections that are likely to catch 
or snag employees or their clothing or ropes, lines, hoses, chains, and 
similar equipment.
Rotary tables should have a substantially constructed metal guard 
adequately covering the outer edge of the table and extending downward 
to completely cover all the exposed rotating side of the table including 
the pinion gear [73], All rotary table gears in motion should be 
enclosed with a substantially constructed metal guard.
o All sprockets and power-driven chains (except spinning chains) 
should be enclosed to prevent accidental contact of employees 
with the moving parts, 
o Guards should be constructed of heavy metal, strong enough to 
withstand the impact of a broken flying chain, and should be 
adequately secured in place.
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o Lag screws, spikes, or nails should not be used as the primary 
means of securing guards in place.
Rig machinery should not be operated without all guards properly 
maintained and in position, except during maintenance, repair, or rig-up 
work or when limited testing is being performed by a qualified person.
No employee should clean or lubricate any machinery where there is 
danger of contact with a moving part until such machinery has been 
stopped, deenergized, tagged, and a safety lock installed.
Any counterweight above the derrick floor when not fully enclosed should 
be directed away from the working surfaces or be guarded.
C. Safe Work Practices
1. General
Alcohol, drugs, or other intoxicants should not be permitted on the
well site, and employees should not be allowed to work while intoxicated
or under the influence of drugs.
The offgoing driller should inform the oncoming driller of any special 
hazards or ongoing work that may affect the safety of the crew.
Oncoming tour employees should be alerted by the driller to ongoing work 
that could affect their safety.
Firefighting equipment should not be tampered with and should not be 
removed for other than the intended firefighting purpose or for
servicing.
If lubrication fittings are not accessible with guards in place, 
machinery should be stopped for oiling and greasing.
Rigging equipment for material handling should be checked prior to use 
on each shift and as necessary during its use to ensure that it is 
safe. Defective rigging equipment should be removed from service.
Combustible materials, such as oily rags and waste, should be stored in 
covered metal containers. The contents should be disposed of daily.
2. Housekeeping
Good housekeeping is the first prerequisite of accident prevention and 
should be a primary concern of all supervisors and workmen. An exces­
sively littered or dirty work area should not be tolerated as it consti­
tutes an unsafe, hazardous condition of employment.
o The area around the base of the derrick ladder should be kept 
clear to provide unimpeded access to the ladder, 
o Work areas and walkways should not be obstructed.
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o The rotary table of the rig floor should be kept picked up and 
free of undue accumulation of oil, water, ice, or circulating 
fluids.
Bagged materials should be stacked by stepping back the layers and 
cross-keying the bags at least every 10 bags high. Noncompatible 
materials should be segregated in storage.
3. Hoisting and Rotary Operations
Drillers should never engage the rotary clutch without watching the 
rotary table. The rotary clutch should not be engaged until the rotary 
table is clear of personnel and material.
Unless the drawworks is equipped with an automatic feed control, the 
brake should not be left unattended without first being tied down. 
Except during drilling, drawworks controls should not be left unattended 
while the hoisting drum is in motion.
Drill pipe or casing should not be picked up suddenly— a sudden jerk may
cause the bottom end to whip about, endangering employees working on the
floor.
The driller should never begin hoisting drill pipe until he has
ascertained that the pipe is latched in the elevator or the derrickman
has signaled that he may safely hoist the drill pipe.
When visibility on the rig floor is obscured, no worker should be re­
quired or permitted to work on the rig floor while the rotary table is 
in motion.
During instances of unusual loading of the derrick or mast, such as when 
making any unusually hard pull, only the driller or other essential 
supervisory personnel should be on the rig floor and no one should be in 
the derrick or mast.
The brakes on the drawworks of every drilling rig should be tested by 
each driller when he comes on shift to determine whether they are in 
good order, and brakes should also be examined at weekly intervals by 
the tool pusher or other person authorized by him.
A hoisting line with a load imposed should not be permitted to be in 
direct contact with any derrick member, stationary equipment, or 
material in the derrick unless specifically designed/intended for line 
contact.
Workers should never stand near the well bore whenever any wire line 
device is being run.
Hoisting control stations should be kept clean and controls labeled as 
to their function.
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4. Riding Hoisting Equipment
Employees should not be permitted to ride the traveling block or ele­
vators except in an emergency and then they should:
o Wear an approved safety belt with appropriate lanyard and safety
attachment anchored and adjusted to prevent a fall of more than
5 feet.
o Have the full and undivided attention of the employee operating 
the hoisting equipment. The operator should be a trained and 
competent person.
The catline should not be used as a personnel carrier except under 
emergency conditions; the person operating the cathead should be fully 
trained and competent.
In an emergency, workers should not slide down any pipe, kelly hose,
cable, or rope line other than the escape line and buggy.
In an emergency, an injured worker may be lowered from the derrick by 
means of the traveling blocks or catlines, in which case the rotary 
table should be stopped. An experienced employee should operate the
controls. Approved fall protection should be provided and used.
5. Catline Operations
An experienced worker should attend the controls while a manually 
operated cathead is in use and should stop the rotation of the cathead 
promptly in case of an emergency. The cathead operator should check the 
kill switch at the cathead position before using the catline. The kill 
switch should be clearly labeled.
Operators of manually operated catheads should keep their operating area 
clear at all times and should keep that portion of the catline not being 
used coiled or spooled. They should never be permitted to stand within 
the catline coil. The operator should not use more wraps than necessary 
to pick the load--the heavier the load, the more wraps needed. No more 
than a single layer of wrap should be permitted on the cathead.
Precautions should be taken to prevent entanglement of other lines with
a line in use on a cathead. Personnel should not stand near, step over,
or go under a cable or catline while it is under tension.
A line should not be left wrapped on or in contact with an unattended, 
manually operated cathead. Catlines should not be wrapped around the 
cathead until the load has been secured at the rigging end.
A splice should not be allowed to come in contact with the friction 
surface of a cathead. It can easily grab the rotating head. Wire line
should not be used on a mechanical cathead.
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No part of a rope being used on a cathead should be touched except the 
free end. Catlines should not be wrapped around any portion of an 
employee's body. The tight line should not be touched for the purpose 
of guiding or removing fouled loops. The engine clutch should be 
disengaged before removing fouled rope.
Employees rigging loads on catlines should:
o Keep out from under the load
o Keep fingers and feet where they will not be crushed 
o Be sure to signal clearly when the load is to be picked 
o Use standard visual signals only and not depend on shouting to 
coworkers
o Make sure the load is properly rigged, since a sudden jerk in the 
catline will shift or drop the load.
6 . Pipe Handling
Pipe should be loaded and unloaded, layer by layer, with the bottom 
layer pinned or blocked securely on all four corners. Each successive 
layer should be effectively chocked or blocked.
During loading, unloading, and transferring of pipe or other similar 
tubular material (rolling stock), workers should not be permitted on top 
of the load. Employees should not be permitted to go between pipe racks 
and a load of pipe during loading, unloading, and transferring 
operations. Boomers should not be released from trucks loaded with pipe 
until the trucks are in position and all employees have been informed 
that the offloading is to begin. Pipes should be loaded on or unloaded 
from trucks one layer at a time.
Pipe or casing should be rolled from the ends or from behind in order to 
get out of the way if the joint gets out of control. Employees should 
never attempt to stop rolling pipe or casing— they should be instructed 
to stand clear and get out of the way. To prevent incidents of finger 
wounds from sharp pipe threads or wickers, pipe threads should be 
cleaned with a brush.
Slips are heavy; slip handles should be used to lift and move slips. 
Employees should not be permitted to kick slips into position. Rat- and 
mouseholes should be kept covered when not occupied by the kelly or pipe 
joint.
When pipe is hoisted, especially during tripping operations, floor- 
hands should not stand where the bottom end of the pipe can whip and 
strike them. Employees should be instructed to never turn their backs 
on pipe being tailed to the rotary table.
Pipe stored on racks or catwalks should be chocked to prevent rolling.
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Subs should be screwed completely into and made up tightly to the drill 
collars before the collars are lifted.
Employees should not be permitted to work immediately below pipe stored 
on the inclined ramp. All rigging and pipe handling should be per­
formed from above where the employee is not exposed to falling or 
tipping pipe. Pipe hoisting lines should be properly attached to the 
joint of pipe to be lifted.
7. Derrick Operations
The derrick climber should be used when climbing the derrick. Der- 
rickmen should be tied off or otherwise protected from falling whenever 
working from an unguarded platform.
The pipe elevators or traveling blocks are not to be used as a means of 
access to the derrick platforms.
The safety buggy and escape line should be checked by the derrickman 
prior to each tripping operation.
A means, such as a pipe hook or tag line, should be available for use by 
the derrickman to assist in maneuvering, stacking, and securing pipe in 
the derrick. If pipe hooks are used above the derrick floor, then the 
pipe hook should be secured to the derrick in a manner that will prevent 
the hook from falling.
All stands of pipe and drill collars racked in a derrick should be 
secured with rope or otherwise adequately secured.
An adequate horizontal supporting member should be provided in the 
derrick with each end secured to and on the outside of adjacent derrick 
legs. The stands of pipe and drill collars should be tied to the 
horizontal member unless the derrick girts are of adequate strength to 
be used for that purpose without being broken, permanently bent, or 
otherwise damaged, or unless other adequate provisions are made for 
securing the pipe and drill collars.
Drill pipe, collars, or tubing should be racked to safely distribute the 
load in the finger boards.
Whenever drill pipe, drill collars, or tubing are racked in the derrick, 
provision should be made for drainage of any fluids from the pipe stands. 
A drain pan should be installed on the derrick floor pipe rack into which 
the drill pipe and drill collars can drain.
Tools, derrick parts, or materials of any kind should not be thrown from 
any point above the first girt of a derrick. A handline should be used to 
lower the item to the level below. A canvas bucket should be used as a 
hoisting container for bolts or other small items. Tools, equipment, or 
materials of any kind should not be left unsecured in or on a derrick
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where they may become accidentally dislodged. Tools or other materials 
should not be carried up or down a ladder unless properly secured to the 
body, leaving both hands free for climbing.
The derrickman should ensure that the elevators are properly clamped onto 
all pipe joints prior to signaling the driller to engage the load.
8 . Making and Breaking Joints
Tongs should be used for the initial making up and breaking of the joint. 
The rotary table should not be used for the initial breaking of a joint.
Employees engaged in making or breaking joints should not be permitted to 
stand within the arc of the tong handles when the tong pull line is 
tensioned. Employees should handle the tongs only by the appropriate 
handles.
Employees should be trained in the safe use of spinning chains. Spinning 
chains should not be handled near the rotary table while it is in motion. 
Workers should not place the chain on the joint of pipe in the mousehole 
while the rotary table is in motion. Spinning chain should not be 
permitted to lodge in the threaded area of the pipe joint. Damaged, torn, 
or loose clothing should not be worn during spinning chain operations.
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Acciden t  s t a t i s t i c s  from n a t i o n a l  and s t a t e  su rveys  t h a t  dem ons t ra te  the  
h ig h  i n j u r y  in c id e n ce  and s e v e r i t y  r a t e s  o f  the  o i l  and gas  w e l l  d r i l l i n g  
i n d u s t r y  (SIC 1381) were p re s e n t e d  i n  C hap te r  I I I .  A t a b u l a t i o n  o f  738 
a c c i d e n t  r e p o r t s  compiled from F ed e ra l  and S t a t e  OSHA i n v e s t i g a t i o n s ,  
w o rk e r s ’ compensation r e p o r t s ,  p u b l i s h e d  a c c i d e n t  ca se  h i s t o r i e s  [10,  
4 6 - 4 9 ] ,  and company r e c o r d s  o f  i n c i d e n t s  t h a t  o cc u r r e d  d u r in g  d r i l l i n g  
o p e r a t i o n s  i s  d iv id e d  acco rd in g  t o  w he the r  t he  employees were i n j u r e d
per fo rming  t a s k s  t h a t  a r e  unique  t o  d r i l l i n g  o p e r a t i o n s  o r  a r e  t y p i c a l  of
a c c i d e n t s  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  numerous o t h e r  o c c u p a t i o n s ;  e . g . ,  c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  
m an u fac tu r in g ,  o r  min ing .
A. A cc iden ts  Unique t o  D r i l l i n g  O pera t ions
I n j u r i e s  t h a t  r e s u l t  from h a z a rd s  un ique  to  o i l  and gas w el l  d r i l l i n g  
o p e r a t i o n s  can be b ro a d ly  c l a s s i f i e d  i n t o  two major c a t e g o r i e s :  those
i n j u r i e s  i n c u r r e d  from t a s k - s p e c i f i c  a c c i d e n t s  and th o s e  i n j u r i e s  i n c u r r e d  
d u r in g  more c a t a s t r o p h i c  e v e n t s . Of the  33 a c c i d e n t  c a se  h i s t o r i e s  t h a t  
fo l low ,  27 a re  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of  i n j u r i e s  s u s t a i n e d  by workers  per fo rming
t a s k s  unique  to  w e l l  d r i l l i n g  o p e r a t i o n s  and 6 a r e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  
a c c i d e n t s  common t o  many i n d u s t r i e s .
1. T a s k - S p e c i f i c  A cc iden ts
The f i r s t  c a te g o ry  o f  a c c i d e n t  c ase  h i s t o r i e s  i s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of  
i n c i d e n t s  t h a t  o cc u r re d  d u r in g  t a s k - s p e c i f i c  o p e r a t i o n s .  This major 
c a teg o ry  has  been  f u r t h e r  subd iv ided  i n t o  a c c i d e n t s  t h a t  o ccu r red  d u r in g  
d r i l l i n g  o p e r a t i o n s ,  d e r r i c k  t a s k s ,  and m a t e r i a l s  h a n d l i n g  a c t i v i t i e s .
In many i n s t a n c e s ,  the  c i t e d  ca se  h i s t o r i e s  d e p i c t  a c c i d e n t s  c l a s s i ­
f i a b l e  i n t o  more than  one s u bc a teg o ry .
a .  D r i l l i n g  O p e ra t io n s
D r i l l i n g  o p e r a t i o n s  have been  f u r t h e r  c a t e g o r i z e d  by the  t o o l s  o r  
equipment used i n  per fo rm ing  the t a s k  such a s :
(1)  S l i p s
Case No. 0355, 1979
Acciden t  Nature  o f  Equipment Length of
Type A c t i v i t y   I n ju r y   o r  Tool Employment
Caught D r i l l i n g  Crushed t o e  S l i p s  and 4 days
between r o t a r y  t a b l e
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The r i g  crew was i n  t he  p ro ce s s  o f  adding  a l e n g th  o f  d r i l l  p ip e  t o  the  
s t r i n g .  An employee was s e t t i n g  the  s l i p s  i n t o  t h e  m as te r
b u s h i n g - r o t a r y  t a b l e  t o  suspend the  d r i l l  s t r i n g .  As t h e  s l i p s  were
i n s e r t e d ,  t he  employee 's  f o o t  s l i p p e d  i n t o  the  opening and was caught  
between the  s l i p  and the  r o t a r y  t a b l e ;  one o f  h i s  t o e s  was c ru sh ed .
Comment s :
S u r f aces  wet w i th  w a te r  a n d / o r  c i r c u l a t i n g  f l u i d s  can be expec ted  to  be 
s l i p p e r y .  Handling heavy i tems on s l i p p e r y  s u r f a c e s  can r e s u l t  i n  
s l i p s  and f a l l s .  Where t h i s  haza rd  i s  compounded by the  p re s e n c e  o f  
moving equipment ( r o t a r y  t a b l e s ,  k e l l y  b u s h i n g s ) ,  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  
i n j u r y  i s  i n c r e a s e d .
Case No. 0654,  1977
Acciden t  Nature  o f  Equipment Length o f
Type A c t i v i t y  I n j u r y  o r  Tool Employment
Caught i n  D r i l l i n g  Amputat ion S l i p s ,  d r i l l  N/Al
o r  between o f  l eg  p ip e ,  and
tongs
The r i g  crew was "b re a k in g  o u t "  the  d r i l l  p i p e .  The i n i t i a l  s t e p  
i n v o lv e s  u s in g  the  p ipe  tongs t o  "b re a k  o u t "  t h e  to rqued  d r i l l  p ipe  
c o u p l i n g .  The tongs  were p o s i t i o n e d  a s  c l o s e  t o  t h e  r o t a r y  t a b l e  as 
p o s s i b l e  t o  avoid bending the  d r i l l  p i p e .  Mechanical  f o r c e s  were 
a p p l i e d  t o  t he  tongs  by the  c a th e a d - c h a i n  system t y p i c a l  o f  d r i l l i n g  
r i g s .  Once the  c ou p l in g  was "b ro k e n , "  t h e  j o i n t  had t o  be r a i s e d  a few 
f e e t  p r i o r  to  " s p in n in g  o u t "  the  th r ea d ed  p o r t i o n .  The tongs  were l e f t  
i n  p l a c e  w i th  t h e  jaws unclamped.
An employee p laced  a fo o t  on the  s l i p s  t o  ho ld  them i n  p l a c e  w h i le  a 
d r i l l e r  h o i s t e d  the  d r i l l  s t r i n g .  The p ip e  j o i n t  was a p p a r e n t l y  spun 
out  b e f o r e  t h e  s l i p s  were s e t ,  and the  employee 's  fo o t  became caught  by 
a s l i p  h a n d l e .  His l e g  was severed  below the  knee when i t  was squeezed 
between the  d r i l l  p ipe  and a b reak o u t  tong l i n e .
Comments:
Th is  a c c i d e n t  was d i r e c t l y  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  the  prematu re  s p in n in g  o f  
t he  p ipe  by the  d r i l l e r .  The a c c i d e n t  p o t e n t i a l  was f u r t h e r  i n c r e a s e d  
by the  p re se n c e  o f  machinery  and equipment ( t o n g s )  no t  r e q u i r e d  f o r  t he  
t a s k  be ing  performed ( s p i n n i n g ) .  The p r e s s u r e  on the  crew t o  per fo rm  
*11 t a s k s  as r a p i d l y  as p o s s i b l e  f u r t h e r  compounds a c c i d e n t  
p r o b a b i l i t i e s .  The t ime p r e s s u r e  t o  "make h o l e "  cou ld  be r e s p o n s i b l e  
fo r  t he  l a c k  o f  s u f f i c i e n t  communication between crew members r u s h in g  t o  comple te i n d i v i d u a l  t a s k s .
Not a v a i l a b l e .
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(2)  Tongs
Case No. 0552, 1975
Accident  Nature  o f  Equipment Length of
Type A c t i v i t y   In ju r y   o r  Tool Employment
S truck  by D r i l l i n g  F a t a l  Tongs N/A
The r i g  crew was "b reak in g  o u t "  a con n ec t io n  i n  t he  d r i l l  s t r i n g .  A 
pipe tong was a t t a c h e d  to  the  d r i l l  p ipe  and connec ted  t o  a backup p os t  
w i th  5 /8 - i n c h  wire  ro p e .  The r o t a r y  t a b l e  was engaged in  r e v e r s e  to  
supply the  to rque  n ec e s s a ry  t o  "b reak"  the  c o n n ec t io n .  The employee 
was h o ld in g  the  jaws o f  the  tongs when t h e  s a f e t y  l i n e  snapped,  c aus ing  
the  backup tong  h an d le  t o  s t r i k e  him. The employee 's  c h e s t  was c rushed  
by the  impact  from the  tong  h an d le .
Comments:
Two f a c t o r s  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h i s  f a t a l  a c c i d e n t .  Tongs a r e  r o u t i n e l y  
powered by the  ca th e ad s  on the  drawworks.  A s a f e t y  l i n e ' s  b re a k in g  
s t r e n g t h  i s  s e l e c t e d  t o  be com pat ib le  w i th  the  maximum f o r c e s  t h a t  can 
be g en e ra te d  by the  c a th e a d .  Rotary  t a b l e s  d e l i v e r  the  fo rc e  n e c e s s a ry  
to  t u r n  the  d r i l l  s t r i n g .  When the  r o t a r y  t a b l e  i s  used t o  to r q u e  the  
c o u p l i n g ,  t h e r e  i s  no method used  t o  de te rm ine  i f  the  s a f e t y  f a c t o r  
and /o r  b reak ing  s t r e n g t h  o f  the  snub l i n e  i s  be ing  exceeded .  NOTE: 
The b re ak in g  s t r e n g t h  o f  new 5 /8 - i n c h  w ire  rope  i s  app rox im ate ly  30,000 
pounds .
The second c o n t r i b u t i n g  f a c t o r  o f  t h i s  a c c i d e n t  was th e  p o s i t i o n  o f  the  
deceased  when the  fo rc e  was a p p l i e d  t o  the  t o n g s .  I f  t he  employee had 
not  been in  the  pa th  o f  t r a v e l  o f  the  p ip e  tong ,  he would not  have been 
k i l l e d ;  the  a c c i d e n t  would have been  a "n e a r  m i s s . "
Case No. 0633, 1976
Accident
Type A c t i v i t y
S t ruck  by D r i l l i n g  
and caught 
between
The r i g  crew was " b re a k in g  o u t "  a c o n n ec t io n  i n  the  d r i l l  s t r i n g .  The 
worker had clamped the  b re ak  ou t  tong to  the  d r i l l  p i p e .  The d r i l l e r  
engaged the  r o t a r y  t a b l e  i n  r e v e r s e  t o  supp ly  t h e  f o r c e  n e c e s s a r y  to  
d isengage  the  c o u p l i n g .  The 5 /8 - i n c h  w ire  rope  s a f e t y  l i n e  f o r  the  
tong was connec ted  t o  t he  d e r r i c k  s t r u c t u r e  w i th  one c a b l e  clamp. This 
c o n n ec t io n  f a i l e d ,  a l low ing  the  tong h an d le  to  f i r s t  s t r i k e  the  
employee (with  g r e a t  fo r c e )  and then  p in  him a g a i n s t  t he  b rake  h an d le .
Nature  o f  Equipment Length o f
I n ju r y   o r  Tool Employment
F a t a l  Tongs 2 days
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Comments:
This f a t a l  a c c i d e n t  cou ld  have been  p reven ted  i f  t h e  p ro p e r  number o f  
c a b l e  clamps had been  u se d .  A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  tongs  a r e  normal ly  powered 
by the  c a th ead s  on the  drawworks.  Rotary t a b l e s  d e l i v e r  an 
undete rmined  amount o f  f o r c e  t o  the  tong  system.  This s i t u a t i o n  lends  
i t s e l f  t o  equipment f a i l u r e .
Of equa l  impor tance  i n  t he  p r e v e n t i o n  o f  a c c i d e n t s  i n v o lv in g  s a f e t y  
l i n e  f a i l u r e  i s  a l lo w in g  the  p o s i t i o n i n g  o f  employees i n  t he  tong  
h a n d l e ' s  d i r e c t i o n  o f  t r a v e l .  Th is p o s i t i o n a l  h aza rd  cou ld  be improved 
by employee t r a i n i n g .
Case No. 0045, 1979
Accident
T y p e ____
Caught
between
A c t i v i t y
D r i l l i n g
Nature  o f  
In j u r y
F ra c tu re d
f i n g e r
Equipment 
o r  Tool
Tongs and 
d r i l l  p ipe
Leqgth of  
Employment
1 week
The r i g  crew was p u l l i n g  the  d r i l l  p ipe  ou t  o f  the  h o l e .  A worker 
p laced  h i s  hand in  the  wrong p o s i t i o n  on the  tongs  and caugh t  h i s  
f i n g e r  between the  d r i l l  p ipe  and the  tong head as he p o s i t i o n e d  t h e  
tongs  on the  p ip e .  The employee s u s t a i n e d  a f r a c t u r e d  f i n g e r  as w e l l  
as  m u l t i p l e  l a c e r a t i o n s  to  o t h e r  f i n g e r s .
Comments:
Tongs a r e  equipped w i th  h and le s  and hand g u id e s .  P roper  t r a i n i n g  and 
gu idance  in  t h e i r  o p e r a t i o n  cou ld  e f f e c t i v e l y  lower the  f requency  o f  
i n c i d e n t s  i n v o lv in g  tong l a t c h i n g s .
(3) E le v a to r s  
Case No. 0488,  1978
A cciden t  Nature  of  Equipment Length o f
Type A c t i v i t y   In ju r y __ o r  Tool Employment
S t ruck  by D r i l l i n g  F a t a l  E l e v a t o r  N/A
and c a s in g
Two workers  were i n  t he  p ro ce s s  o f  wrapping rope  around a s t e e l  c a s in g  
t h a t  was i n  the  w e l l  b o r e .  Another c a s in g  was be ing  h o i s t e d  t o  make a 
c o n n e c t io n .  One o f  t he  two workers had j u s t  walked under the  e l e v a t e d  
load when t h e  e l e v a t o r  l a t c h  came open,  d ropp ing  the  3 0 - fo o t  s e c t i o n  o f  
s t e e l  c a s in g  on h i s  head and f a t a l l y  i n j u r i n g  him.
Comments:
Examination  o f  the  e l e v a t o r ,  which dropped the  d r i l l  p ip e ,  r e v e a l e d  
t h a t  a s a f e t y  c h a in  had neve r  been i n s t a l l e d .  The e l e v a t o r  d id  not
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have the  double  s a f e t y  l a t c h  system o r  a s a f e t y  c h a in  and p i n .  
Redundant s a f e t y  mechanisms should  be used  t o  p r e v e n t  a c c i d e n t s  o f  t h i s  
t yp e .
Case No. 0637, 1976 
Acciden t
Type A c t i v i t y
S t ru ck  by D r i l l i n g
Nature  o f  
in ju r y
Equipment 
or  Tool
Length o f  
Employment
4 monthsF a t a l  head E l e v a t o r s
i n j u r y  and d r i l l
p ipe
D r i l l i n g  o f  the  w e l l  had been comple ted  and t h e  d r i l l i n g  p ip e  was be ing
removed. The p rocedure  f o r  w ithdrawing  the  d r i l l i n g  p ipe  was be ing
fo l lo w e d .  The e l e v a t o r s  were a t t a c h e d  t o  the  b e l l e d  p o r t i o n  o f  the  
d r i l l  p ip e  t o  b r i n g  each  s e c t i o n  o f  p ipe  (500 pounds) about  4 f e e t  above 
the  top  o f  the  d r i l l i n g  f l o o r .  The s e c t i o n  was th e n  clamped t o  h o ld  the  
d r i l l  s t r i n g  i n  t he  w e l l  w h i l e  t h e  e l e v a t e d  c o n n e c t io n  was b roken  loose  
and t h e  p ipe  spun-ou t  from the  p ip e  rem a in ing  i n  the  w e l l  h o l e .  To
f a c i l i t a t e  movement, t he  bot tom o f  t h e  p ip e  was p laced  on a hook 
suspended from a p u l l e y  t h a t  r i d e s  on a c a b l e  s t r e t c h e d  from the  mast  to  
a p o i n t  beyond the  p ipe  r a c k .  As the  p ip e  was lowered,  t he  sm a l l  end of 
the  p ip e  moved ou t  toward the  p ipe  r a c k  a long  the  c a b l e .
When t h e  a c c id e n t  o c c u r r e d ,  a s e c t i o n  o f  p ipe  had been broken lo o se  and 
was be in g  r ig g e d  f o r  lower ing  t o  the  p ipe  r a c k s .  The c a b l e s  above the  
h o i s t i n g  b lock  became t w i s t e d ,  t u r n i n g  the  e l e v a t o r s  180 d e g r e e s ,  as 
w e l l  as  r e v e r s i n g  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n ,  so t h a t  they  were u ps id e  down when the  
top  o f  the  p ip e  reached  t h e  d r i l l i n g  f l o o r .  The f lo o r h a n d s  u n l a tc h e d  
the  e l e v a t o r s  b u t  were unab le  to  remove the  e l e v a t o r s .  When they
a t t em p ted  to  r e l a t c h  the  e l e v a t o r s ,  t h e  d r i l l e r ,  b e l i e v i n g  the  e l e v a t o r s  
had been  l a t c h e d ,  r e h o i s t e d  the  p i p e ,  which was r a i s e d  abou t  20 f e e t  
above the  d r i l l i n g  f l o o r .  At t h i s  p o i n t  t h e  e l e v a t o r s  opened and the  
s e c t i o n  o f  d r i l l  p ip e  f e l l  t o  the  r i g  f l o o r ,  s t r i k i n g  an employee on the  
h e a d .
Comments:
The d r i l l e r  was u nab le  t o  see  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  ( l a t c h i n g  the  e l e v a t o r )  from 
h i s  c o n t r o l  s t a t i o n .  He h o i s t e d  the  d r i l l  p ip e  w i th o u t  r e c e i v i n g  a 
s i g n a l  o t h e r  than  a n o i s e  he i n t e r p r e t e d  as t he  l a t c h i n g  o f  the 
e l e v a t o r s .  C lea r  h o i s t i n g  s i g n a l  methods,  s i m i l a r  t o  t h o s e  used in  
c rane  o p e r a t i o n s ,  cou ld  have p reven ted  t h i s  a c c i d e n t — crane  o p e r a t o r s  do 
n o t  r a i s e  or  move a load  u n t i l  s i g n a l e d  by a pe r so n  d e s ig n a t e d  as a 
s igna lman.
Case No. 0365,  1979
Acc iden t
T y p e ____
Caught
between
A c t i v i t y  
Dr i  11 ing




o r  Tool
E l e v a t o r  or  
d r i l l  p ipe




The crew was removing the  d r i l l  p ip e  from th e  w e l l  bore  and l a y in g  i t  
down in  the  Vee-door .  The p ipe  was suspended by t h e  e l e v a t o r s .  The 
bottom o f  t he  d r i l l  p ipe  was p u s h e d /p u l l e d  by f lo o r h a n d s  u n t i l  i t  was 
suspended over t he  Vee-door .  The d r i l l e r  t h e n  lowered t h e  h o i s t  a long  
w i th  the  d r i l l  p ip e  and e l e v a t o r s .  An employee u n l a t c h e d  t h e  e l e v a t o r s  
(suspended out  o f  plumb by the  h o i s t ) ,  which then  swung back  and 
c rushed  h i s  hand a g a i n s t  the  s t and  o f  p ipe  i n  t he  r o t a r y .
Case No. 0048, 1979
Accident
T y P e _____
S tru ck  by 
and caught  
between
A c t i v i t y
D r i l l i n g
Nature  of  
I n j u r y
Equipment 
o r  Tool
Mashed f i n g e r s  E l e v a t o r
Length o f  
Employment
4 months
A der r ickman  was u n l a t c h i n g  t h e  e l e v a t o r s  from the  d r i l l  p ip e  when t h e  
e l e v a t o r  swung o u t ,  mashing h i s  hand between the  p ip e  and t h e  e l e v a t o r .
Comments:
B e t t e r  s u p e r v i s i o n  was needed in  c o o r d i n a t i n g  t h e  d r i l l i n g  a c t i v i t y ;  
i . e . , employees on the  d e r r i c k  cannot  be a l lowed t o  ru sh  th rough  t a s k s  
to  keep up w i th  f loo rhand  o p e r a t i o n s .
(4)  C a t l i n e s  
Case No. 0658, 1979
Accident
Type__
F a l l  to  
below
A c t i v i t y
P o s i t i o n ­
ing s t a b ­
bing board
Nature  of  
i n j u r y ______
F r a c tu r e d  leg
Equipment 
o r  Tool
C a t l i n e
Length o f  
Employment
N/A
A c a t l i n e  was being  used  t o  p o s i t i o n  a s t a b b in g  board  on the  d e r r i c k .  
The i n j u r e d  employee was g u id in g  (hands on) t he  s t a b b i n g  boa rd  i n t o  
p o s i t i o n .  He was n o t  wear ing  a s a f e t y  b e l t  o r  l a n y a r d .  The s t a b b in g  
board  jammed on the  d e r r i c k ,  t he  c a t l i n e  b ro k e ,  and the  s t a b b i n g  board  
and t h e  employee f e l l .
The i n j u r e d  employee was saved from p ro b a b le  d e a th  by t h e  d r i l l e r  who 
broke  h i s  f a l l  by c a t c h in g  him. The d r i l l e r  s u s t a i n e d  m u l t i p l e  
f r a c t u r e d  r i b s  from t h i s  a c c i d e n t .
Comment s :
This  i n j u r y  cou ld  have been  p reven ted  had the  i n j u r e d  employee been  
wearing  a s a f e t y  b e l t .
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Case No. 0662, 1981




and f a l l  
t o  below
A c t i v i t y
D r i l l i n g
Nature  of  
in ju r y
Amputated hand;  
r u p tu r e d  sp le e n
Equipment 
o r  Tool
Cathead o r  
w ire  l i n e
Length o f  
Employment
N/A
An employee was to  run  a 1 /8 - i n c h  wire  rope th rough  a p u l l e y  sheave  
l o c a t e d  a t  the  d e r r i c k  runaround p l a t f o r m .  The w i re  was t o  a t t a c h  a 
geo log raph ,  used t o  re c o r d  d r i l l i n g  r a t e s .  The employee wrapped the  
w ire  rope  around h i s  hand and proceeded t o  c l imb the  d e r r i c k .
The w ire  l i n e  became snagged i n  a space  between th e  bot tom p l a t e  and 
the  c l u t c h  mechanism o f  t he  c a th e a d .  The l i n e  wound around the  ca thead  
and yanked th e  employee o f f  the  d e r r i c k ;  as he f e l l  he s t r u c k  a beam 
and r u p tu r e d  h i s  s p l e e n .  The w ire  l i n e  c o n t in u ed  t o  wrap around the  
ca thead  u n t i l  i t  became t a u t  enough t o  amputa te  t h e  employee 's  hand.
Comment s :
The employee committed an unsa fe  a c t  when he wrapped the  w ire  around
h i s  hand t o  c a r r y  i t  up the  d e r r i c k .  F a i l u r e  t o  i n s t r u c t  the  employee
in  the  s a f e  p rocedures  n ec e s sa ry  to  complete  a t a s k  i s  the
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  management. (Th is  was the  f i r s t  t ime the  i n j u r e d
employee had performed t h i s  t a s k .  F ur therm ore ,  no one was s t a t i o n e d  a t  
the  r i g  c o n t r o l s  t o  s t o p  the  ca th e ad s  i n  the  even t  o f  an emergency. )
(5)  Working s u r f a c e s  
Case No. 0575,  1975
Acciden t
T y p e _____
F a l l  to  
working 
s u r f a c e  
and caught  
between
A c t i v i t y
T r ip p in g
Nature  o f  
in ju r y
F a t a l
Equipment 
o r  Tool
D r i l l  p ipe
Length o f  
Employment
15 months
This crew had removed app rox im ate ly  6 ,300  f e e t  o f  d r i l l  p ipe  from the  
h o l e  d u r in g  the  t r i p p i n g  o p e r a t i o n .  There were app rox im ate ly  6,000 
f e e t  o f  " t h r i b b l e "  s t a n d s  o f  d r i l l  p ip e  i n  t he  d e r r i c k  p ip e  r a c k .  Each 
" t h r i b b l e "  s t a n d  o f  p ip e  was app rox im ate ly  94 f e e t  i n  l e n g t h .  The crew 
had p la c e d  one s t a n d  o f  p ipe  from th e  o f f s i d e  r a c k  i n  t h e  h o l e .  The 
der r ickm an  was on the  monkey board  abou t  90 f e e t  above the  f l o o r ,  the  
d r i l l e r  was a t  h i s  c o n t r o l  p a n e l ,  and one f lo o rhan d  had h i s  back t o  the  
r o t a r y  t a b l e  p u l l i n g  the  sp in n in g  cha in  from the  c a th e a d .  The second 
f loo rhand  was p o s i t i o n e d  nea r  t he  r o t a r y  t a b l e ,  w a i t i n g  t o  s t a b  the  
n ex t  s t and  o f  p i p e ,  w h i le  the  motorman ( t h e  employee t o  be f a t a l l y
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i n j u r e d )  was in  back  o f  t he  o f f s i d e  p ipe  ra c k  ready  t o  t a i l  t h e  p ip e  i n  
t h e  h o l e .  The d r i l l e r  r a i s e d  t h e  e l e v a t o r s  to  t he  monkey board  l e v e l  
and s topped  t h e i r  t r a v e l  w h i le  t he  der r ickm an  loaded  one o f  the  two 
remaining  s t a n d s  o f  p ip e  from the  o f f s i d e  r a c k .  The d r i l l e r  then  
r a i s e d  the  s t and  o f  p ip e  a pp rox im a te ly  18 in c h es  above the  f l o o r .  As 
the  motorman a t t em p ted  t o  t a i l  t h e  p i p e ,  he s l i p p e d  and wrapped both  
arms around the  p i p e .  The p ip e  swung back i n  the  d i r e c t i o n  o f  the  
s t and  o f  p ip e ,  s t i l l  i n  t h e  o f f s i d e  r a c k ,  c ru s h in g  h i s  head  between t h e  
two s t a n d s  o f  p ip e  and f a t a l l y  i n j u r i n g  him.
Case No. 0388,  1979
Acciden t
T y p e ____
F a l l  t o  
below
A c t i v i t y
D r i l l i n g
Nature  o f  
In j u r y
B ru ised  c h e s t  
and r i b  cage
Equipment 
o r  Tool
C e l l a r
Length of  
Employment
19 days
An employee had been  working as a f loorman f o r  19 days .  He f e l l  i n t o  
an unguarded c e l l a r  under  t he  r i g  s u b s t r u c t u r e  and b r u i s e d  h i s  c h e s t  
and r i b  cage .
Comment s :
S ince  t h e  c e l l a r  was f u l l  o f  w a t e r  and c o n t a in e d  blowout p r e v e n t i o n  
equipment ,  t he  p o t e n t i a l  e x i s t e d  f o r  t he  employee t o  s t r i k e  h i s  head 
and drown w hi le  u nco nsc iou s .
"Near -miss"  a c c i d e n t s  should  s e rv e  a s  a warn ing .  Open c e l l a r s  shou ld  
be guarded as a m a t t e r  o f  s t a n d a r d  o p e r a t i n g  p ro ce d u re .
Case No. 0371,  1979
Accident
Type
F a l l  to  
below
A c t i v i t y
N/A
Nature  o f  
i n j u r y
F r a c t u r e d  r i b
Equipment 
o r  Tool
C e l l a r
l a d d e r
Length of  
Employment
1 month
A f loo rhand  a t t em p ted  to  c l imb down a l a d d e r  i n t o  the  c e l l a r .  His 
hand s l i p p e d  and he f e l l  i n t o  the  c e l l a r .  He b r u i s e d  h i s  back  and 
f r a c t u r e d  a r i b .
Comments:
Ladders  e n t e r i n g  c e l l a r  open ings  from above should  be des igned  w i th  
adequa te  h a n d r a i l s  above the  open ings .
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Case No. 0195, 1979
Accident Nature of Equipment Length of
Type A c t i v i t y  I n j u r y  o r  Tool Employment
F a l l  to  D r i l l i n g  F ra c tu r e d  fo o t  Mousehole
working
s u r f a c e
14 y e a r s
The d r i l l e r  had p u l l e d  a j o i n t  o f  d r i l l  p ip e  ou t  
add t o  the  s t r i n g  when he s tepped  back  i n t o  
f r a c t u r e d  h i s  f o o t .
o f  t h e  mousehole to  
the  mousehole.  He
Comments:
A l l  h o l e s  in  t h e  f l o o r  o f  a d r i l l i n g  r i g  a re  p o t e n t i a l  h a z a r d s .  They 
should  be covered  when no t  i n  use  t o  p re v e n t  employees from s t e p p i n g  
i n t o  them.
Case No. 0342,  1979
Acc iden t  Nature  o f  Equipment 
Type A c t i v i t y  I n j u r y  o r  Tool
Length o f  
Employment
F a l l  t o  D r i l l i n g  B ru ised  h i p  Mousehole 
working and s t r a i n e d  
s u r f a c e  back
1 month
A f loo rhand  was h e l p in g  a n o the r  employee move a w e l l  head from th e  r i g  
f l o o r .  He i n a d v e r t e n t l y  s tepped  i n t o  the  unguarded  mousehole and 
f e l l .  He s u s t a i n e d  a b r u i s e d  h ip  and p u l l e d  musc les i n  t h e  lower back .
Comments:
When unoccupied ,  mouseholes and r a t h o l e s  shou ld  be 
employees from a c c i d e n t a l l y  s t e p p in g  i n t o  them.
covered  t o  p re v e n t
Case No. 0661,  1979
Acc iden t  Nature  o f  Equipment 
• Type A c t i v i t y  I n j u r y  o r  Tool
Length o f  
Employment
F a l l  t o  C i r c u l a t -  F a t a l  drowning Reserve p i t s  N/Abelow ing  i n ­
f l u i d  s p e c t i o n
A f a t a l  drowning o cc u r r e d  a t  a w e l l  d r i l l i n g  s i t e  when an employee 
s l i p p e d  from a r e s e r v e  p i t  embankment i n t o  t h e  s l u r r y .  This  i n c i d e n t  
occu r red  a t  n ig h t  i n  an u n l i g h t e d  a r e a .  Employees were o p e r a t i o n a l l y  
r e q u i r e d  to  be i n  t he  r e s e r v e  p i t  a r e a  t h r e e  o r  more t im es  each  s h i f t .
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Comments:
Guardrails around the dike embankment were not in evidence, personal 
flotation lifejackets were not provided, and no water rescue devices 
were onsite.
b. Derrick Tasks
The der r ickman  on a w e l l  d r i l l i n g  o p e r a t i o n  per forms h i s  t a s k s  from 
v a r io u s  e l e v a t e d  work p l a t fo rm s  i n  the  m as t .  He i s  exposed t o  f a l l s  
whi le  c l imbing  the  d e r r i c k  l a d d e r ,  working w i th  the  p ipe  s t a n d s ,  and 
moving from the  l a d d e r  to  h i s  p l a t fo rm  s t a t i o n .  The der r ickman  i s  a l s o  
exposed to  c ru sh in g  i n j u r i e s  from s h i f t i n g  s t a n d s  o f  p ipe  and e l e v a t o r  
l a t c h i n g  t a s k s .
Adequate and con t inuous  f a l l  p r o t e c t i o n  i s  a p r e r e q u i s i t e  f o r  the  
s a f e t y  o f  employees working on a d e r r i c k .  C ond i t ions  beyond the  
c o n t r o l  o f  the  der r ickm an  (wind,  v i b r a t i o n ,  p ipe  movement) make even 
momentary u n p r o te c t e d  exposures  h aza rdous .
Case No. 0656, 1977
Accident
Type A c t i v i t y
F a l l  t o  T r ipp ing
below
Nature of  
i n j u r y
F a t a l
Equipment 
o r  Tool
D er r i ck
p la t f o r m
Length of  
Employment
8 months
The d r i l l i n g  crew was comple t ing  the  f i n a l  phase of  a t r i p p i n g  
o p e r a t i o n .  F o r ty - s e v e n  hundred f e e t  o f  d r i l l  p ip e ,  in  6 0 - fo o t  i n ­
c rem ents ,  had been r e t u r n e d  t o  the  h o l e .  The f i n a l  s t and  o f  p ipe  would 
not  go i n t o  the  h o l e ,  so the  d r i l l e r  r e p l a c e d  i t  i n  the  d e r r i c k  r a c k .  
When the  k e l l y  was r e a t t a c h e d  t o  the  h o i s t ,  the  d r i l l e r  r a i s e d  the  
b lo ck .  For unknown r e a s o n s ,  the  b lock  s t r u c k  the  d e r r i c k  s t r u c t u r e ,  
caus ing  the  der r ickman  to  f a l l  50 f e e t  from th e  d e r r i c k  p l a t f o rm  to  h i s  
d e a th .
Further investigation revealed that the derrickman was observed earlier 
in the tripping operation wearing a safety belt. It was determined 
that the derrickman had removed his safety belt to leave the derrick 
platform. He either did not put it back on to assemble the single pipe 
stand or he had again removed it prior to descending the derrick ladder.
Comments:
In either instance, the wearing of a safety belt could have prevented 
this fatal accident. The transfer point from climbing the ladder (with 
a fall arresting device) to the donning of the safety belt and lanyard
worn during the tripping operation leaves the employee at risk during
this transfer period. The use of retractable lifelines would provide
fall protection during tripping operations, as well as provide
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p r o t e c t e d  freedom o f  movement d u r ing  t r a n s f e r  from th e  d e r r i c k  l a d d e r  
t o  t he  work s t a t i o n .
Case No. 0641,  1972
Accident
Type A c t i v i t y  I n j u r y
Nature  of Equipment Length of
o r  Tool Employment
F a l l  to  
below
T r ip p in g  M u l t ip l e  f r a c -
t u r e s  o f  legs  
and aims ; head 
and i n t e r n a l  
i n j u r i e s
D e r r i c k  N/A
la d d e r
The d r i l l i n g  crew was p re p a r in g  t o  b eg in  a t r i p p i n g  o p e r a t i o n .  The 
der r ickman was c l im b ing  the  d e r r i c k  l a d d e r  when he l o s t  h i s  g r i p  and 
f e l l  about  70 f e e t  t o  t he  d e r r i c k  f l o o r .  He s u f f e r e d  m u l t i p l e  i n j u r i e s .
This  a c c i d e n t  cou ld  have been p reven ted  by the  wearing  o f  a d e r r i c k  
c l im be r  o r  o t h e r  f a l l  a r r e s t i n g  c l im b ing  d e v i c e .
c .  M a t e r i a l s  Handling A c t i v i t i e s
The most common type  of  a c c i d e n t  t h a t  occu rs  i n  m a t e r i a l s  h a n d l in g  
o p e r a t i o n s  i s  t h e  "caught  between" s i t u a t i o n ;  e . g . ,  when a load  i s  
be ing  hand led  and a f i n g e r  o r  t oe  g e t s  caught  between two 
o b j e c t s .  R o l l i n g  s t o c k  ( d r i l l  p ipe  and c o l l a r s )  can s h i f t  a n d /o r  
f a l l  from a p ipe  ra c k  o r  t ru ck b ed .  Employees must  be a l e r t  t o  the  
haza rd s  a t t e n d a n t  t o  p ipe  h an d l in g  and r a c k i n g .
V e r t i c a l  s t o r a g e  o f  d r i l l  p ipe  on the  i n c l i n e d  ramp r e q u i r e s  
adequate  s l i p p a g e  p r o t e c t i o n  and employee p ro c e d u r a l  t r a i n i n g  in  
o r d e r  t o  h an d le  them s a f e l y .
Improper r i g g i n g  o f  loads  can e a s i l y  r e s u l t  i n  load s h i f t s  and 
o b j e c t s  f a l l i n g  on those  below. M a t e r i a l s  h a n d l in g  p ro ced u res  a r e  
f r e q u e n t l y  no t  g iv en  the  n ec e s s a ry  emphasis  i n  s a f e t y  t r a i n i n g ;  
i . e . ,  m a t e r i a l s  h a n d l in g  i s  a su p p o r t  a c t i v i t y  t o  t he  t a s k  of  
"making h o l e "  and as such may be s l i g h t e d .
The r i g  was a c t i v e l y  d r i l l i n g .  Two crew members were h o i s t i n g  (by 
c a t l i n e )  3 0 - f o o t  d r i l l  p ipe  s e c t i o n s  from the  p ip e  r a c k / c a tw a lk  t o  the
Comments:
Case No. 0508, 1973
Accident
Type A c t i v i t y
Nature o f  Equipment Length o f
I n j u r y  o r  Tool Employment
S truck  by P ipe
p ip es  h an d l in g
F a t a l  D r i l l  p ipe  N/A
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d e r r i c k  i n c l i n e .  One man was working the  c a t l i n e ,  and one man was 
r i g g in g  the  p ipe  a t  ground l e v e l .  The i n c l i n e ,  l o c a t e d  below the  
Vee-door ,  was s e rv in g  as a temporary s t o r a g e  p o i n t  f o r  the  d r i l l  p ip e ;
i . e . ,  d r i l l  p ipe  t h a t  was expec ted  t o  be added t o  t h e  d r i l l  s t r i n g  
d u r ing  the  s h i f t  was s t o r e d  in  a l o c a t i o n  conducive to  i t s  r a p id
a d d i t i o n  to  the d r i l l  s t r i n g .  The d r i l l  p ipe  was b locked  a t  the  
bottom,  bu t  no p r e c a u t i o n s  were taken  a t  t he  top  to  p re v e n t  t he  p ipe  
from s l i p p i n g ;  e . g . ,  3 0 - f o o t - l o n g  p ipe  j o i n t s  s t o r e d  a lm os t  v e r t i c a l l y  
may tend to  t o p p le  sideways .  The f i v e  p ip e s  s t o r e d  i n  t he  i n c l i n e  
topp led  and f a t a l l y  c rushed  the  man working below.
A r e t a i n i n g  s a f e t y  dev ice  a t  the  top  of  the  i n c l i n e  cou ld  p reven t  
s i m i l a r  a c c i d e n t s  o f  t h i s  type .
Case No. 0576, 1979
Accident  Nature  o f  Equipment Length of
Type A c t i v i t y  I n j u r y  o r  Tool Employment
S t ruck  by D r i l l i n g  F ra c tu r e d  f o o t ;  D r i l l  p ipe  N/A
c on tus io ns
Two men were h an d l in g  d r i l l  p ipe  on the  i n c l i n e d  p ipe  ramp below the  
Vee-door o f  a d r i l l i n g  r i g .  Two j o i n t s  o f  d r i l l  p ipe  go t  away and s l i d  
down the  ramp, s t r i k i n g  and i n j u r i n g  bo th  employees.  A p ipe  j o i n t
weighs about 500 pounds and i s  about  30 f e e t  long .
This a c c i d e n t  happened a f t e r  t he  two men had p u l l e d  f i v e  j o i n t s  o f  
d r i l l  p ipe  onto the  p ipe  ramp with  an a i r  t u g g e r .  Two j o i n t s  ended up 
c ro s sed  over  t h r e e  j o i n t s  a l r e a d y  on the  ramp. A l l  j o i n t s  were 
p o s i t i o n e d  a g a i n s t  a p ipe  s to p  n ea r  the  bottom o f  t he  ramp. When one 
j o i n t  was moved from the  bottom end o f  t he  ramp, i t  went over t h e  p ipe
s to p .  The o th e r  c ro s s e d  j o i n t  fo l lowed .  One j o i n t  s l i d  on top  o f  the
p ipe  r a c k s ,  and the  o t h e r  j o i n t  s l i d  t o  the  ground under t he  p ipe  
r a c k s ,  s t r i k i n g  bo th  employees and c aus in g  a f r a c t u r e d  fo o t  i n  one and 
c o n tu s io n s  in  bo th .
Comment s :
This a c c i d e n t  r e f l e c t s  a l ack  o f  p r o c e d u r a l  i n s t r u c t i o n  to  em­
p lo y ee s .  A p ipe  should  neve r  be handled  from below. R e t a i n e r s  l o ­
c a t e d  a t  t h e  upper l e v e l  o f  t he  p ip e  ramp may have p reven ted  t h e  p ipe  
from s l i p p i n g .
Case No. 0513, 1975
Accident Nature of
Type Activity  Injury









The employees were i n  t he  p ro c e s s  o f  making up j o i n t s  of  p ip e ,  a normal 
t a s k  in  a d r i l l i n g  o p e r a t i o n .  The k e l l y  bush ing  s e p a r a t e d ,  f a l l i n g  
approx im ate ly  30 f e e t  t o  t h e  r i g  f l o o r  and f a t a l l y  s t r i k i n g  one o f  the  
employees.
I n v e s t i g a t i o n  r e v e a l e d  t h a t  t h e r e  was no p o s i t i v e  lock in g  d e v ice  used 
to  s e c u r e  the  k e l l y  bush ing  assembly t o  the  h o i s t .  I t  was a l s o  found 
t h a t  t he  b o l t  h o ld in g  the  s p l i t  r i n g  on the  k e l l y  b u sh in g ,  to  p re v e n t  
disengagement o f  t he  assembly ,  had worked loo se  and had no t  been 
t i g h t e n e d .
Case No. 0130, 1975
Acciden t
 T y B e _____
Struck  by 
k e l l y  
bush ing
A c t i v i t y
D r i l l i n g
Nature  o f  
injury
Broken c o l l a r  
bone
Equipment 
o r  Tool
K el ly  bush ing  
assembly
Length o f  
Employment
N/A
The employee was s e t t i n g  the  s l i p s  i n t o  the  r o t a r y  t a b l e  on the  r i g  
f l o o r .  The k e l l y  bush ing  f e l l  app rox im ate ly  10 f e e t  from the  h o i s t e d  
k e l l y ,  s t r i k i n g  the  employee on the  neck.  His c o l l a r  bone was broken 
by the  im pac t .
Comments:
Employees should be p r o t e c t e d  from f a l l i n g  o b j e c t s  by p ro pe r  r i g g i n g  
t e c h n iq u e s  and equipment i n s p e c t i o n s .  S a f e ty  c h a in s  o r  o t h e r  redundan t  




S truck  by 
mud hose
A c t i v i t y  
D r i l l i n g
Nature of  
In j u r y
F a t a l
Equipment 
o r  Tool
Rotary  hose
Length of  
Employment
N/A
The n ig h t  crew had j u s t  commenced d r i l l i n g  a c t i v i t i e s .  They had made a 
con n ec t io n  to  t he  d r i l l  s tem. The s l i p s ,  which ho ld  the  d r i l l  stem 
whi le  con n ec t io n s  a re  be ing  made, were p u l l e d  up.  The mud pump had 
j u s t  been a c t i v a t e d  by the  d r i l l e r ,  when the  r o t a r y  h o s e ,  which was 
a t t a c h e d  t o  the  s w iv e l ,  came loose  a t  the  p o i n t  o f  the  c o n n e c t io n  and 
f e l l  app rox im ate ly  45 f e e t  to  t he  d e r r i c k  f l o o r .  The mud hose  s t r u c k  
the  employee on the  s i d e  o f  the  head and s h o u l d e r ,  f a t a l l y  i n j u r i n g  him.
I n v e s t i g a t i o n  d i s c l o s e d  a new mud hose  had r e c e n t l y  been i n s t a l l e d .  
The s a f e t y  c h a in ,  p ro v id ed  f o r  t he  purpose  o f  r e s t r a i n i n g  the  end of 
the  hose  in  the even t  of  an a c c i d e n t a l  s e p a r a t i o n  of  the  hose  from i t s  
p o in t  o f  c o n n ec t io n  a t  the  s w iv e l ,  had no t  been r e c o n n ec te d .
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Case No. 0497, 1981
Accident
J j R g ____
Caught
between
A c t i v i t y
I n s t a l l ­
ing
Hydri l
Nature  of  
In j u r y
F a t a l
Equipment 
o r  Tool
H ois t  and
blowout
p r e v e n t e r
Length o f  
Employment
N/A
The w e l l  d r i l l i n g  o p e r a t i o n  had p ro g r e s s ed  th rough  the  i n s t a l l a t i o n  and 
cementing o f  t h e  s u r f a c e  c a s i n g .  The d r i l l i n g  crew was i n s t a l l i n g  the  
upper p o r t i o n  o f  a blowout p r e v e n t e r .  They were u s in g  the  main h o i s t  
to  "p ick "  the  equipment from the  ground t o  i t s  p o s i t i o n  below th e  d r i l l  
f l o o r  ( i n  the  s u b s t r u c t u r e  a r e a ) .  The r i g  was equ ipped w i th  on ly  two 
s l i n g s  long enough t o  perfo rm the  t a s k .  Tag l i n e s  were no t  used to  
p o s i t i o n  and s t a b i l i z e  the  loa d .  During the  p o s i t i o n i n g  o p e r a t i o n ,  the  
equipment t i p p e d  and f a t a l l y  c rushed  one o f  t he  employees.
A number of  e v e n t s  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h i s  i n c i d e n t .  The d r i l l i n g  crew i s  
f r e q u e n t l y  a s s ign e d  t a s k s  t h a t  a re  no t  p a r t  o f  the  everyday d r i l l i n g  
r o u t i n e .  In  t h i s  i n s t a n c e ,  the  r i g g i n g ,  p i c k i n g ,  and p lacement  o f  a 
heavy load (12 ,000  pounds) in  a c o n s t r i c t e d  space  was beyond the  
e x p e r t i s e  o f  the  crew. A f o u r - p o i n t  p ic k  made from two p o i n t s  should 
never  be per fo rmed .  Hands-on p o s i t i o n i n g  o f  heavy lo a d s ,  i n s t e a d  o f  
u s in g  t ag  l i n e s ,  i s  no t  an a c c e p t a b l e  p r a c t i c e .
Comments :
P rope r  t r a i n i n g ,  a p p r o p r i a t e  equipment,  and o p e r a t i o n a l  s u p e r v i s i o n  
cou ld  have p reven ted  t h i s  d e a t h .
2. C a t a s t r o p h i c  Events
C a t a s t r o p h i c  a c c i d e n t s  i nv o lv e  t h e  d e s t r u c t i o n  o f  the  d r i l l i n g  r i g  a n d /o r  
i n j u r i e s  t o  m u l t i p l e  employees.  Blowouts,  d e r r i c k  c o l l a p s e ,  and hydrogen
s u l f i d e  a c c i d e n t s  a r e  inc luded  in  t h i s  c a t e g o r y .  These a c c i d e n t s  may
f r e q u e n t l y  inv o lve  l o s s  o f  l i f e  as w e l l  as  t he  major d e s t r u c t i o n  of  
equipment .  In su rance  companies and c o r p o r a t e  d ec i s ionm aker s  become invo lved  
in  a c c i d e n t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  and p r e v e n t i o n  p o l i c i e s .  Although t h e s e  
i n c i d e n t s  f r e q u e n t l y  make f o r  media h e a d l i n e  m a t e r i a l ,  t h e  a c t u a l  l o s s  of  
employee l i f e  and l imb r e p r e s e n t s  a smal l  p e r c e n ta g e  of  the  t o t a l  w e l l  
d r i l l i n g  o c c u p a t io n a l  worker i n c id e n c e  and s e v e r i t y  r a t e s  [2 ] .
a .  D e r r i ck  o r  Mast C o l lapse
D er r i ck  or  mast  c o l l a p s e  i s  most common d u r in g  r i g g i n g - u p  and
r igging-down p ro c e d u re s .  The g r e a t e s t  s t r a i n s  a r e  e x e r t e d  on the  mast  
components d u r in g  th e s e  o p e r a t i o n s .  I n s p e c t i o n  of  the  d e r r i c k
s t r u c t u r e  i s  im p or tan t  f o r  t he  d e t e c t i o n  o f  s u l f i d e  e m b r i t t l e m e n t ,  weld 
weakness,  o x i d a t i o n ,  and b en t  members [6,  7 ] .  Weight i n d i c a t o r s  and
r e c o r d e r s  a l low  the  d r i l l e r  to  s t a y  w i th  mast  load  t o l e r a n c e s ;
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co n se q u e n t ly ,  they  must be m a in ta ined  and i n s p e c t e d .  M anufac tu re r  r i g  
c a p a c i t i e s  and guying requ i rem en ts  should  always be fo l lowed.
Case No. 0567,  1976
Accident
Type A c t i v i t y
F a l l  to  D r i l l i n g
below
Nature of  
In ju r y
F rac tu red
p e l v i s
Equipment 
o r  Tool
Rig mast
Length of  
Employment
N/A
This a c c i d e n t  happened j u s t  a f t e r  t h e  crew had p u l l e d  t h e  l a s t  d r i l l  
c o l l a r  out  o f  the  w e l l .  A f t e r  removing the  b i t ,  a g u s t  of  wind tu rned  
the  d r i l l  r i g  over i n t o  an a d j a c e n t  canyon.  The derri ckman on the
f i n g e r  board rode i t  down and s u s t a i n e d  a f r a c t u r e d  p e l v i s .
Water from b reak ing  d r i l l  p ipe  a t  t he  r o t a r y  t a b l e  d r a i n s  under t he  r i g
f l o o r  to  the  ground n ea r  the mast  f o o t i n g s .  This c o n d i t i o n  may have
s o f t e n e d  the  ground and c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  the  t u r n o v e r .
Although the  m a n ufac tu re r  o f  the  d e r r i c k  recommended t h a t  the  mast  be 
guyed,  i t  was n o t .  O u t r i g g e r s  improve s t a b i l i t y  bu t  a r e  not  des igned  
to  s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  a guying system. A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  t he  o u t r i g g e r s  on the 
d r i l l e r ' s  s ide  were not  i n s t a l l e d  because  the  mud box and s t a i r s
p rec luded  the  p lacement o f  an o u t r i g g e r .
Case No. 0493
Accident  Nature  o f  Equipment Length of
Type A c t i v i t y   In ju r y  o r  Tool Employment
F a l l  Rigging F a t a l  Rig mast  10 days
The sequence o f  e v e n t s  l e a d in g  t o  the  c o l l a p s e  o f  the  r i g  was as 
fo l low s :  The crew had j u s t  comple ted  a d r i l l i n g  job on an ap­
p rox im a te ly  1 2 ,0 0 0 - fo o t  h o le  and the  mast  was be ing  p repa red  f o r  
letdown. Two members on each s i d e  of  the  r i g  cl imbed up to  unlock  the  
mast  l eg  lock ing  l u g s .  Before the  lugs  cou ld  be p u l l e d ,  the  d r i l l e r  
had to  t ak e  t e n s i o n  on the  b r i d l e  hookup t o  loosen  th e  l u g s .  The two 
men on each s i d e  p u l l e d  the  lugs  w h i le  the  d r i l l e r  took t e n s i o n  on the  
b r i d l e .  Three men then  got  down w hi le  the  der r ickman  cl imbed the
approx im ate ly  143-foo t  mast  to  hook the  "ange l  f l i g h t "  l i n e  a t  a h ig h e r  
e l e v a t i o n  t o  pe rm i t  t he  coun te rw e igh t  to  go down to  n ea r  ground l e v e l  
where i t  could  be d isc o n n e c te d  f o r  the  mast  letdown. The derrickman 
was above the  mast  p ipe  ra c k in g  p l a t f o r m ,  n e a r  t he  120- foo t  l e v e l .  The 
d r i l l e r  a t  h i s  s t and  on the  f l o o r  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  he took  a t e n s i o n  o f  
60,000 to  70,000 pounds,  so he p icked  i t  back up t o  60,000;  i t  then  
b led  down to  about 40 ,000 .  The t h i r d  t ime he p icked  i t  up to  60,000 
pounds, t he  l e f t  r e a r  l e g  of  the  mast  c o l l a p s e d  and the  mast  f e l l  to 
the  f r o n t  l e f t  q u a r t e r .  The der ri ckman f e l l  w i th  the  m as t .
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Although t h i s  a c c i d e n t  o ccu r red  when the  crew was p re p a r in g  to  lay  the  
mast  down, the  even ts  l e a d in g  up t o  t h i s  a c c i d e n t  cou ld  occur  d u r in g  
any phase o f  a d r i l l i n g  o p e r a t i o n .  The d r i l l e r ,  who s u p e r v i s e s  
a c t i v i t i e s  du r ing  the  d r i l l i n g  o p e r a t i o n ,  i s  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  checking  
the  weight  i n d i c a t o r  f o r  load  f o r c e s  on the  mast  th roughout  the  
d r i l l i n g  o p e r a t i o n .
In t h i s  i n c i d e n t ,  the  d r i l l e r  had t aken  a weight  r e a d in g  of  the  mast  
load .  He was t r y i n g  to  m a i n t a in  a weight  of  60 ,000  pounds as i n d i c a t e d  
on the  meter  when i n  a c t u a l i t y  he had exceeded the  s a f e  load  o f  the  
mas t .  When the  m e te r  b led  down, r a t h e r  than  s top p in g  to  de te rm ine
where the  f a u l t  was, t he  d r i l l e r  con t inued  w i th  the  o p e r a t i o n .
B. Acc iden ts  Not Unique to  D r i l l i n g  O pera t ions
Employees of drilling contractors may be injured in accidents due to:
o Working wi th  saws, hammers, g r i n d e r s ,  d r i l l s ,  cha in  h o i s t s ,  o r  
p ip e s
o Working with electricity, pressurized air, or other energized 
systems
o F a l l i n g  from o r  s l i p p i n g  on l a d d e r s ,  f l o o r s ,  s c a f f o l d s ,  or  
walkways.
The s i x  a c c id e n t  case  h i s t o r i e s  t h a t  fo l low  a re  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  i n j u r i e s
s u s t a i n e d  by workers  per fo rming  t a s k s  no t  unique  to  w e l l  d r i l l i n g  o p e r a t i o n s .
Case No. 0671, 1977
Accident  Nature  o f  Equipment Length of
Type A c t i v i t y   I n ju r y   o r  Tool  Employment
Electro- Checking Fatal Jumper cables N/A
cution oil level
The deceased ,  who had been checking  o i l  l e v e l s  fo r  a s t a r t - o f - s h i f  t  
o p e r a t i o n ,  was found on the  r i g  f l o o r  between the  motor f o r  the  
drawworks and the  d i e s e l  t ank  (which s u p p l i e s  f u e l  fo r  t he  r i g  motor 
and the  p o w e rp la n t ) .  The n ig h t  s h i f t  had "jumped" the  powerp lan t  
b a t t e r y  w ith  the  motor b a t t e r y .  The jumper c a b l e s  were removed from 
the  motor b a t t e r y  bu t  no t  from the  powerp lant  b a t t e r y ,  and were l e f t  
l y in g  a c ro s s  a l a r g e  d i e s e l  s t o r a g e  tank  lo c a t e d  between the  powerp lant  
and the  motor f l o o r .
The deceased was found ly in g  on h i s  back,  h i s  head r e s t i n g  on a mud 
p ipe  wi th  the  grounded s i d e  o f  a jumper c a b l e  c l i p  a c r o s s  h i s  c h e s t .  
The c ab le  was c la sp e d  i n  h i s  r i g h t  hand;  h i s  c h e s t  appeared  burned.  
Another employee grabbed the  c a b le  clamp and cou ld  f e e l  a " p u l s a t i o n "  
through  the  clamp. When he could not  remove the  c ab le  from the  hand of 
the  deceased ,  an o th e r  employee j e r k e d  the  c a b l e  o f f  the  ground s i d e  of  
the  powerplant  b a t t e r y .  The autopsy  s t a t e d  t h a t  the  shock caused 
v e n t r i c u l a r  f i b r i l l a t i o n ,  which made him f a l l  t o  t he  f l o o r  and s t r i k e
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h i s  head on a p ip e .  The ground c a b le  was conduc t ing  c u r r e n t  from an 
undetermined so u rc e .
Case No. 0659,  1979 
Accident
TyPe
S truck  by 
d r i l l  pipe
A c t i v i t y
Unloading
Nature o f  
i n j u r y ____
F a t a l
Equipment 
o r  Tool
D r i l l  p ipe
Length of  
Employment
N/A
A load of d r i l l  p ipe  was p o s i t i o n e d  to  be unloaded from a highway 
t r a c t o r - t r a i l e r . The boomer load  b in d e r  c h a in ,  which h e ld  the  d r i l l
p ipe  i n  p lace  e n r o u t e ,  had been r e l e a s e d .
An employee was f a t a l l y  i n j u r e d  when a d r i l l  p ipe  r o l l e d  o f f  the  bed of  
the  t ru c k  and s t r u c k  him. The employee was s t a n d in g  in  the  pa th  the  
r o l l i n g  s to c k  would t r a v e l  i n  when o f f l o a d e d .
Case No. 0148, 1979
Accident
Type
Nature  of  
A c t i v i t y  I n j u r y
Equipment 
o r  Tool
Length of  
Employment
S t ruck  by Hammering No l o s t  time Hammer 3 months
An employee was hammering a d r i l l i n g  head when he 
back too  f a r ,  h i t t i n g  h im s e l f  in  t he  mouth.
p u l l e d  the  hammer
Case No. 0001, 1979
Accident
Type
Nature o f  
A c t i v i t y  I n ju r y
Equipment 
o r  Tool
Length of  
Employment
Fore ign  
body in  
eye
C lea r in g  No l o s t  t ime 
pump
Mud pump 4 .5  months
A derrickman was c l e a n in g  the  mud pump when a p iece  
h i s  eye .  He d id  not  r e p o r t  the  i n c i d e n t  r i g h t  away, 
needed t o  go to  the  d o c t o r  and have h i s  eye c le a n ed .
o f  d i r t  go t  i n t o  
Two days l a t e r  he
Case No. 0144, 1979
Accident
Type
Nature  o f  
A c t i v i t y  In ju r y
Equipment 
o r  Tool
Length of  
Employment
S truck  by H o i s t in g  No l o s t  t ime Jack  hand le  3 days
An employee was j a c k in g  up a ca tw alk  w i th  a j a c k ,  when the  j a c k  hand le  
s l i p p e d  and h i t  him in  the  jaw.
127
Accident  Nature  o f  Equipment Length o f
Type A c t i v i t y   I n ju ry ____  o r  Tool Employment
F i r e  L ig h t in g  Burns t o  face  Hea te r  1 y ea r
h e a t e r  and hands
Case No. 0272, 1979
A f loorhand  was r e l i g h t i n g  a gas h e a t e r  in  the  "doghouse ."  
n e g l e c t e d  to  t u r n  the  bu tane  o f f  p r i o r  t o  s t r i k i n g  a match .  The 





REVIEW OF STATE, FEDERAL, INTERNATIONAL, 
AND CONSENSUS SAFETY STANDARDS
APPENDIX B
REVIEW OF STATE, FEDERAL, INTERNATIONAL, AND CONSENSUS SAFETY STANDARDS
The purpose  of  t h i s  appendix  i s  t o  compare e x i s t i n g  s t a t e ,  F e d e r a l ,  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l ,  and consensus  s t a n d a rd s  r e l a t e d  t o ,  and impac t ing  on,  o i l  and 
gas wel l  d r i l l i n g .  Inc luded  a re  the  OSHA Genera l  I n d u s t ry  S tandards  (29 CFR 
1910) [7 0 ] ;  s t a t e  s t a n d a r d s  w i th  o i l  and gas w e l l  d r i l l i n g  r e g u l a t i o n s ;
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s t a n d a rd s  from Canada ( A lb e r t a )  [6 9 ] ;  and consensus  s t a n d a r d s  
developed  by API [74 ] .
The f i r s t  s e c t i o n  o f  t h i s  appendix  t a b u l a t e s  e x i s t i n g  n a t i o n a l  s t a n d a r d s  
t h a t  r e l a t e  to  o i l  and gas w e l l  d r i l l i n g .  The second s e c t i o n  rev iews s t a t e ,  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l ,  and consensus s t a n d a r d s  t h a t  s p e c i f i c a l l y  a d d re s s  a c t i v i t i e s ,  
o p e r a t i o n s ,  t a s k s ,  t o o l s ,  and c o n d i t i o n s  t y p i c a l  o f  w e l l  d r i l l i n g  o p e r a t i o n s .
A. E x i s t i n g  N a t ion a l  S tandards
N a t io n a l  s t a n d a rd s  do not  s p e c i f i c a l l y  r e g u l a t e  o i l  and gas w e l l  d r i l l i n g ,  
b u t  OSHA General  I n d u s t r y  S tandards  (29 CFR 1910) app ly  to  many o f  the  
o p e r a t i o n s ,  t a s k s ,  and c o n d i t i o n s  t y p i c a l l y  p r e s e n t  a t  a w e l l  s i t e .  Table  
B-l  p r e s e n t s  e x i s t i n g  n a t i o n a l  s t a n d a r d s  which may be a p p l i c a b l e  to  the  
a c t i v i t i e s  o r  c o n d i t i o n s  a t  a w e l l  s i t e .
B. E x i s t i n g  S t a t e ,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l ,  and Consensus S tanda rds
An exam inat ion  of  s t a n d a r d s  from a l l  50 s t a t e s ,  p lu s  P u e r to  Rico and the  
V i rg in  I s l a n d s ,  de te rmined  t h a t  only  Alaska  [7 7 ] ,  C a l i f o r n i a  [7 5 ] ,  Michigan 
[86 ] ,  Utah [73] ,  and Wyoming [78] have s t a n d a r d s  t h a t  s p e c i f i c a l l y  a d d re s s  
o i l  and gas w e l l  d r i l l i n g .  The remaining  s t a t e s  r e p r i n t  t he  n a t i o n a l  
s t a n d a r d s .  The C a l i f o r n i a  Pe t ro leum S afe ty  Orders a r e  i n  the  p ro c e s s  o f  
r e v i s i o n ;  the  r e v i s e d  s t a n d a r d ,  no t  y e t  e n a c ted  i n t o  law, i s  used  i n  t h i s  
appendix  to  r e p r e s e n t  d r i l l i n g  r e g u l a t i o n s  in  C a l i f o r n i a .
O ccupa t iona l  s a f e t y  and h e a l t h  s t a n d a rd s  f o r  o i l  and gas  w e l l  d r i l l i n g  
o p e r a t i o n s  were r e q u e s t e d  from Germany, t he  Uni ted  Kingdom, F rance ,  the  
N e th e r l a n d s ,  Sweden, A u s t r a l i a ,  Canada,  and Mexico.  The Canadian ( A lb e r t a )  
s t a n d a rd s  t h a t  r e g u l a t e  o i l  and gas w e l l  d r i l l i n g  o p e r a t i o n s  a re  inc luded  
f o r  rev iew [67] .  The Uni ted  Kingdom has  s t a n d a r d s  f o r  t he  p e t ro leum  
i n d u s t r y ,  bu t  does no t  r e g u l a t e  d r i l l i n g  o p e r a t i o n s .  The remaining  
c o u n t r i e s  do not  have s a f e t y  s t a n d a rd s  t h a t  s p e c i f i c a l l y  a d d re s s  w e l l  
d r i l l i n g  o p e r a t i o n s .
The i n d u s t r y  consensus s t a n d a r d s  developed  by API have been reviewed and 
compared wi th  e x i s t i n g  s t a t e  s t a n d a r d s .  In many i n s t a n c e s ,  s t a t e  s t a n d a r d s  
have adopted p o r t i o n s  o f  the  API s t a n d a r d s .
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TABLE B-l
GENERAL INDUSTRY STANDARDS WHICH MAY BE APPLICABLE 
TO THE OIL AND GAS WELL DRILLING INDUSTRY
Genera l  In d u s t ry
Standard  Area o f  Impact








.106(a )  through  (e )
.109
. 110





Subpart  K 
Subpart  L 
.157 
Subpart  M 
.169
Employee Exposure Records
Guarding F loor  and Wall Openings ,  and Holes,  
P o r t a b l e  Wood and Meta l  L adders ,  Fixed L adders ,  
S c a f f o l d in g  and o t h e r  Walking-Working S ur faces
Means of  E g re s s ,  Emergency P lans  and F i r e  
P re v e n t i o n  P lans
O ccupa t iona l  H ea l th  and Envi ronmenta l  Con t ro l
Hazardous M a te r i a l s
Compressed gases  
Ace ty lene  c y l i n d e r s  
Flammable and com bus t ib le  l i q u i d s  
E x p lo s iv e s  and b l a s t i n g  a gen ts
S to rage  and h an d l in g  o f  l i q u e f i e d  p e r t r o l e u m  gases
Eye and Face P r o t e c t i o n ,  R e s p i r a t o r y  P r o t e c t i o n ,  
Head P r o t e c t i o n ,  and o t h e r  types  of  P e r son a l  
P r o t e c t i v e  Equipment
Genera l  Envi ronmenta l  C o n t ro l s
S a n i t a t i o n
Temporary l a b o r  camps
S p e c i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  a c c i d e n t  p r e v e n t i o n  s i g n s  and 
t ag s
Medical  S e rv ic e s  and F i r s t  Aid
F i r e  P r o t e c t i o n
P o r t a b l e  f i r e  e x t i n g u i s h e r s
Compressed Gas and Compressed A ir  Equipment
Air  r e c e i v e r s
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TABLE B-l
GENERAL INDUSTRY STANDARDS WHICH MAY BE APPLICABLE TO 
THE OIL AND GAS WELL DRILLING INDUSTRY (Concluded)
Genera l  I n d u s t r y  
S tandard Area o f  Impact
P a r t  1910





Handling m a t e r i a l s  
Overhead and g an t ry  c r a n e s  
Crawler locomotive  and t r u c k  c ranes  
S l in g s




Genera l  r eq u i rem en ts  f o r  a l l  machines
Abras ive  wheel machinery
Mechanical  p o w e r - t r a n s m is s io n  a p p a ra tu s
Subpart P Hand and P o r t a b l e  Power Tools and o th e r  Hand-Held 
Equipment and Guarding Requirements
Subpart Q Welding,  C u t t i n g ,  and Braz ing
Subpart s E l e c t r i c a l  Systems and Equipment
Subpar t z Toxic and Hazardous Substances
A t o p i c a l  comparison and e v a l u a t i o n  of  e x i s t i n g  s t a t e ,  i n t e r n a t i o n a l ,  and 
API s t a n d a rd s  r e f e r e n c e d  i n  t h i s  document a r e  p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n ;  
however,  the  s u b j e c t  m a t t e r  d i s c u s s e d  i s  e i t h e r  no t  add re s se d  o r  only  p a r t l y  
a dd re s se d  by the  n a t i o n a l  s t a n d a rd s  (Tab le  B - l ) .
1. F i r s t  Aid and Communications
a.  F i r s t  Aid
Alaska r e q u i r e s  a l l  s u p e r v i s o r s  and foremen to  be t r a i n e d  and 
c e r t i f i e d  i n  f i r s t  a id  and a t  l e a s t  one t r a i n e d  person  t o  be o n s i t e  
a t  a l l  t imes  when work i s  i n  p r o g r e s s .  The p re sence  o f  c e r t i f i e d  
f i r s t - a i d  p e r s o n n e l  i s  s i m i l a r l y  r e q u i r e d  by C a l i f o r n i a ,  Mich igan ,  
Wiscons in ,  and Utah.  Canada r e q u i r e s  the  t o o l  pusher  and one a d d i ­
t i o n a l  worker p e r  crew to  be c e r t i f i e d  in  f i r s t  a i d .  The API
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consensus s t a n d a r d  r e q u i r e s  t he  p re sence  o f  a p e r so n  c e r t i f i e d  in  
f i r s t  a id  when medica l  s e r v i c e s  a re  no t  r e a so na b ly  a v a i l a b l e .
A l l  S t a t e s  and Canada r e q u i r e  t he  p resence  o f  u n i t - t y p e ,  f i r s t - a i d  
k i t s  ( u s u a l l y  2 4 - u n i t  s i z e ) ,  s t r e t c h e r s ,  and b l a n k e t s .  In a d d i ­
t i o n ,  Wyoming r e q u i r e s  arm and l e g  s p l i n t s .  P r o v i s i o n s  f o r  eyewash 
f a c i l i t i e s  a r e  made by Wyoming, Utah ,  Mich igan ,  and API. The 
a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  a t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  v e h i c l e  o f  s u f f i c i e n t  s i z e  to  
accommodate a s t r e t c h e r  i s  r e q u i r e d  by Canada,  whi le  the  l i s t e d  
S t a t e s  r e q u i r e  on ly  t h a t  t r a n s p o r t  be a v a i l a b l e .  Canada a l s o  
mandates t h a t  a l t e r n a t i v e  means o f  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  be su pp l i e d  i f  
the  c o n d i t i o n  o f  the  road  i s  d e t r i m e n t a l  t o  t he  i n j u r e d  pe r so n .
b .  Communication
A l l  p e r t i n e n t  S t a t e  s t a n d a r d s  and Canada p rov ide  f o r  t he  p re sence  
o f  adequa te  communication t o  emergency f a c i l i t i e s  and the  p o s t i n g  
o f  phone numbers. Wyoming r e q u i r e s  t h a t  r a d i o  numbers be p os ted  
and s p e c i f i e s  t h a t  r a d i o  communication be p rov ided  when phones a re  
not  a v a i l a b l e .
2. P e r s o n a l  P r o t e c t i v e  Equipment
a .  Genera l
A l l  s t a n d a rd s  p r o h i b i t  t he  wearing o f  loose  c l o t h i n g ,  j e w e l r y ,  and 
long h a i r  i n  the  work a r e a .
b .  Foot  S a f e ty
S a f e t y - t o e d  foo tw ear  i s  r e q u i r e d  in work a r e a s  by API, Utah,  
Wyoming, and Canada.  Wyoming a l s o  r e q u i r e s  m e t a t a r s a l  p r o t e c t i o n  
when n e c e s s a r y .
c .  F a l l  P r o t e c t i o n
The API r e q u i r e s  t h a t  s a f e t y  b e l t s  and a t t a c h e d  l a n y a r d s  be worn 
when the  f a l l  p o t e n t i a l  i s  g r e a t e r  than  10 f e e t ,  excep t  when 
freedom o f  movement i s  r e q u i r e d  and d u r in g  r i g g i n g - u p  and 
r igg ing-down o p e r a t i o n s .  C a l i f o r n i a ,  Michigan,  Utah,  and Wyoming 
r e q u i r e  t h a t  s a f e t y  b e l t s  be worn i n  accordance  w i th  the  OSHA 
c o n s t r u c t i o n  o r  g e n e r a l  i n d u s t r y  s t a n d a r d s .  Canada r e q u i r e s  s a f e t y  
b e l t s  o r  a l t e r n a t i v e  means o f  f a l l  p r o t e c t i o n  when working above 10 
f e e t  6 i n c h e s .  A la ska  r e q u i r e s  s a f e t y  n e t s  when workp laces  a r e  
more than  25 f e e t  above ground and when s a f e t y  b e l t s  a re  
i m p r a c t i c a l .
Ladder cages w i th  p l a t f o r m s  o r  l a d d e r  c l im b ing  d ev ice s  a r e  r e ­
q u i r e d  by a l l  the  examined s t a n d a r d s .
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d. Respiratory Protection, Hydrogen Sulfide
Wyoming and Utah r e q u i r e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  s t r i n g e n t  hydrogen s u l f i d e  
d e t e c t i o n  and warning systems as w e l l  as  r e s p i r a t o r y  p r o t e c t i o n  
programs to  be c o o r d in a t e d  w ith  i n c r e a s i n g  l e v e l s  o f  hydrogen 
s u l f i d e .  The API consensus s t a n d a rd s  (which r e f e r e n c e s  t h e i r  s a f e  
work p r a c t i c e s  guide  f o r  hydrogen s u l f i d e  env i ronments [72])  and 
the  "Outer  C o n t in e n t a l  She l f  S tanda rd :  S a f e ty  Requirements fo r
D r i l l i n g  in  Hydrogen S u l f i d e  Environments" [87] o f f e r  adequa te  
worker p r o t e c t i o n .
3. F i r e  P r o t e c t i o n  and P re v e n t io n
a.  F i r e  P re v e n t io n
C a l i f o r n i a  and Alaska  p r o h i b i t  smoking and the  c a r r y in g  o f  un­
p r o t e c t e d  matches o r  l i g h t e r s  i n  the  w e l l  a r e a .  The w e l l  a r e a  i s  
v a r i o u s ly  d e f in e d  as 50-100 f e e t  from the  w e l l  b o re .  Open f lames ,  
spa rk  s o u r c e s ,  and exhaus t  h e a t  from i n t e r n a l  combustion eng ines  
a re  p r o h i b i t e d  i n  the  w e l l  a r e a  by A laska ,  C a l i f o r n i a ,  Wyoming, and 
Utah.  The API q u a l i f i e s  i t s  f i r e  p r o t e c t i o n  re q u i re m e n ts  by 
" d e s ig n a te d  a r e a s "  and " s a f e t y  h e a t e r "  p r o v i s i o n s .
Adequate s t a n d a r d s  f o r  t he  l i g h t i n g  o f  f l a r e  p i t s  and l i n e s  a r e  i n  
e f f e c t  in  Utah ,  A lask a ,  C a l i f o r n i a ,  Wyoming, and Canada.  The API 
does not  add re ss  t h i s  problem.
Grounding and bonding o f  the  d e r r i c k  t o  ensu re  p r o t e c t i o n  a g a i n s t  
s t a t i c  e l e c t r i c i t y  i s  a de q ua te ly  r e g u l a t e d  i n  A laska ,  C a l i f o r n i a ,  
and Canada. The API does no t  add re ss  s t a t i c  d i s c h a r g e .
b .  F i r e  P r o t e c t i o n
P ro v i s i o n s  a re  made i n  a l l  t h e  w el l  d r i l l i n g  s t a n d a r d s  f o r  the  
p re sence  and i n s p e c t i o n  o f  p o r t a b l e  f i r e  e x t i n g u i s h e r s .  The API, 
Michigan,  Utah,  and Wyoming r e q u i r e  t h a t  fou r  20-pound, B :C - ra ted  
f i r e  e x t i n g u i s h e r s  be r e a d i l y  a v a i l a b l e  on d r i l l i n g  r i g s .  
C a l i f o r n i a  r e q u i r e s  a 10-pound e x t i n g u i s h e r ,  whereas Canada 
mandates t h a t  fo u r  30-pound e x t i n g u i s h e r s  be a v a i l a b l e  on the  d r i l l
r i g .  Wyoming a l s o  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  a 150-pound,  B :C - ra ted  f i r e  e x t i n ­
g u i s h e r  be l o c a t e d  a t  each w e l l  d r i l l i n g  s i t e .
4.  D er r ick s
A l l  o f  the  s t a n d a r d s  a d d re s s  the  problems of d e r r i c k  i n t e g r i t y .
I d e n t i f i c a t i o n ,  r a t i n g  c a p a c i t y ,  guying p a t t e r n s ,  a nc h o r in g ,  and i n s p e c ­
t i o n  a re  mandated i n  A laska ,  Michigan,  Utah,  C a l i f o r n i a ,  and Wyoming. 
The API has s i m i l a r  r e q u i r e m e n ts  f o r  worker p r o t e c t i o n .  P roced u ra l
guying diagrams and wind e f f e c t s  a re  inc luded  in  the  Wyoming s t a n d a r d s .  
A y e a r l y  magnaflux i n s p e c t i o n  o f  A - l e g s ,  e l e v a t o r  l i n k s ,  b lock  hooks,
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and pins is required by Alaska. The API tabulates soil stabilities
relative to derrick support.
a. Derrick Ladders
The examined standards regulate the construction of derrick lad­
ders.
b. Derrick Floor
All existing standards attend to housekeeping and maintaining the
derrick surface free from oil and grease. Utah specifies cleats,
mats, and grates if the surface condition necessitates it.
c .  Mousehole,  Ratho le
Only the California standard specifies that if a rathole is un­
occupied and does not have at least a 12-inch protruding pipe
guide, then it must be covered or guarded. Utah requires that all
floor holes be guarded when not in use.
d. Vee-doors
A chain or wire rope cable is required by all standards 
tect the worker from falls through the Vee-door.
e. Derrick Exits
The API requires a minimum of two access/egress stairs 
which may be a ladder) for derricks with floors over 6 
height. Canada, Alaska, Michigan, and Wyoming have 
requirements for providing alternative exits from the
floor, and they also provide for exit locations relevant to
prevailing winds and potential gas accumulations. Utah requires 
three exits from the derrick floor. No mention is made in any
standard of emergency escape facilities such as slides from
elevated derrick floors.
5. H o i s t in g  Lines  and O pera t ion
a. Hoisting Lines
The API s t a nd a rd  fo r  wire  rope s p e c i f i c a t i o n ,  s l i p p i n g ,  and c u t o f f  
p rocedures  [85] r e f e r e n c e d  by a l l  s t a t e s ,  r e q u i r e s  a s a f e t y  f a c t o r  
of  "3" fo r  normal o p e r a t i o n s  and "2" when " s e t t i n g  c a s in g ,  p u l l i n g  
on s tu c k  p ip e ,  o r  s i m i l a r  i n f r e q u e n t  o p e r a t i o n s . "
b. Deadline Anchors
Deadline anchors are required by API to be constructed so that 







c.  Weight I n d i c a t o r s
The API s t a n d a r d s  and a l l  r e f e r e n c e d  S t a t e s  s i m i l a r l y  r e q u i r e  the  
p re sence  of  an a c c u r a t e  (5%) weight  i n d i c a t o r .  Monthly c a l i b r a ­
t i o n  t o  c a l c u l a t e d  d r i l l  s t r i n g  weight  i s  r e q u i r e d  by API and 
Michigan.
d. Crown and T ra v e l i n g  Blocks
Alaska and C a l i f o r n i a  r e g u l a t i o n s  a d d re s s  the  e n g i n e e r i n g  d e s ig n  
and use of  crown and t r a v e l i n g  b lo c k s .  The API has s i m i l a r  
r eq u i rem en ts  in  i t s  s t a n d a rd  and t h e i r  recommended " S p e c i f i c a t i o n  
fo r  Rotary  D r i l l i n g  Equipment" [88] d e t a i l s  p ro pe r  guard ing  
t e c h n i q u e s .
e .  Drawworks
Drawworks guards  a r e  r e q u i r e d  by A laska ,  Utah ,  C a l i f o r n i a ,  and 
Canada. V isu a l  i n s p e c t i o n  of  the  drawworks i s  r e q u i r e d  by a l l  
s t a n d a r d s .  Brake t e s t i n g  by the  d r i l l e r  (each s h i f t )  i s  mandated 
by Alaska .
f .  Hoist  O pera t ions
D r i l l e r s  a re  r e q u i r e d  by a l l  s t a n d a r d s  to  be a t  t h e i r  s t a t i o n s
d u r in g  load movements. Alaska  and C a l i f o r n i a  a l s o  r e q u i r e  c l e a r l y  
l a b e le d  c o n t r o l s .  A l l  s t a n d a r d s  r e q u i r e  t h a t  b rake  h a n d le s  be t i e d  
down when the  d r i l l e r  i s  not  a t  h i s  s t a t i o n  ( a u to fe e d  drawworks a re  
exempt) .  A l l  s t a n d a r d s  a l lo w  an employee to  r i d e  an unloaded 
t r a v e l i n g  b lo ck  i f  he i s  t i e d  o f f  w i th  approved s a f e t y  b e l t  and
l a n y a r d .
6. Rotary Equipment and Guarding ,
The examined S t a t e s  a l l  r e q u i r e  gua rd ing  of  the  r o t a r y  t a b l e  by sub­
s t a n t i a l l y  c o n s t r u c t e d  m a t e r i a l  ex t e n d in g  downward and c o v e r i n g  a l l  
g e a r s ,  p in s ,  and s p r o c k e t s .  Wyoming, A laska ,  and C a l i f o r n i a  
s p e c i f i c a l l y  exc lude  the  k e l l y  bush ing  and the  k e l l y  from gua rd ing
requ i rem en ts  as does API. Utah and Michigan r e q u i r e  t h a t  a l l  g e a r s ,  
p u l l e y s ,  and r o t a t i n g  p a r t s  be guarded  b u t  do no t  s p e c i f i c a l l y  a d d re s s  
the  k e l l y .
S tanda rds  e x i s t  in  a l l  S t a t e s ,  Canada, and API r e q u i r i n g  t h a t  the  
d r i l l e r  s h a l l  n o t  o p e r a t e  the  r o t a r y  t a b l e  w h i le  p e r s o n n e l  a n d / o r  e q u ip ­
ment a re  in  c o n t a c t  with  the  r o t a t i n g  p a r t s .  The d r i l l e r  i s  a l s o
r e q u i r e d  to  watch the  r o t a r y  a r e a  when i t  i s  i n  mot ion .
A l l  s t a n d a r d s  r e q u i r e  exposed moving g e a r s ,  c h a i n s ,  s p r o c k e t s ,  b e l t s ,  
and o th e r  s i m i l a r  p a r t s  to  be guarded .  The ANSI B15.1-1972 " S a fe ty
hoisting line. Similar regulations exist in the State standards.
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Standard  f o r  Mechanical  Power T ransm iss ion  A ppara tus"  [89] i s  r e f e r e n c e d  
in the  API s t a n d a r d .  C a l i f o r n i a ,  Wyoming, and Alaska  p ro v ide  the  
s p e c i f i c  guard ing  r eq u i rem en ts  i n  t he  t e x t  o f  t h e i r  r e g u l a t i o n s .
7. Catheads and C a t l i n e s
Al l  S t a t e s ,  Canada, and API p rov ide  adequate  s t a n d a r d s  f o r  o p e r a t o r  
c o n t r o l s ,  f r i c t i o n  s u r f a c e  wear,  rope s p l i c e s ,  u na t te n d e d  c a th e a d s ,  
headache p o s t s ,  and au tom a t ic  ca th ead  mechanisms.  A laska ,  C a l i f o r n i a ,  
and Wyoming a l s o  p rov ide  fo r  rope  a n t i f o u l i n g  d e v i c e s .  Cathead 
p r o t e c t i o n ,  rope c o i l i n g ,  and employee hand p o s i t i o n  have been a dd re s sed  
in  the  C a l i f o r n i a  s t a n d a r d .
Riding on the  c a t l i n e  i s  p r o h i b i t e d  excep t  i n  emergency s i t u a t i o n s  by 
a l l  s t a n d a r d s .
8. Tongs, Backup P o s t s ,  S a f e ty  L in e s ,  and Breaking/Making Connec tions
A l l  s t a n d a r d s  p rov ide  f o r  the  tongs  t o  be a t t a c h e d  t o  a backup system. 
P ro v i s io n s  a re  made in  a l l  s t a n d a r d s  f o r  p ro p e r  a t t a chm en t  o f  l i n e s  to  
g i r d e r s  o r  p o s t s .  Canada s p e c i f i e s  t h a t  a d e r r i c k  g i r d e r  no t  be used  as 
a backup p os t  u n l e s s  i t  i s  des igned  as such.  I n s p e c t i o n  and main­
t enance  p rocedures  a r e  s i m i l a r  i n  a l l  s t a n d a r d s .
Rotary  t a b l e s  a re  s p e c i f i c a l l y  exc luded  by a l l  s t a n d a r d s  as a power 
source  fo r  the  i n i t i a l  "b re a k in g"  o f  a c o n n e c t io n .  The r o t a r y  t a b l e  i s  
a l lowed t o  sp in  the  j o i n t  once i t  has been  b roken .  S a f e ty  l i n e s  t o  p r e ­
v en t  backsp in  o f  tong  h a n d le s  a r e  r e q u i r e d  i n  C a l i f o r n i a ,  A laska ,  and 
Canada. There a re  no r e g u l a t i o n s  t h a t  a d d re s s  t he  em ployee 's  p o s i t i o n  
d u r in g  p ipe  j o i n t  b r e ak in g  and making p ro ce d u re s .
9 .  E l e v a to r s  and La tch ing
S p e c i f i c  r e g u l a t i o n s  f o r  e l e v a t o r  l a t c h i n g  p ro ce d u r e s  and s a f e t y  l a t c h  
r equ i rem en ts  a r e  n a t  add ressed  by any o f  the  s t a n d a r d s .
10. S l i p s  and S l i p  Handles
The h an d l in g  and p o s i t i o n i n g  o f  s l i p s  a r e  no t  a dd re s sed  by any o f  the  
s t a n d a r d s .  The C a l i f o r n i a  s t a n d a r d s  r e g u l a t e  s l i p  hand le  l e n g t h .
11. Chains
A l l  s t a n d a rd s  add re s s  the  h az a rd s  o f  moving c h a in .
12. Pipe  Racks and Pipe  Handling
Wyoming, Utah,  Michigan,  Canada,  and API s i m i l a r l y  a d d re s s  t h e  p rob­
lems o f  d r i l l  p ipe  r a c k in g  and t r a n s f e r  o f  p ip e s  from t r u c k s .  Alaska  
and C a l i f o r n i a  r e g u l a t e  in  g r e a t e r  d e t a i l  p ipe  chock ing ,  b i n d in g ,  and 
employee p o s i t i o n s  d u r in g  p ip e  t r a n s f e r  from t r u c k s  t o  r a c k s .
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Techniques f o r  t r a n s f e r  o f  d r i l l  p ipe  from p ipe  ra c k s  t o  c a tw a lk  t o  
i n c l i n e d  ramp to  Vee-door  a r e  no t  ad d re s se d  by any o f  t h e  s t a n d a r d s .
Employee p o s i t i o n s  under p ipe  loads  s t o r e d  o r  b e in g  r i g g e d  i n  the
Vee-door a r e a  do no t  e x i s t .  P ipe  h a n d l i n g ,  r i g g i n g ,  and t a g  l i n e s  a r e  
only  p a r t l y  add ressed  by the  e x i s t i n g  s t a n d a r d s .
Racking and se c u r in g  o f  p ipe  s t a n d s  d u r in g  t r i p p i n g  i s  covered  by a l l
the  s t a n d a r d s .
13. C i r c u l a t i n g  F l u i d ,  Tanks,  Reserve P i t s
a.  C i r c u l a t i n g  F lu id
Chemical exposure  t o  harmfu l  a d d i t i v e s  i n  c i r c u l a t i n g  f l u i d s  i s  
r e g u l a t e d  by F ed e ra l  OSHA s t a n d a r d s  (29 CFR 1910.1001—.10 4 6 ) .  
P e r son a l  p r o t e c t i v e  equipment i s  a l s o  r e g u l a t e d  by F e d e ra l  OSHA 
S tandards  (29 CFR 1926.100 and .10 2 ) .
b. Tanks
Guarding of  both  s i d e s  o f  walkways ove r  mud tanks  i s  mandated i n  
Canada.  Wyoming s p e c i f i e s  t h a t  t he  i n s i d e  s e c t i o n  o f  walkways on 
mud tanks  be p rov ided  w i th  s t a n d a r d  g u a r d r a i l s  and the  o u t s i d e  be 
guarded i f  more than  4 f e e t  above ground l e v e l .  Wyoming a l s o  
r e q u i r e s  hazardous  su bs ta n ce  t e s t i n g  p r i o r  to  employee e n t r y  o f  
tanks  t h a t  have c o n t a i n e d  t o x i c  m a t e r i a l .  These p r o v i s i o n s  a r e  no t  
r e q u i r e d  by API.
c .  Reserve P i t s
C a l i f o r n i a  r e q u i r e s  open p i t s  c o n s t i t u t i n g  a h aza rd  t o  employees to  
be guarded o r  fenced .  Water r e s c u e  equipment s p e c i f i c  t o  r e s e r v e  
p i t s  i s  not  add ressed  by any s t a n d a r d .
14. E l e c t r i c a l —Hazard Zones
Wyoming, Utah,  Mich igan ,  and API d ia g ra m m a t ic a l ly  d e p i c t  h az a rd  zones 
( e . g . ,  s h a l e  s h a k e r s ,  mud p i t s ,  and v a r io u s  e n c lo s e d  a r e a s  on r i g  sub­
s t r u c t u r e s )  t h a t  a r e  c l a s s i f i e d  i n t o  d i f f e r e n t  e x p l o s i v e  h aza rd  a r e a s .  
E l e c t r i c a l  equipment s p e c i f i e d  by the  n a t i o n a l  e l e c t r i c a l  code ,  NFPA 70- 
1980 [90],  i s  mandated by n a t i o n a l ,  S t a t e ,  and API s t a n d a r d s  f o r  t h e s e  
zones.
15. C e l l a r s
A c c e s s / e g re s s  to c e l l a r s  i s  r e g u l a t e d  by a l l  s t a n d a r d s .  Guarding of  the  
c e l l a r  p e r im e te r  should  be a t t e n d e d  t o ,  thu s  p r e v e n t i n g  employees from 
f a l l i n g  i n t o  i t .  Atmospheric t e s t i n g  f o r  flammable gas and hydrogen 
s u l f i d e  p r i o r  to c e l l a r  e n t r y  i s  no t  s p e c i f i e d  i n  e x i s t i n g  r e g u l a t i o n s .
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16. Blowout Prevention
Employee t r a i n i n g  in  blowout p r e v e n t i o n  equipment ,  blowout d r i l l s ,  and 
p r a c t i c e s  r e f e r e n c e d  by the  API s t a n d a rd  "Recommended P r a c t i c e  f o r  
Blowout P re v e n t io n  Equipment Systems" [76] p rov ide  n e c e s s a ry  worker 
p r o t e c t i o n .
17. Employee T ra in in g
A l l  s t a n d a rd s  r e q u i r e  t h a t  employees be t r a i n e d  i n  h aza rd  r e c o g n i t i o n  
s p e c i f i c  to  t h e i r  t a s k s .  S p e c i f i c  g u i d e l i n e s  a r e  not  g iv e n  fo r  
o p e r a t i o n a l  t r a i n i n g  a r e a s ,  d u r a t i o n  o f  t r a i n i n g ,  and c e r t i f i c a t i o n .
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A combination of oil and acid or water and acid under 
high pressure used to separate or fracture hard limestone 
formations.
To treat oil-bearing limestone or other formations, using 
a chemical reaction with acid, to increase production. 
Hydrochloric acid or other acid is injected into the 
formation under pressure. The acid etches the rock, 
enlarging the pore spaces and passages through which the 
reservoir fluids flow. The acid is then pumped out and 
the well swabbed and put back into production.
A method of rotary drilling that uses compressed air as 
its circulation medium. This method of removing cuttings 
from the well bore is as efficient or more efficient than 
the traditional methods using water or drilling mud; in 
addition, the rate of penetration is increased 
considerably when air drilling is used. However, a
principal problem in air drilling is the penetration of 
formations containing water, since the entry of water 
into the system reduces its efficiency.
A large valve, usually installed above the ram 
preventers, that forms a seal in the annular space
between the pipe and well bore or, if no pipe is present, 
on the well bore itself.
The space around a pipe in a well bore, the outer wall of 
which may be the wall of either the bore hole or the cas­
ing; sometimes termed the annulus.
Any method used to raise oil to the surface through a 
well after reservoir pressure has declined to the point 
at which the well no longer produces by means of natural
energy. The most common methods of artificial lift are
sucker rod pumps, hydraulic pumps, submersible pumps, and 
gas lifts.
An air or hydraulic fluid operated device that fits into 
the opening in the rotary table when the drill stem must 
be suspended in the well bore (as when a connection, or 













slips, eliminate the need for roughnecks to set and take 
out slips manually.
A section of pipe with left-hand threads on one end and 
conventional right-hand threads on the other.
A post, column or stanchion secured to the derrick, 
derrick floor, or derrick foundation, the purpose of 
which is to make secure the dead end of the safety line.
A cylindrical steel bar (similar to the handle or bail of 
a bucket, only much larger) that supports the swivel and 
connects it to the hook. The two cylindrical bars that 
support the elevators and attach them to the hook are 
sometimes called bails.
A long cylindrical container, fitted with a valve at its 
lower end, used to remove water, sand, mud, or oil from a 
well.
To recover bottomhole fluids, samples, or drill cuttings 
by lowering a cylindrical vessel called a bailer to the 
bottom of a well, filling it, and retrieving it.
Barium sulfate, BaSO^; a mineral used to increase the 
weight of drilling mud.
A rope/belt retaining device used on stabbing boards. It 
allows the derrickman to lean past his overbalance point 
to handle pipe. Not to be confused with fall protection 
equipment.
A flexible band or cord connecting and passing about each 
of two or more pulleys to transmit power or impart motion.
A colloidal clay, composed of montmorillonite, which 
swells when wet. Because of its gel-forming properties, 
bentonite is a major component of drilling muds.
The cutting or boring element used in drilling oil and 
gas wells. Most bits used in rotary drilling are 
roller-cone bits. The bit consists of the cutting 
elements and the circulating element. The circulating 
element permits the passage of drilling fluid and 
utilizes the hydraulic force of the fluid stream to 
improve drilling rates.
A heavy plate that fits in the rotary table and holds the 














An integral part of a blowout preventer, serving as the 
closing element. Its ends do not fit around the drill 
pipe but seal against each other and shut off the space 
below completely.
Any assembly of pulleys on a common framework; in mechan­
ics, one or more pulleys, or sheaves, mounted to rotate 
on a common axis. The crown block is an assembly of 
sheaves mounted on beams at the top of the derrick. The 
drilling line is reeved over the sheaves of the crown 
block alternately with the sheaves of the traveling 
block, which is hoisted and lowered in the derrick by the 
drilling line. When elevators are attached to a hook on 
the traveling block and when drill pipe is latched in the 
elevators, the pipe can be raised or lowered in the 
derrick or mast.
The discharge pipe from a well being drilled by air 
drilling, which conducts the air or gas used for 
circulation away from the rig to reduce the danger of 
fire and to transport the cuttings a suitable distance 
from the well.
An uncontrolled flow of gas, oil, or other well fluids 
occurring when formation pressure exceeds the pressure 
applied to it by the column of drilling fluid.
One of several valves installed at the wellhead to pre­
vent the escape of pressure either in the annular space 
between the casing and drill pipe or in open hole (i.e., 
hole with no drill pipe) during drilling or completion 
operations.
The well bore; the hole made by drilling or boring.
To unscrew one section of pipe from another section,
especially drill pipe while it is being withdrawn from 
the well bore. During this operation, the breakout tongs 
are used to start the unscrewing operation.
A device attached to the shaft of the drawworks that is 
used as a power source for unscrewing drill pipe; usually 
located opposite the driller's side of the drawworks.
Tongs that are used to start unscrewing one section of 
pipe from another section, especially drill pipe coming 
out of the hole; also called lead tongs.
A tubular device that, when lowered to a selected depth
within a well, fires bullets through the casing to 
provide holes through which the well fluids may enter.
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A drilling method in which the hole is drilled by drop­
ping a sharply pointed bit on the bottom of the hole. 
The bit is attached to a cable, and the cable is 
repeatedly picked up and dropped as the hole is drilled.
Steel pipe placed in an oil or gas well as drilling pro­
gresses to prevent the wall of the hole from caving in 
during drilling and to provide a means of extracting 
petroleum if the well is productive.
The entire length of all the joints of casing run in a 
well. Casing is manufactured in lengths of about 30 
feet, each length or joint being joined to another as 
casing is run in a well.
A spool-shaped attachment on a winch around which rope 
for hoisting and pulling is wound.
A hoisting or pulling line powered by the cathead and 
used to lift heavy equipment on the rig.
A pit in the ground to provide additional height between 
the rig floor and the well head to accommodate the 
installation of blowout preventers, ratholes, mouseholes, 
and so forth. It also collects drainage water and other 
fluids for subsequent disposal.
To fill the annulus between the casing and hole with 
cement to support the casing and prevent fluid migration 
between permeable zones.
The application of a liquid slurry of cement and water to 
various points inside or outside the casing.
A slurry of portland cement and water and sometimes one 
or more additives. They affect either the density of the 
mixture or its setting time. Additives include 
accelerators (such as calcium chloride), retarders (such 
as gypsum), weighting materials (such as barium sulfate), 
lightweight additives (such as bentonite), and a variety 
of lost circulation materials (such as mica flakes).
A drive system using a chain and chain gears to transmit 
power. Power transmissions use a roller chain, in which 
each link is made of side bars, transverse pins, and 
rollers on the pins. A double roller chain is made of 
two connected rows of links, a triple roller chain of 
three, and so forth.
A tool consisting of a handle and a releasable chain that 










complete a well 
completion rig
in diameter to use a pipe wrench. The chain is tightened 
around the pipe or fitting.
An orifice installed in a line to restrict the flow and 
control the rate of production. Surface chokes are part 
of the Christmas tree and contain a choke nipple, or 
bean, with a small-diameter bore that serves to restrict 
the flow. Chokes are also used to control the rate of 
flow of the drilling mud out of the hole when the well is 
closed in with the blowout preventer and when a kick is 
being circulated out of the hole.
An extension of pipe from the blowout preventer assembly 
used to direct well fluids from the annulus to the choke 
manifold.
The arrangement of piping and special valves, called 
chokes, through which drilling mud is circulated when the 
blowout preventers are closed to control the pressures 
encountered during a kick.
The control valves, pressure gauges, and chokes assembled 
at the top of a well to control the flow of oil and gas 
after the well has been drilled and completed.
A casing that has joints of various collapse resistance, 
internal yield strength, and tensile strength designed 
for various depths in a specific well to best withstand 
the conditions of that well. In deep wells, high tensile 
strength is required in the top casing joints to carry 
the load, whereas high collapse resistance and internal 
yield strength are needed for the bottom joints. In the 
middle of the casing, average qualities are usually 
sufficient. The most suitable combination of types and 
weights of pipe helps to ensure efficient production at a 
minimum cost.
To pull the drill stem out of the well bore. This with­
drawal is necessary to change the bit, change from a core 
barrel to the bit, run electric logs, prepare for a 
drill-stem test, run casing, and so on.
To finish work on a well and bring it to productive 
status.
A portable servicing or workover rig that is 
selfpropelled, using the hoisting engines for motive 
power. Because the driver's cab is mounted on the end 
opposite the mast support, the unit must be backed up to 













The mechanism used to transmit power from the engines to 
the pump, drawworks, and other machinery on a drilling 
rig. It is composed of clutches, chains and sprockets, 
belts and pulleys, and a number of shafts, both driven 
and driving. Also used to connect two or more 
power-producing devices such as engines to run one piece 
of driven equipment such as the drawworks.
An assembly of sheaves or pulleys mounted on beams at the 
top of the derrick over which the drilling line is reeved.
The fragments of rock dislodged by the bit and brought to 
the surface in the drilling mud. Washed and dried 
samples of the cuttings are analyzed by geologists to 
obtain information about the formations drilled.
The drilling line from the crown block sheave to the 
anchor, so called because it does not move.
A device to which the deadline is attached to the mast or 
derrick substructure. Also called a deadline anchor.
The equipment used to remove unwanted gas from a liquid, 
especially from drilling fluid.
A large load-bearing structure, usually of bolted 
construction. In drilling, the standard derrick has four 
legs standing at the corners of the substructure and 
reaching to the crown block. The substructure is an 
assembly of heavy beams used to elevate the derrick and 
provide space to install blowout preventers, casing 
heads, and so forth. Because the standard derrick must 
be assembled piece by piece, it has largely been replaced 
by the mast, which can be lowered and raised without 
disassembly.
A counterweighted device to assist the derrickman in 
climbing on derricks. Attached to a safety harness 
running on a wire rope cable, the device has adjustable 
counterweights and physically assists workers climbing 
and descending the derrick.
The crew member who handles the upper end of the drill 
stem as it is being hoisted out of or lowered into the 
hole. He is also responsible for the conditioning of the 
drilling fluid and the circulation machinery.
A centrifugal device for removing sand from drilling 
fluid to prevent abrasion of the pumps. It may be 














inside a special cone-shaped vessel, in which case it is 
sometimes called a hydrocyclone.
A centrifugal device, similar to a desander, used to 
remove very fine particles, or silt, from drilling fluid 
to keep the amount of solids in the fluid to the lowest 
possible level.
The power supplied to a drilling rig by diesel engines 
driving electric generators, used widely offshore and 
gaining popularity onshore.
A high-compression, interna1-combustion engine used 
extensively for powering drilling rigs. In a diesel 
engine, air is drawn into the cylinders and compressed to 
very high pressures; ignition occurs as fuel is injected 
into the compressed and heated air. Combustion takes 
place within the cylinder above the piston, and expansion 
of the combustion products imparts power to the piston.
Intentional deviation of a well bore from the vertical. 
Controlled directional drilling makes it possible to 
reach subsubsurface areas laterally remote from the point 
where the bit enters the earth, and involves the use of 
turbo-drills, Dyna-Drills, whipstocks, or other 
deflecting tools.
A small enclosure on the rig floor used as an office for 
the driller or as a storehouse for small objects. Also, 
any small building used as an office or for storage.
The hoisting mechanism on a drilling rig. It is 
essentially a large winch that spools off or takes in the 
drilling line and thus raises or lowers the drill stem 
and bit.
A heavy, thick-walled tube, usually steel, used between 
the drill pipe and the bit in the drill stem, used to put 
weight on the bit so that the bit can drill.
4k
The heavy seamless tubing used to rotate the bit and 
circulate the drilling fluid. Joints of pipe 30 feet 
long are coupled together by means of tool joints.
All members in the assembly used for drilling by the 
rotary method from the swivel to the bit, including the 
kelly, drill pipe and tool joints, drill collars, 
stabilizers, and various subsequent items.
The column, or string, of drill pipe, not including the 












loosely applied to include both the drill pipe and drill 
collars.
The employee directly in charge of a drilling rig and 
crew. His main duty is operation of the drilling rig and 
hoisting equipment, but he is also responsible for the 
downhole condition of the well, operation of downhole 
tools, and pipe measurements.
Circulating fluid, one function of which is to force cut­
tings out of the wellbore and to the surface. While a 
mixture of clay, water, and other chemical additives is 
the most common drilling fluid, wells can also be drilled 
using air, gas, or water as the drilling fluid. Also 
called circulating fluid.
A wire rope hoisting line, reeved on sheaves of the crown 
block and traveling block (in effect a block and tackle), 
the primary purpose of which is to hoist or lower drill 
pipe or casing from or into a well. Also, a wire rope 
used to support the drilling tools.
A cylinder around which wire rope is wound in the draw- 
works. The drawworks drum is that part of the hoist upon 
which the drilling line is wound.
A set of clamps that grip a stand, or column, of casing, 
tubing, drill pipe, or sucker rods, so that the stand can 
be raised or lowered into the hole.
The end of the drilling line that is affixed to the drum 
or reel of the drawworks, so called because it travels 
with greater velocity than any other portion of the line.
Steel, fingerlike projection that forms a slot in the 
finger board.
A rack that supports the tops of the stands of pipe being 
stacked in the derrick or mast. It has several steel 
fingerlike projections that form a series of slots into 
which the derrickman can set a stand of drill pipe as it 
ir. pulled out of the hole.
Any structural member either in direct or indirect 
contact with the finger to resist either horizontal, 
vertical, or diagonal movement of the finger.
An object left in the well bore during drilling 
operations that must be recovered or drilled around 
before work can proceed. It can be anything from a piece 










from a well any equipment left there during drilling 
operations, such as a lost bit or drill collar or a part 
of the drill string. To remove from an older well 
certain pieces of equipment, such as packers, liners, or 
screen pipe, to allow reconditioning of the well.
To recover from a well any equipment left there during 
drilling operations, such as a lost bit or drill collar 
or part of the drill string; to remove from an older well 
certain pieces of equipment, such as packers, liners, or 
screen pipe, to allow reconditioning of the well.
A chemical used to lighten the water column in gas wells, 
in oil wells producing gas, and in drilling wells in 
which air or gas is used as the drilling fluid so that 
the water can be forced out with the air or gas to 
prevent its impeding the production or drilling rate.
A method of stimulating production by increasing the per­
meability of the producing formation. Under extremely 
high hydraulic pressure, a fluid (such as water, oil, 
alcohol, dilute hydrochloric acid, liquefied petroleum 
gas, or foam) is pumped downward through tubing or drill 
pipe and forced into the perforations in the casing. The 
fluid enters the formation and parts or fractures it. 
Sand grains, aluminum pellets, glass beads, or similar 
materials are carried in suspension by the fluid into the 
fractures. These are called propping agents or 
proppants. When the pressure is released at the surface, 
the fracturing fluid returns to the well and the 
fractures partially close on the proppants, leaving 
channels for oil to flow through them to the well. This 
process is often called a frac job.
The force exerted by fluids in a formation, recorded in 
the hole at the level of the formation with the well shut 
in. It is also called reservoir pressure or shut-in 
bottomhole pressure.
The gathering of data on a formation to determine its 
potential productivity before installing casing in a 
well. The conventional method is the dril1-stem test. 
Incorporated in the drill-stem testing tool are a packer, 
valves or ports that may be opened and closed from the 
surface, and a pressure recording device. The tool is 
lowered to bottom on a string of drill pipe and the 
packer set, isolating the formation to be tested from the 
formations above and supporting the fluid column above 
the packer. A port on the tool is opened to allow the 
trapped pressure below the packer to bleed off into the 













atmospheric pressure and allowing the well to produce to 
the surface, where the well fluids may be sampled and 
inspected.
The process of raising or lifting fluid from a well by 
injecting gas down the well through tubing or through the 
tubing-casing annulus. Injected gas aerates the fluid to 
make it exert less pressure than the formation does; 
consequently, the higher formation pressure forces the 
fluid out of the well bore.
An emergency escape line affixed to the monkey board sec­
tion of a derrick. In the event of an impending blowout 
or structural collapse, an employee may grab a slide 
attached to the wire rope cable and escape to the ground.
A structural framework erected on top of the derrick for 
lifting material to the top of the derrick.
To create holes in casing and cement set through a 
productive formation. A perforation gun is lowered into 
the hole and fired to detonate high-powered jets or shoot 
steel projectiles (bullets) through the casing and cement 
and into the productive formation. This process allows 
the flow of formation fluids from the reservoir into the 
well bore.
A wire line attached to a mast or derrick to stabilize 
it. Load guys provide the main support for the 
structure; wind guys attached to ground anchors provide 
lateral support.
An arrangement of pulleys and wire rope or chain used for 
lifting heavy objects; a winch or similar device; the 
drawworks.
The large, flanged spool in the drawworks on which the 
hoisting cable is wound.
A large, hook-shaped device from which the elevator bails 
or the swivel is suspended. It is designed to carry 
maximum loads ranging from 100 to 650 tons and turns on 
bearings in its supporting housing.
The forcing into a formation of liquids under high 
pressure to open passages for oil and gas to flow through 
and into the well bore.
A gaseous compound, H2S, of sulfur and hydrogen 
commonly found in petroleum, which causes the foul smell 













The string of casing set in a well after the surface cas­
ing to keep the hole from caving in and to seal off 
troublesome formations. Sometimes called protection 
casing.
A structural steel, open-sided tower raised vertically by 
special lifting tackle attached to the traveling block.
A hydraulic device operated by pump pressure to clean mud 
pits and tanks in rotary drilling and to mix mud compo­
nents. Also, in a perforation gun using shaped charges, 
a highly penetrating stream of exploded particles that 
cuts a hole in the casing, cement, and formation.
To create a hole through the casing with a shaped charge 
of high explosives instead of a gun that fires 
projectiles. Once detonated, the charges emit short, 
penetrating jets of high-velocity gases that cut holes in 
the casing and cement and some distance into the 
formation. Formation fluids then flow into the well bore 
through these perforations.
A single length (about 30 feet) of drill pipe or drill 
collar, casing, or tubing that has threaded connections 
at both ends.
The heavy square or hexagonal steel member suspended from 
the swivel through the rotary table and connected to the 
topmost joint of drill pipe to turn the drill stem as the 
rotary table turns.
A device fitted to the rotary table through which the 
kelly passes and the means by which the torque of the 
rotary table is transmitted to the kelly and to the drill 
stem. Also called the drive bushing.
A valve installed between the swivel and the kelly. When
a high-pressure backflow begins inside the drill stem,
the valve is closed to keep pressure off the swivel and 
rotary hose.
A pneumatically operated device mounted on top of the
kelly that, when actuated, causes the kelly to turn or 
spin. It is useful when the kelly or a joint of pipe 
attached to it must be spun up; that is, rotated rapidly 
in order to make it up.
An entry of water, gas, oil, or other formation fluid
into the well bore. It occurs because the pressure 
exerted by the column of drilling fluid is not great 
















the formation drilled. If prompt action is not taken to 
control the kick or kill the well, a blowout will occur.
The pipe tongs suspended in the derrick and operated by a 
wire line connected to the breakout cathead. Also called 
breakout tongs.
A systematic recording of data, as from the driller's 
log, mud log, electrical well log, or radioactivity log 
run in wells being produced or drilled to obtain various 
characteristics of downhole formations.
The recording of information about subsurface geologic 
formations.
To attach a joint of drill pipe onto the drill stem sus­
pended in the well bore to permit deepening of the well 
bore.
To hoist the drill stem out of the well bore to perform 
one of a number of operations such as changing bits, 
taking a core, and so forth, and then to return the drill 
stem to the well bore.
To assemble and join parts to form a complete unit (as to
make up a string of casing) or to screw together two
threaded pieces.
The cathead used as a power source for screwing together 
joints of pipe.
To deepen the hole made by the bit; to drill ahead.
A calibrated funnel used in field tests to determine the 
viscosity of drilling mud.
A portable derrick capable of being erected as a unit, as 
distinguished from a standard derrick, which cannot be 
raised to a working position as a unit.
A device that fits into the rotary table. It
accommodates the slips and drives the kelly bushing so 
that the rotating motion of the rotary table can be 
transmitted to the kelly. Also called rotary bushing.
The derrickman's working platform. Double board, tribble 
board, fourble board; a monkey board located at a height 
in the derrick or mast equal to two, three, or four 
lengths of pipe, respectively.













Shallow bores under the derrick, usually lined with pipe, 
in which joints of drill pipe are temporarily suspended 
for later connection to the drill string.
The addition of a length of drill pipe or tubing to the 
active string.
The liquid circulated through the well bore during rotary 
drilling and workover operations. It functions to bring 
cuttings to the surface, to cool and lubricate the bit 
and drill stem, to protect against blowouts by holding 
back subsurface pressures, and to deposit a mud cake on 
the wall of the bore hole to prevent loss of fluids to 
the formation. The mud used in modern drilling 
operations is a complex, three-phase mixture of liquids, 
reactive solids, and inert solids. The liquid phase may 
be freshwater, diesel oil, or crude oil and may contain 
one or more conditioners.
The recording of information derived from examination and 
analysis of formation cuttings made by the bit and mud 
circulated out of the hole.
A series of open tanks, usually made of steel plates,
through which the drilling mud is cycled to allow sand
and sediments to settle out. Additives are mixed with 
the mud in the pit, and the fluid is temporarily stored 
there before being pumped back into the well. Mud pits 
are also called shaker pits, settling pits, and suction 
pits, depending on their main purpose.
A large, reciprocating pump used to circulate the mud on 
a drilling rig.
line A trough or pipe, placed between the surface connections 
at the well bore and the shale shaker, through which
drilling mud flows upon its return to the surface from 
the hole.
To pierce the casing wall and cement, with the use of a 
perforating gun, to provide holes through which formation 
fluids may enter.
gun A device, fitted with shaped charges or bullets, that is 
lowered to the desired depth in a well and fired to
create penetrating holes in casing, cement, and formation.
A horizontal support for tubular goods.

















A sealing component for a blowout preventer that closes 
the annular space between the pipe and the blowout
preventer or well head.
The act of placing stands of pipe in orderly arrangement 
in the derrick while hoisting pipe from the well bore.
The closing and sealing component on a blowout
preventer. One of three types— blind, pipe, or
shear— may be installed in several preventers mounted in 
a stack on top of the well bore. Blind rams, when 
closed, form a seal on a hole that has no drill pipe in 
it; pipe rams, when closed, seal around the pipe; shear 
rams cut through drill pipe and then form a seal.
A blowout preventer that uses rams to seal off pressure
on a hole that is with or without pipe. It is also
called a ram preventer.
A hole in the rig floor 30-35 feet deep, lined with 
casing that projects above the floor, into which the 
kelly and swivel are placed when hoisting operations are 
in progress.
The addition of a length of drill pipe or tubing to the
active string. The length to be added is placed in the
rathole, made up to the kelly, pulled out of the rathole,
and made up into the string.
To pass (as the end of a rope) through a hole or opening 
in a block or similar device.
To string a wire-rope drilling line through the sheaves 
of the traveling and crown blocks to the hoisting drum.
A set of controls used to open and close the blowout pre­
venters; the panel is placed some distance away from the 
rig so that the controls can be operated without 
personnel present on the rig floor.
A set of controls, usually placed on the rig floor, that 
is manipulated to control the amount of drilling fluid 
being circulated out through the choke manifold. This 
procedure is necessary when a kick is being circulated 
out of a well.
A mud pit in which a supply of drilling fluid has been 
stored. Also, a waste pit, usually an excavated, 
earthen-walled pit. It may be lined with plastic to 














The derrick or mast, drawworks, and attendant surface 
equipment of a drilling unit.
To dismantle the drilling rig and auxiliary equipment 
following the completion of drilling operations; also 
called teardown.
To prepare the drilling rig for making hole; to install 
tools and machinery before drilling is started.
The machine used to impart rotational power to the drill 
stem while permitting vertical movement of the pipe for 
rotary drilling.
A metal lining that fits into the opening of the rotary 
table to reduce its size for special purposes, such as 
fitting the slips or the kelly bushing. It is also 
called the master bushing.
A drilling method in which a hole is drilled by a 
rotating bit to which a downward force is applied. The 
bit is fastened to and rotated by the drill stem, which 
also provides a passageway through which the drilling 
fluid is circulated. Additional joints of drill pipe are 
added as drilling progresses.
A worker on a drilling rig, subordinate to the driller; 
sometimes called a roughneck, floorman, or rig crewman.
The hose on a rotary drilling rig that conducts the 
drilling fluid from the mud pump and standpipe to the 
swivel and kelly; also called the mud hose or the kelly 
hose.
The swivel attached to the top of the kelly that permits 
the kelly to be rotated when suspended from the traveling 
block hook during drilling operations.
The principal component of a rotary, or rotary machine, 
used to turn the drill stem and support the drilling 
assembly. It has a beveled gear arrangement to create 
the rotational motion and an opening into which bushings 
are fitted to drive and support the drilling assembly.
A wire rope, one end of which is fastened to the end of a 
pipe tong handle and the other end secured to hold the 
tongs while such tongs are in use.
A series of trays with sieves that vibrate to remove 
cuttings from the circulating fluid in rotary drilling 












selected to match the size of the solids in the drilling 
fluid and the anticipated size of cuttings. Also called 
a shaker.
The components in a blowout preventer that cut, or shear, 
through drill pipe and form a seal against well 
pressure. Shear rams are used in mobile offshore 
drilling operations to provide a quick method of moving 
the rig away from the hole when there is no time to trip 
the drill stem out of the hole.
A grooved pulley.
Wedge-shaped pieces of metal with teeth or other gripping 
elements that are used to prevent pipe from slipping down 
into the hole or to hold pipe in place. Rotary slips fit 
around the drill pipe and wedge against the master 
bushing to support the pipe. Power slips are 
pneumatically or hydraulically actuated devices that 
allow the crew to dispense with the manual handling of 
slips when making a connection. Packers and other 
downhole equipment are secured in position by slips that 
engage the pipe by action directed at the surface.
A plastic mixture of cement and water that is pumped into 
a well to harden; there it supports the casing and 
provides a seal in the well bore to prevent migration of 
underground fluids.
Natural gas containing hydrogen sulfide.
A spooling attachment on the makeup cathead to permit use 
of a spinning chain to spin up or make up drill pipe.
A Y-shaped chain used to spin up (tighten) one joint of 
drill pipe into another. In use, one end of the chain is 
attached to the tongs, another end is attached to the 
spinning cathead, and the third end is free. The free 
end is wrapped around the tool joint and the cathead 
pulls the chain off the joint, causing the joint to spin 
(turn) rapidly and tighten up. After the chain is pulled 
off the joint, the tongs are secured in the same spot, 
and continuous pull on the chain (and thus on the tongs) 
by the cathead makes the joint up to final tightness.
To begin drilling; to start the hole.
To guide the end of a pipe into a coupling or tool joint 
when making up a connection.










feet above the derrick floor. The derrickman or another 
crew member works on the board while casing is being run 
in a well. The board may be wooden or fabricated of 
steel girders floored with antiskid material and powered 
electrically to raise or lower it to the desired level.
A stabbing board serves the same purpose as a monkey
board or safety platform but is temporary instead of 
permanent.
A length of drill pipe, tubing or other pipe consisting 
of one or more joints in a continuous section that is 
stood, racked, or hung in a derrick.
A vertical pipe rising along the side of the derrick or 
mast, which joins the discharge line leading from the mud 
pump to the rotary hose and through which mud is pumped 
going into the hole.
Any process undertaken to enlarge old channels or create
new ones in the producing formation of a well.
A short, threaded piece of pipe used to adapt parts of 
the drilling string that cannot otherwise be screwed 
together because of differences in thread size or
design. A sub may also perform a special function. 
Lifting subs are used with drill collars to provide a 
shoulder to fit the drill pipe elevators. A kelly saver 
sub is placed between the drill pipe and kelly to prevent 
excessive thread wear of the kelly and drill pipe
threads. A bent sub is used when drilling a directional 
hole. Sub is a short expression for substitute.
The foundation on which the derrick or mast and usually 
the drawworks sit; contains space for storage and well 
control equipment.
A hollow, rubber-faced cylinder mounted on a hollow 
mandrel with a pin joint on the upper end to connect to
the swab line. A check valve that opens upward on the
lower end provides a way to remove the fluid from the 
well when pressure is insufficient to support flow.
Operation of a swab to bring well fluids to the surface 
when the well does not flow or require artificial lift or 
stimulation to bring oil to the surface.
A rotary tool that is hung from the rotary hook and 
traveling block to suspend and permit free rotation of 
the drill stem. It also provides a connection for the 
rotary hose and a passageway for the flow of drilling 











A utility rope or cable that is attached to unwieldy 
loads being hoisted by a crane to allow a load handler 
better control of the movement of the load.
Three sections of drill pipe removed from the hole (while 
joined) during a trip.
To flip the spinning chain up from a tool joint box so 
that the chain wraps around the tool joint pin after it 
is stabbed into the box. The stand or joint of drill 
pipe is turned or spun by a pull on the spinning chain 
from the cathead on the drawworks.
The large wrenches used for turning when making up or 
breaking out drill pipe, casing, tubing, or other pipe; 
variously called casing tongs, rotary tongs, and so forth 
according to the specific use. Power tongs are 
pneumatically or hydraulically operated tools that serve 
to spin the pipe up and, in some instances, to apply the 
final makeup torque.
A heavy coupling element for drill pipe made of special 
alloy steel. Tool joints have coarse, tapered threads 
and seating shoulders designed to sustain the weight of 
the drill stem, withstand the strain of frequent coupling 
and uncoupling, and provide a leakproof seal. The male 
section of the joint, or the pin, is attached to one end 
of a length of drill pipe, and the female section, or 
box, is attached to the other end. The tool joint may be 
welded to the end of the pipe or screwed on, or both. A 
hard metal facing is often applied in a band around the 
outside of the tool joint to enable it to resist abrasion 
from the walls of the bore hole.
A employee of a drilling contractor who is in charge of 
the entire drilling crew and the drilling rig. Also 
called a drilling crew foreman, manager, supervisor, or 
rig superintendent.
The turning force that is applied to a shaft or other 
rotary mechanism to cause it to rotate or tend to do so. 
Torque is measured in foot-pounds, joules, 
meter-kilograms, and so forth.
The gear or chain arrangement by which power is 
transmitted from the prime mover to the drawworks, mud 
pump, or rotary table of a drilling rig.
An arrangement of pulleys, or sheaves, through which 











An opening in a side of a derrick at the floor level 
having the form of an inverted "V." This opening is 
opposite the drawworks. It is used as an entry to bring 
in drill pipe and casing from the pipe rack.
A bore hole; the hole drilled by the bit. A well bore 
may have casing in it or may be open (i.e., uncased), or 
a portion of it may be cased and a portion of it may be 
open. Also called bore hole or hole.
The activities and methods necessary to prepare a well 
for the production of oil and gas; the method by which a 
flow line for hydrocarbons is established between the 
reservoir and the surface. The method of well completion 
used by the operator depends on the individual 
characteristics of the producing formation or 
formations. These techniques include the following types 
of completions: open-hole, sand exclusion, tubingless,
multiple, and miniaturized.
The equipment installed at the surface of the well bore. 
A well head includes such equipment as the casing head 
and tubing head.
A long, steel casing that uses an inclined plane to cause 
the bit to deflect from the original borehole at a slight 
angle.
A well drilled in an area where no oil or gas production 
exists. With present-day exploration methods and equip­
ment, about one wildcat out of every nine proves to be 
productive although not necessarily profitable. Also, to 
drill wildcat wells.
A cable composed of steel wires twisted around a central 
core of hemp or other fiber to create a rope of great 
strength and considerable flexibility. Wire rope is used 
as drilling line (in rotary and cable-tool rigs), coring
line, servicing line, winch line, and so on.
To perform one or more of a variety of remedial
operations on a producing oil well with hope of restoring 
or increasing production. Examples of workover 
operations are deepening, plugging back, pulling and
resetting the liner, squeeze cementing, shooting, and 
acidizing.
From: References [1, 73, 91].
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